

The Security Times

SPECIAL EDITION OF THE GERMAN TIMES FOR THE 54TH MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE

February 2018

Munich, Germany

FILLING THE

44 pages on the new world order*

VOID



*or lack thereof

IN THIS ISSUE

NAVIGATING TRUMP

The US president and his "America First" foreign policy are setting the world on edge. Charles Kupchan, Thierry De Montbrial and Metin Hakverdi decipher the rules of engagement for Trump world. **Pages 4-5**

MIDDLE EAST PIECES

The political geometry of the Middle East has been redrawn in the last year. Turkey now seeks to destroy Kurdish self-governance in Syria. Analysis by Volker Perthes, Can Dündar and Michael Martens. **Pages 17-19**

RUSSIAN EVOLUTION

Putin is widening his footprint across the globe. Katja Gloger charts Russia's path to superpowerdom, but Dmitri Trenin wonders if the Russian threat is overblown. Reinhard Veser and Stephanie Liechtenstein tend to agree on whether Minsk is working in Ukraine. It isn't. **Pages 25-28**

CHINA PERSEVERES

Beijing's long-term strategy is to become the world's number one power. Fu Ying and Theo Sommer debate if the world is becoming more Western or more Chinese. Kishore Mahbubani explains how and why Trump is helping the Chinese achieve their goal. Complete Asia coverage: **Pages 29-35**

BOT AND SOLD

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems have a bad reputation. Many opponents want to ban killer robots. Ronald Arkin explains why he disagrees. Kim Min-seok details how the South Korean military is finally embracing drones. And Stuart Russell calls for a treaty before a bots race gets out of hand. **Pages 40-41**

IMPRINT

Publisher
Detlef W. Prinz

Executive Editor
Theo Sommer

Editors
Peter H. Koepf
Lutz Lichtenberger
Jonathan Lutes

Senior Art Director
Paul M. Kern

Layout
Gordon Martin, Johanna Trapp

Advertising
Janine Kulbrok

Times Media GmbH
Tempelhofer Ufer 23-24
10963 Berlin, Germany
www.times-media.de
info@times-media.de
Phone +49 30-2150-5400
ISSN 2191-6462
Press deadline: Feb. 9, 2018

Power boost

The EU must win the conflicts of the future

BY SIGMAR GABRIEL

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Europe has rarely been associated with power. Complaints about Europe's weakness are the rule, especially among those Europeans who too often favor depressive self-reflection over strategic observation, Germany included. Only one hundred years ago, just before World War I, European powers were at their imperial peak – and the US was beginning its rise. Many countries that are now our equal partners were, at that time, targets of European might. More than a century later, a very different Europe must still find its place in a rapidly changing world. If Europe wants to remain a major pole in the evolving world order, it needs power.

First of all, we should not underestimate the power we have; Europe is a powerful magnet in the eyes of the millions of refugees and migrants who choose Europe as their destiny. Its soft power may frighten some leaders in the EU neighborhood when their own people wave blue flags with twelve golden stars in public squares. Europe is sometimes a safe haven for journalists, politicians and citizens, when they appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.

The European Union also exerts economic hard power when the European Commission, representing more than 510 million people in a common market with a GDP of \$17 trillion, takes a tough stance in negotiations on trade agreements. Moreover, Europe matters when the European Union, aligned with other European partners, imposes economic sanctions in reaction to the illegal annexation of Crimea or against the regime in North Korea. Finally, the EU and its member states are also a humanitarian power. They are the biggest donors of humanitarian aid and development assistance, and major financial contributors when it comes to mitigating climate change and funding adaptation projects to support developing countries.

Europe in this sense is a pole of its own in a multipolar world – with real but limited power projection capabilities. Yet it is not equidistant from the other poles. It is by far closest to the United States as the source and defender of the liberal world order – even when the United States seems to disassociate itself from that role. Common history

and values – as well as the role the US played in Europe in two World Wars, during the Cold War and in the 1990s – have formed robust bonds. NATO is the most successful alliance in history, and remains strong to this very day. Germany is committed to doing its part in our common efforts, in the Baltics, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in NATO's headquarters and command chain. Germany has always acknowledged that the aim of combining European soft and hard power to create real "smart power" has an important military component.

How do we make Europe militarily strong and efficient? How can Europe gain a significant capability for military power projection that will enable us to uphold the rules and norms of the UN Charter? First, we all know that nothing comes from nothing; a sound and strong economy is the basis for any investment. In democracies, having a growing economy is the best way to avoid budgetary battles in which the armed

HOW DO WE MAKE EUROPE MILITARILY STRONG AND EFFICIENT?

forces suffer. Therefore, supporting the economic recovery of our European allies, especially in the south, is not only a question of European solidarity; it is also in Germany's security interests. If we were to lose the support of the people of Europe for the European cause, we would only weaken Europe. This is why it is sensible to reach out to President Emmanuel Macron to discuss his ideas on the future of Europe.

At the same time we must not repeat the mistakes of the past and base our political planning on the wrong assumptions. World history provides no set path towards perpetual peace, in Immanuel Kant's sense. If Europe ever wants to be a strategic power, we must look beyond our horizons and plan for the world we do not yet know. It is therefore neither reckless nor anti-American to imagine a Europe without the United States. Anyone who has ever had a nightmare knows that the thoughts we have are not always the thoughts we wish to have. If a time traveler from 2050 were to assure us today that the US presence in Europe would endure, we would be able to relax. Yet now, in 2018, we cannot. We must strive to keep the US as close as possible,

Continued on page 12

Power outage

"America first" means America alone

BY CONSTANZE STELZENMÜLLER

In past decades – a time we may yet come to refer to wistfully as "the good old days" – America's national security elites have tended to be somewhat blasé about the National Security Strategy (NSS). In 1986, a Congress alarmed by US policy failures in Vietnam, Iran and Grenada had decreed that this document should be produced at the outset of each new administration to explain the principles and goals of the president's grand strategy.

On occasion these exercises proclaimed a genuine strategic shift that would make headlines worldwide. This was the case in 2002, when President George W. Bush issued a NSS declaring that the US might undertake preemptive strikes against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction. After appalled reactions from the international community, this never-implemented threat was retracted in the subsequent document.

Far more often they produced a stew of strategic platitudes rendered in boilerplate language, a testament to the tortuous "interagency process" by which the American federal executive explains its thinking to itself. Sometimes a paper was no sooner published than it was obviated by events. Survivors of the process were prone to intimate in a strangled whisper that they would rather be waterboarded than have to go through it all again.

Germany's "Iron Chancellor" Otto von Bismarck famously said that two things should never be exposed to public view: the making of sausage and the making of laws. Were he alive today, he would likely include the writing of national strategy papers.

Nevertheless, even the most jaded critics will admit that producing a NSS has its merits. On the domestic front, it helps remind the executive of the principle of separation and balance of powers; Congress will keep a watchful eye on the shaping of foreign and security policy by a president and his advisers, and it intends to use the strategy paper as a benchmark against which to measure their actions. Within the executive, it helps the national security adviser and his or her staff align other agencies with the administration's political preferences. For the national security staff itself, it can be a useful

tool for building consensus and exerting message discipline.

Last and probably least, it lends gravitas to signals the US government sends to the rest of the globe. Thus, back when things were "normal," the publication of a new NSS meant that analysts, journalists and diplomats the world over would heave a sigh, pour themselves some extra-strong coffee and inspect the text with a fine-toothed comb to extract any available insights into the superpower's latest strategic intentions.

But the Trump era is anything but business as usual. Never has an American president so recklessly dispensed with the formalities of international relations, or so liberally threatened allies and adversaries alike, from calling NATO "obsolete" to threatening Europe with trade wars and North Korea with nuclear obliteration.

Of course, unilateralism, skepticism of "foreign entanglements" (George Washington) and protectionism are

American traditions as old as the republic itself. Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama oversaw NATO (and EU) enlargement after the fall of the Berlin Wall, yet all made serious efforts to retrench the US military and diplomatic engagement in Europe.

One faction of Trump explainers in Washington – let's call them the "nothing to see here" faction – suggests ignoring presidential language and looking instead at events, or rather everything that has not happened; NATO is still standing, they say; and what wars has he started? They also point out – fairly – that this uniquely disruptive president is surrounded by a multitude of political appointees, civil servants and military officers, all of whom are attempting to hold the administration to standards and processes that will make it more stable and predictable.

Others have a different take: none of this is a return to normalcy. Trumpism is not the latest iteration of an American retrenchment following a period of (over-)extension. It is rather a massive and radical discontinuity. Trump is the first president to question the validity of an international order based on norms and cooperation, and the first to decry globalization as a nefarious ideology ("the false song of globalism")

Continued on page 4

SECURITY STRATEGY

Business is business, security is not

Brexit is about more than just trade; it's also about security

BY WOLFGANG ISCHINGER
AND STEFANO STEFANINI

In mid-December the European Council authorized Brexit negotiations to move from a divorce settlement to forging a new relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom. The clock is ticking. Brussels and London have barely a year left to lay the foundations for their future partnership. Failure to do so would have disastrous strategic consequences for European prosperity and security.

There are areas, such as the Single Market, that do not lend themselves to cherry picking. The new relationship across the Channel will have to be consistent with the British choice to be in or out of it. The sphere of foreign policy and defense, including homeland and cybersecurity, will need to rely on strong and continuing EU-UK cooperation irrespective of Brexit. Trade can be transactional; security is not. This is why Theresa May's speech at the Munich Security Conference this year

will be watched very closely. The prime minister is expected to make the case for a close security relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit. In response, the EU leaders should avoid making security a hostage of Brexit negotiations. Neither side stands to gain from trade-offs on security.

Indeed, there are many good reasons for remaining closely aligned: Between 25 and 30 percent of overall EU military capabilities fly the Union Jack, which is too modest for the UK to stand alone, and too much for the EU to do without. In times of shifting geopolitics, growing multiple threats and budget constraints, London should not delude itself and Brussels should not be in denial. European security will undoubtedly continue relying on NATO, with the UK's full participation, but there are and will be operations carried out by European forces alone, for instance in Africa or in the Mediterranean. London is hinting at supporting a credible European defense structure and capabilities, as long as they do not amount to a "vanity fair." In exchange we believe the UK should

get a comprehensive and generous offer from the EU to be associated with it, including access to the European Defense Fund and to the EU Defense Industrial Development Program.

Confronted with sharper international competition and rising protectionist winds, London and Brussels must get the trade negotiations right, stay clear of "who's winning" narratives and give themselves a generous transition period to minimize the inevitable bumps in the road.

On foreign policy and defense there is a strong rationale to keep a place for the British at the European table. London will certainly welcome it. It is up to the EU to think outside the box, come up with innovative solutions and address the concerns of those who fear that a decision-making role for the UK may compromise the independence of EU decision making. While diplomats must come up with a mechanism for coordination between London and the EU, the solution need not be a new institutional framework. What matters is to make it work; the EU has everything to gain and nothing to lose from

continuing constructive engagement and cooperation with the UK, a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The remaining differences must be solved lest Europe as a whole be weakened – especially at a time when the EU faces unprecedented challenges in international affairs. Europe must address a resurgent Russian military posture to the East, instability and asymmetric threats in the Mediterranean, economic competition from China and other emerging powers, as well as immigration pressures stemming from demography and climate change in Africa and elsewhere. There is serious concern over the resilience of arms control treaties – including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) – that have been the backbone of European security and stability. In less than one year, the new US administration has made three major decisions that are clearly at odds with European mainstream foreign policy: withdrawing from the Paris climate accord, decertifying the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and moving the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. On all of these issues, London and the EU have found themselves squarely

on the same side. The EU would benefit from enduring reinforcement from British diplomatic expertise.

In the current state of world disorder and European insecurity, the UK and the EU need each other more now than in the past. Brexit must not be allowed to create a security cleft across the Channel. On either side, Europeans will have common foreign policy interests and face identical security challenges – better to work together as closely as possible.



WOLFGANG ISCHINGER is chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Professor for International Security and Diplomatic Practice at the Hertie School of Governance.

STEFANO STEFANINI is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security and a former diplomatic adviser to Italian President Giorgio Napolitano.

on the same side. The EU would benefit from enduring reinforcement from British diplomatic expertise.

In the current state of world disorder and European insecurity, the UK and the EU need each other more now than in the past. Brexit must not be allowed to create a security cleft across the Channel. On either side, Europeans will have common foreign policy interests and face identical security challenges – better to work together as closely as possible.

Germany: Good for the UN

In summer 2018, the 72nd General Assembly of the United Nations in New York will decide on Germany's application for a seat on the Security Council in 2019 and 2020. Germany's application for one of the non-permanent seats was announced in June 2016 by then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.

As a German citizen, I like the idea that the Federal Republic has applied for one of the seats soon to be vacated; as the publisher of this newspaper, I would like to take this opportunity to give reasons why Germany would be a good choice for membership of the Security Council.

In the nearly 70 years since it was founded on May 23, 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany has become Europe's largest economy, providing its now 82.5 million inhabitants with a life of freedom, peace, unity, security as well as material and cultural prosperity. For the stability of these five pillars of a successful life, the people in this country can thank two things: their own effort and the goodwill of their neighbors and friends.

We, the citizens and their government, are willing and able to repay this goodwill to other countries that could benefit from our positive experience as they continue working to erect those five pillars and to enable their citizens to live successfully.



Detlef Prinz, Publisher

Freedom: All is nothing without it. Peace: All is in doubt without it. Unity: There is no peaceful coexistence without it. Security: There is no peace without it. Prosperity: There is no dignity without it. But how does it all work? Tackle each goal separately, and then all of them as a whole? In facing this conundrum, Germany can apply and share its nearly 70 years of knowledge and experience.

Our country's membership of the United Nations Security Council would be a smart choice. It is precisely in unsettled times like these – and certainly in the next two years to come – that Germany would be perfectly suited to the UN Security Council.

How to win friends ...

... and influence peaceful resolutions: Strengthening NATO's transatlantic bond

BY JENS STOLTENBERG

For almost seven decades, NATO has helped keep the peace in Europe. This zone of stability has not only benefited NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic, but the broader Euro-Atlantic community and our neighbors as well.

Our Alliance has been successful because we have continued to adapt to the ever-evolving security challenges we face. Since 2014, the security landscape in Europe has changed dramatically, from Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea to the turmoil and violence across North Africa and the Middle East. Terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to the safety and security of our citizens. This is true even though most of the territory controlled by the Islamic State has been liberated. We know that the fight against terrorism is not over.

We also know that cyber warfare presents a major challenge, potentially enabling adversaries to steal our information, disrupt our democracies and attack the infrastructure critical for our societies, including banking systems, health systems, power grids and air traffic control.

Allies have responded to these new and emerging threats with strength and speed. Over the past four years, NATO has implemented the biggest increase in our collective defense capabilities in a generation. We have transformed our ability to respond to a crisis, whether it is on land, at sea, in the air or from cyberspace. Our forces have increased their ability to move quickly where they are needed. And we have deployed multinational troops and equipment in the east of our Alliance to deter aggression.

All of the steps we have taken have been strictly defensive, proportionate

and in line with our international commitments. Our aim is the same as it has always been: To prevent a conflict, not to provoke one. We do not want a new Cold War. Nor do we want a new arms race.

That is why we have pursued a dual-track approach towards Russia, combining strong defense and deterrence with meaningful dialogue. Over the past two years, the NATO-Russia Council has met six times. These discussions are not always easy, but it is precisely because they are difficult that we need to have them. I believe it is critically important to keep channels of communication open, to increase transparency and to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations from spiraling out of control.

As we continue our adaptation to a more dangerous security environment, our summit in Brussels this July will be an important milestone. NATO leaders will make decisions about the next steps for our Alliance in five interrelated areas:

- Further strengthening our deterrence and defense;
- Stepping up efforts to project stability in our neighborhood, including the fight against terrorism;
- Making the partnership between NATO and the EU even stronger;
- Continuing to modernize our Alliance, including plans to update our military command structure; and
- Ensuring fairer burden sharing across the Alliance.

A critical factor in addressing all of these challenges is our commitment to spend more and better on defense. Increasing defense-related resources and capabilities will enable our Alliance to continue to adapt as the world changes in the years ahead.

This has been one of my top priorities since becoming secretary general in 2014. At our Wales Summit that year,

Allies agreed to stop the cuts, gradually increase defense spending and move toward spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense by 2024. Last year marked the third consecutive year of accelerating defense spending. In 2017, we estimate a real defense spending increase of 4.3 percent in Europe and Canada. This translates into an additional \$46 billion in spending compared to the past three years.

We are moving in the right direction, but we still have much more work to do. This February, Allies will report on their specific defense investment plans covering three main areas: cash, capabilities and contributions. These national blueprints will spell out how Allies plan to meet their commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense; how they are investing in key military capabilities; and how they are contributing to NATO missions and operations.

Having adequate resources devoted to strengthening our defense and security will enable the Alliance to do even more to counter terrorism and protect the safety of our people. We will be able to do even more to help our neighbors build more resilient institutions and fight corruption. We will be able to do even more to deter aggression and preserve the peace. We will be able to do even more to strengthen our partnership with the European Union.

NATO and the EU are natural partners, with more than 90 percent of EU citizens living in a NATO country. Over the past 18 months, NATO and the EU have made unprecedented progress on a wide range of cooperative measures, including cyber, exercises, terrorism and military mobility. More defense-related resources will help us make even more progress.

With European Allies and Canada moving toward spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, our all-important

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, right, welcomes the Special Envoy for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Angelina Jolie at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Wednesday, Jan. 31, 2018.


transatlantic bond – which has underpinned the security of North America and Europe over the past seven decades – will be further reinforced. Europeans are grateful that the United States has significantly increased its presence in Europe, with more equipment, more exercises and more troops. The United States has more than 60,000 service members in Europe. And Europe relies on the United States for its ballistic missile defense.

European Allies and Canada have been stepping up. We are moving in the right direction. I expect all Allies to continue this forward momentum. Doing so will bolster our transatlantic bond even more by showing American leaders and taxpayers that Europeans are doing their fair share.

As NATO Allies prepare for our Brussels Summit in July, and as we continue to adapt to changing security challenges, we can draw strength and inspiration from knowing that we have overcome stern challenges throughout our history. After all, NATO helped to end the Cold War without firing a shot. That demonstrates the value of a strong deterrence and defense. I am confident that a cohesive transatlantic community, united by our shared values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, will continue to safeguard our nearly one billion citizens in Europe and North America for many decades to come.

JENS STOLTENBERG is secretary general of NATO.

SECURITY STRATEGY



RUMORS OF REAL WAR

Russia and the US must agree on shared rules, set up common control centers and develop a system of cyber control

BY MICHAEL STÜRMER

The Cold War was by and large better than its reputation, especially in hindsight. It imposed, as never before, a kind of long nuclear peace upon the global powers and forced minor players to conform. French philosopher Raymond Aron described what he saw in telegram-style: "Guerre improbable, paix impossible."

But the Cold War is over, for better or for worse, and a repeat performance does not seem near on the horizon. What this means for the United States will be decided to a large degree in Washington. What it will mean for Europe in general, and Germany in particular, is an open question. As far as the US is concerned, leadership has all but disappeared and been reduced to a catch-all phrase – "America first" – by Trumpists and a new nationalism.

The new US National Security Strategy sounds reassuring. But will it serve its purpose? For the time being, no firm ground is in sight, not for NATO, not for the EU and, by implication, not for the Federal Republic of Germany. "The time is out of joint" – Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, is often quoted these days, even in the most unlikely places. If taken seriously, this means that nothing less than a new security architecture is in order. In the face of an unreconciled Russia, NATO must be redesigned with a much more coherent European contribution, and Europe reinvented accordingly, Brexit or no Brexit, Trump or no Trump. The mantle of leadership is there to be seized – but there are few takers willing and able to act while the world is in such turmoil. The Federal Republic of Germany? A reluctant leader at best, a wholly ineffective one at worst.

MICHAEL STÜRMER is an historian and journalist. He has been chief correspondent for the German daily newspaper *Die Welt* since 1998.

When the US refuses to carry the burden of the world, like Atlas in Greek mythology, leaving old friends to their own

devices; when deterrence no longer rests on a credible strategy and new military and civilian technologies change every equation; when a US president daydreams about the use of nuclear weapons while discounting arms control and backchannel diplomacy; when the last of the superpowers renounces the liberal world order it more or less called into being after World War II – as these realities have combined to create the new normal, we find ourselves in a newly perilous world.

If the time is indeed visibly "out of joint"; if cyber warfare has no beginning and no end, so that terms like "offensive" and "defensive" lose their meaning and are replaced by a menacing factor of strategic ambiguity – in short, if the world refuses predictability while the strangely familiar logic of MAD becomes imponderable, what is there to do? Deny reality and close your eyes or panic and prepare for surrender? We are living in ever more interesting times, where everything depends on our ability to reconstruct trust and predictability and to put a new correlation of forces, unstable as it may be, into treaty language and verification practice. The world after the Cold War will survive together or perish separately.

It is time for an agonizing reappraisal of NATO and the idea of international order that it represents, including its limitations and its achievements. And it is simultaneously time for a new Russia policy, one that avoids the somewhat dated concept of a distinctively German Ostpolitik. As Henry Kissinger tends to remind us, the demonization of the man in the Kremlin does not suffice as a long-term answer to the dangers of our era.

In this effort, Germany is not the lonely but inevitable mediator and moderator – this is better

left to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. But Germany has an existential interest in taming the new military technologies before they fall into the hands of inexperienced actors and light the world ablaze.

This time around, however, an exclusively nuclear approach will not be enough, nor will a bipolar approach suffice, given the Middle Kingdom's inexo-

THE WORLD AFTER THE COLD WAR WILL SURVIVE TOGETHER OR PERISH SEPERATELY

measure of disarmament ushered in an era of détente. Today they offer ever less mutual trust and strategic equilibrium without which a reasonable measure of peace is not feasible. When the microphones are off, seasoned diplomats from both Russia and the US can be heard enunciating the pessimistic view that since Berlin and Cuba more than fifty years ago, the

world has never been so close to war – real war – as it is today. The foremost challenge is to find a way out of the confrontation over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. All that has happened since early 2014 – the annexation of the strategic peninsula, hybrid warfare, half-hearted sanctions by both sides and US threats to supply defensive weaponry to the front – has not reversed Ukraine's territorial losses while it has cost Russia space for political maneuvering, economic comfort and West-facilitated modernization. The Kremlin can ill afford this kind of posturing between half-war and half-peace. The longer critical oil prices remain where they have been for quite some time, the more Moscow stands to lose.

Given the rise in uncertainty, the question remains: Is it sensible to turn the Crimea Question into the shibboleth of East-West relations? Who stands to win in the end? Not Russia, not the US, not the West as a whole, but

China. So what is wrong with circumventing the Ukrainian roadblock on the way to a safer world? The Cold War was also an exercise in strategic patience.

The White House assumption that economic sanctions will produce political regret has not seemed to work. "It's the economy, stupid" is an American slogan, but not a means to force Mother Russia's clumsy hand. Who will blink first? What has happened so far is unlikely to bring peace.

Putin's promise to protect Russians wherever they can be found is more than ominous. "A question of war and peace," he keeps repeating to himself. But even if a new steady state can be achieved within the Russian space, it will not be enough to recover trust and confidence on the world stage. We need CSBMs: confidence- and security-building measures. Reinvigorating OSCE and its rulebook could do the trick.

But even more important is the future of missile defense. When President George W. Bush cancelled US participation in the ABM system, he put paid to a well-balanced regime that had proved its worth. It is essential – and in the interest of both sides – to once again agree on shared rules, set up common control centers and develop a system of cyber control. Cold War management of the nuclear standoff through limitation and verification is not an unfeasible solution for dealing with new and largely untested technologies. What is required is Russian self-restraint, a broad-based Western Ostpolitik, a thorough understanding of the relevant history and geopolitics as well as an appreciation of the new technologies and their disruptive potential. In other words, we need a combination of statecraft and bold diplomacy. Biding our time to see what comes next is the worst of all options: a leap into the dark with open eyes.

Kleist Award to US Senator John S. McCain

The recipient of this year's Ewald von Kleist Award is US Senator John S. McCain; the laudatory speech will be given by former US Vice President Joe Biden. Presented by the Munich Security Conference, the award honors "eminent personalities with an outstanding record in contributing to international peace and conflict resolution." McCain is undoubtedly such a personality, said the MSC Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger, adding: "He is a long-time backer of the conference."

McCain has been a fixture at the MSC for four decades; in 2017, shortly after Donald Trump's inauguration, he delivered a memorable speech. "What would von Kleist's generation say if they saw our world today?" he asked. "They would be alarmed by an increasing turn away from universal values and toward old ties of blood, and race, and sectarianism." They would be alarmed by our "flirting with authoritarianism and romanticizing it as our moral equivalent." Most of all they would be concerned "that many of our peoples, including in my own country, are giving up on the West," because they consider it a "bad deal." "I know there is profound concern across Europe and the world that America is laying down the mantle of global leadership," he said. "Make no mistake, my friends: These are dangerous times, but you should not count America out, and we should not count each other out."



Avid reader of *The Security Times*: John McCain

The award's namesake, Ewald von Kleist (1922–2013), a co-conspirator in the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler, was founder of the MSC, held for the first time in 1963. Previous recipients of the prize, include Henry Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

SECURITY STRATEGY

Continued from page 1
Power outage

rather than an economic and political fact. Furthermore, his more mainstream advisers have not managed to “normalize” the administration; at best, they have achieved less bad outcomes, such as kicking the responsibility of reviewing the Iran nuclear deal over to Congress rather than just tearing it up.

Under these circumstances, the publication of the Trump administration’s first National Security Strategy in late December of 2017 was met with significantly more than the customary tepid specialist interest. But the document does not resolve the tension between the normalizers and the radicals – indeed, it enshrines it.

On the one hand, the NSS makes dozens of references to partners and allies. It also makes a point of restating the president’s late and reluctant re-commitment to the mutual defense clause in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. On the other hand, it emphatically reinforces the dictate delivered in a now-notorious op-ed written in May by National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn, president of the National Economic Council: the fundamental paradigm of American power in the age of Trump is one of zero-sum competition rather than cooperation. And the rationale made by the NSS for US support of its allies in Europe and elsewhere is self-interested in the narrowest possible terms: America’s “allies and partners magnify US power and extend US influence.”

The NSS also insists, rather remarkably, that the institutions of domestic democracy must be made resilient to political interference from abroad. This new emphasis on challenges to US dominance by other great powers – specifically, Russia and China – was amplified shortly after publication of the NSS by the new National Defense Strategy and its motto of “compete, deter, and win.” Written at the Pentagon under the aegis of Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, this document is notable for its embrace of allies and partners, which it describes as “crucial” to American strategy. Given the increasingly aggressive global assertiveness of both Russia and China, this re-focusing of US strategy makes sense, and Europeans can and should engage with it.

If only the commander in chief agreed. President Trump has made it clear – in his speeches on the launch of the NSS, his Davos speech and his State of the Union address – that he does not share the strategic framework advocated by his advisors. Trump continues to argue for cooperation with Putin’s Russia, and sees China chiefly as a trade adversary; the top three threats he obsesses over are immigrants, terrorists and North Korea. He remains disdainful of the notion that has underpinned US strategy since World War II: American stewardship of a liberal international order is in the American interest.

Even more importantly, Trump appears to believe that the US should be able to use nuclear weapons, would win a trade war against China and could emerge victorious from a preventive “bloody nose” strike against North Korea. Should any of these come to pass, the world would become a different place. But even if they are avoided, the president’s inability or unwillingness to tone down his rhetoric, his overt disagreements with his advisors or his contempt for allies will lead America’s friends to hedge their bets. As for America’s adversaries, they will feel encouraged to fill the vacuum the superpower leaves behind. ■

CONSTANCE STELZENMÜLLER is the inaugural Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.



Keeping Washington tethered to the international community during the president’s tenure will make it easier to repair the wreckage he leaves behind

BY CHARLES A. KUPCHAN

One down, three to go. And judging by Trump’s first year in office, the next three should be long and painful. As the US backs away from its traditional role as team captain, its “America First” foreign policy is setting the world on edge. Trump has already pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Agreement. Next on his chopping block may well be the Iran nuclear deal and US participation in NAFTA and the World Trade Organization.

America’s deliberate undermining of the rules-based international order it worked so hard to establish after World War II has left America’s partners understandably vexed, and wondering when it is time to give up on Trump. But even if justified, their approach is ill-advised.

Instead of turning their backs on Trump in anger and frustration, friends of the US should engage the president with hopes of curbing his destructive instincts. Trump will do more damage if he feels isolated, rejected and cut loose, while holding him close provides at least some leverage over his behavior and may impress upon him that partnership has its advantages. Moreover, the Trump presidency will not last forever. Trying to keep Washington tethered to the international community during his tenure will make it easier to repair the wreckage he leaves behind.

Learning to live with the Trump presidency means accepting the harsh reality that what you see is what you get. Indeed, his presidency is likely to get worse, not better, in the months ahead. The adults in the room – John Kelly, Rex Tillerson, H.R. McMaster, James Mattis – are unable to tame Trump, and some of them may well jump ship in the near future, eliminating whatever moderating influence they may exercise. Trump is also likely to ramp up his hard-edged populism as the mid-term elections draw near. With the Democrats poised to do well in November, Trump will seek to rally his base by doubling down on his nationalist and populist agenda.

Having alienated the more centrist voters who helped him win the presidency, Trump is retreating to his faithful base, which at least for now has commanded the Republican Party. The Republican establishment is running for cover in the face of a mobilized and angry base. Whether he likes it or not, Trump is beholden to an ascendant insurgency of

populist nationalists; he has already lost much of the rest of the country.

Trump has gravitated to the far right by inclination as much as by necessity. Even as Steve Bannon, Sebastian Gorka and other fervent ideologues have been banished from the White House, Trump’s racially tinged brand of nationalism has continued, if not deepened. His equivocation over neo-Nazi protesters in Charlottesville, his insults toward Hispanic immigrants, his decision to send back Haitians, Salvadorans and others who came to the United States to escape conflict and natural disaster, his disparaging comments about Africa – this is the real Donald Trump, not a political concoction of his handlers.

Confronted with this sobering reality, how should the international community handle the remainder of Trump’s tumultuous presidency?

TO WALK AWAY FROM TRUMP IS TO ENCOURAGE HIS WORST INSTINCTS

First, America’s partners should continue to try to connect with Trump, seeking to exercise whatever influence they may have over his behavior. Trump craves respect and acceptance; shunning and isolating him will only make matters worse. Moreover, engagement indeed has the potential to yield concrete payoffs. Even when Trump appears ready to start dismantling policies he does not like, he tends to offer an escape hatch.

Rather than simply dismantling the Iran deal, he handed it over to Congress to address his concerns. He announced the end of the program allowing Dreamers (residents who entered or remained in the country illegally as minors) to stay in the US, but then opened a dialogue with Democrats about preserving it. He declared he was rescinding health care subsidies needed to fund Obamacare, but soon thereafter entertained a bipartisan proposal to salvage the funding. Even though Trump has announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris climate agreement, the US cannot formally exit the accord until 2020, leaving room to maneuver.

It is difficult to know whether Trump’s stop-and-go style is a sign of genetic inconstancy or part of a shrewd negotiating strategy. But it does mean that the door is open to negotiation, and concerned parties should walk through that door. In the end, Trump may or may not uphold the Iran deal, allow Dreamers to stay in the US, preserve the health insurance of Americans in need or return to the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, it is certainly worth trying to bring him around. To walk away from Trump is to encourage his worst instincts.

Second, engaging Trump does not mean bending to his wishes; it means attempting to bring him around to sensible positions, and standing one’s ground when that effort fails. On the Iran nuclear deal, America’s partners must staunchly defend the pact, come what may; it is the only game in town. How-

change and trade. But in the meantime, the rest of the world is right to stand by the Paris climate agreement, even though Trump has renounced it. The same goes for the Trans-Pacific Partnership; its remaining members are doing the right thing by proceeding with a trade deal despite Trump’s withdrawal from the pact. If Trump seeks to back away from the World Trade Organization, it will be up to other members to defend a rules-based trading order.

While engaging Trump, America’s partners, and Europe in particular, must prevent him from dismantling the liberal norms and rules-based institutions that have long anchored the West. Europe should make sure that the next US president does not assume office in a Western world that has been reduced to rubble.

Third, America’s friends must prevent popular opposition to Trump from transforming into anti-American sentiment. Even if anger toward Trump may be understandable, and even if politicians are tempted to cater to it, doing so risks setting democratic societies against the US. If leaders around the world are to remain committed to working with Trump whenever possible – as well as reaching out to the US bureaucracy, Congress, and state and local officials, all of which may be better partners than the White House – they must ensure that their own electorates have not come to write off the US.

Otherwise, any hope of sustaining a sense of solidarity and community among the Atlantic democracies will prove illusory. Otherwise, the US president following Trump may preside over a country that has turned sharply inward and lost its internationalist calling.

The United States, long the anchor of republican ideals and multilateralism, is backing away from both under Trump’s leadership. This turn in US politics is part of a broader surge in illiberalism and populist nationalism playing out in many quarters of the globe.

To help ensure that we are witnessing only a temporary setback – not a permanent reversal – in the fortunes of liberal politics, America’s partners should keep reaching out to Trump and resist the temptation to distance themselves from the US. Engaging Trump will limit the damage he can do, and make it more likely that the Trump era represents a dark detour for Americans – and not the new normal. ■

CHARLES A. KUPCHAN is professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served on the US National Security Council from 2014 to 2017. This article draws on an essay originally published in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Foreign Policy*.

SECURITY STRATEGY

American primacy

BY THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL

There are two main reasons the United States will maintain its primacy on the world stage. The first is that, in a world of weak or broken identities, theirs remains strong, despite racial tensions and the growth of social inequality. The US is a land of immigrants, who swept the plate clean – almost – of its indigenous populations. From the outset, Americans have been bound together by a sacred text, the US Constitution, which has survived more than two centuries of adventures and crises.

The most recent crisis is Trump’s electoral college victory following a campaign marked by a populism that broadly rejected all traditional political elites. But the new president also represents the American Dream. His slogan “Make America Great Again” and his desire to serve the national interest according to right-wing gospel are not wholly out of tune with much of the US populace, despite the anger and disgust of a majority of voters.

The political and media elites, and much of the population as a whole, have maintained an unshakeable faith in the country’s institutions. Any president that fails to respect them would be voted out of office.

That issue has many ramifications. For example, regardless of the 45th president’s intent to stop Mexicans from illegally crossing the border, the US will remain a land of immigration, yet one comprising a rigorous framework premised on the immigrants’ commitment to obey American law as it flows from the Constitution.

This is something altogether different from, for example, French-style ideological liberalism, which prioritizes unconditional “diversity.” The Constitution’s role as the cornerstone of American identity cannot be overemphasized. Only if an active minority were to one day transgress it, would there be reason to embrace serious concern for the country’s identity and future. That day has not yet come.

The second reason for the primacy of the United States is its effective “grand strategy” of means based on a simple idea: in all circumstances, the US armed forces must be larger than any imaginable foreign coalition, regardless of any current constellation of allies and adversaries. The arms industry and, more generally, the high-tech activities it encompasses are top priority.


And there’s more. Considerably well protected by its geography, the US has always aimed for energy independence and increasingly overt dominance in terms of information control. Technology has allowed the US to achieve both goals. The only possible challenger in the foreseeable future is China, which is striving to catch up.

The acronym GAFAM provides an apt summation of the situation: search engines (Google), mobility (Apple), social media (Facebook) and e-commerce (Amazon), not to mention Microsoft. The singular combination of an unparalleled entrepreneurial culture with the active support of the government has enabled the US, and in particular California, to become the undisputed champion of big data, the internet and innovation.

No country, not even China, can hope to overtake it anytime soon. The US has the whole world under surveillance and, militarily, can strike any target on the globe while bearing next to no risk – except in the extreme event of war with other nuclear powers.

America dominates the digital world, which is still embryonic but growing at a brisk pace. Its dominance in this realm is such that it can afford to make mistakes that the rest of the world cannot. While it is not immune to cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns (whether or not they can be categorized as post-truth) or other attempts at destabilization, the US is currently better prepared to overcome such setbacks than any other country in the world.

And yet, the United States is in no position to govern the world. Firstly, this would not be compatible with its ideology, and even if it were, the country has frequently changed course throughout its history. Protecting its territory and national identity; furthering its economic interests from a position of strength; making and unmaking alliances accordingly; reserving the sovereign right to strike abroad without fearing a counterstrike; and fostering the spread of its values to boost its soft power are the implicit, unchanging foundations of its foreign policy. Not only is it less volatile in the long term than it may seem to be in the short or medium term, it also always reflects a unique, pragmatic combination where interests and values dovetail. ■



BY METIN HAKVERDI

“As far as the world economy is concerned, it is interlinked,” deadpanned the famous German satirist Kurt Tucholsky in the early 1930s. Although uttered in the Weimar Republic, the remark applies today as much as ever. Indeed, while some observers see President Donald Trump’s words at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos – “America first does not mean America alone” – as a gesture of conciliation, this would be an incorrect reading. American economic policy will be part of a new global public policy that has a tangible impact on Germany as well. After Davos, there can be no doubt about this.

And yet, as unpleasant and protectionist as Trump’s “America first” slogan may sound, it is nothing we haven’t heard before. While his term – or terms – in office will be sure to drag on, his administration will not usher in the “demise of the West.” Although Trump is indeed fostering a sense of alienation among trans-Atlantic partners, he is far from legitimizing the reasons for doing so.

The debate launched by the recent “In Spite of It All, America” manifesto examining the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship is on the right path, but it is too monothematic in parts. Although my intention is by no means to question or deny the importance of foreign and security policy, an approach that reduces the debate to this topic alone gets me thinking. After all, this approach neglects the fact that globalization, automation and digitization have long since caused domestic and foreign policy to move closer together while blurring the lines distinguishing one policy field from the other.

Unlike any president before him, Trump has been able to convince people who were not profiting from our new world order that he understood their woes. In fact, these were the very people who put him in office. Indeed, the 2016 election has been referred to as the “can you hear me now?” elec-

tion. Today, these “losers of modernization” are exerting their influence on the future of the Western world order. That being said, we cannot forget that this development is not entirely new; and it’s not just taking place in the US.

Has the trans-Atlantic relationship been shattered by the efforts of one person? Certainly not. At this point, our approach should be to take advantage of Trump’s political egoism, his contempt for national and international institutions, his rejection of multilateralism and his utter disdain for the idea of a united Europe as an opportunity to revitalize and redefine the trans-Atlantic relationship. Indeed, it is up to us to do our homework now so we can enjoy the fruits of our labor while Trump is still president and, more importantly, when he is no longer in office.

The US and Germany share a common horizon of experience that began – however inauspiciously – during World War II. With this in mind, it is important to note that one reason for today’s rising alienation is a generational shift in the political sphere, one that has nothing to do with the current US administration. Over the past several years, a number of political figures whose yearning for the West had been fed by the direct experience of WWII and the post-war years have retired from politics. As more and more eyewitnesses of that era – those with vivid recollections of the liberation of Germany – fade into the background, the more difficult it becomes for the younger generation to bridge this emotional gap.

This is why we need new narratives that can revitalize our trans-Atlantic relationship. These stories can no longer revolve around military liberation; instead, they must focus on what makes liberal democracies such as the US and Germany so successful.

METIN HAKVERDI (SPD) is a member of the German-American Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag. He is also a member of the Atlantik-Brücke.

This involves shared liberal democratic values, equality before the law and an open, tolerant society. In fact, in order to be a part of this community, our countries need not even share interests – which, indeed, they often do not.

First of all, it would suffice to have open and fair elections. Indeed, for all of us who doubt the strength of democracy under Trump, we need only look at the latest elections for governor in New Jersey and Virginia as well as the Senate special election in Alabama. The results show that the liberal tradition not only alive, but vibrant – and that we would behoove us to put aside our typical German pessimism in this case. The confident and professional media so despised by Trump is serving its purpose by fulfilling its journalistic mandate. In other words, there will be a time after Trump – and we should be prepared for it.

What can we do in the meantime to revitalize and redefine the trans-Atlantic relationship? While Trump is in office, it is urgent and necessary to identify and reach out to the president’s antagonists, especially those working in the complicated US system of checks and balances. These include elected members of Congress, scientists, academics, local politicians and all those who see multilateralism as self-evident and desirable. For example, in the realm of climate protection, California is currently showing that it is possible for reasonable environmental policies to succeed even without adherence to the Paris Climate Agreement.

In fact, there are plenty of areas in which we can work now to refine our shared values. For example, it is urgent that we explore the impact of digitization on the economy and the workplace in both our countries. Our response to the challenges of the fourth industrial revolution will have to reflect our liberal tradition and thus be differ greatly from the solutions offered by authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China. But how exactly can this work in a globalized market?

In our era of growing populism within liberal democracies, the “future of work” is perhaps the most important trans-Atlantic theme on which to

focus. How can we achieve a fair tax and trade policy? What should be the nature of internet regulation? In order to answer these and other questions, it is imperative that we engage in an intensive trans-Atlantic dialogue.

I am optimistic that we will succeed in this endeavor. On my travels throughout the US, which have often taken me deep into rural areas, I have experienced an American society steeped in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson; that is, not only do people want a better America, they also want a better world. At its core, the community of values in the West has always been shaped by an image of man as a bearer of freedom and dignity.

Anyone who travels through the industrial wastelands of the Ohio Valley and then visits Germany’s Ruhr Valley – both of which have been hit hard by the structural changes of recent decades – will immediately recognize that liberal and Western democracies will have to work together to provide political solutions to address the anger and hopelessness felt by those referred to in German as Rationalisierungserlierer, or “rationalization losers.” This is where domestic and foreign policy intersect; indeed, without the anger and hopelessness felt by former coalminers in the Rust Belt, Trump’s electoral success would have been inconceivable – and there would have been no resulting shift in policy alliances in the West.

Politicians of my generation are now obliged to use the coming years to establish reliable and sustainable contacts as well as to address the key challenges of our time – both in and outside of the political sphere. The self-absorption of Trump’s presidency provides us with a living reminder that we must explore, nurture and develop our shared values on both sides of the Atlantic time and again. After all, the more we know about each other, the less Trump will be able to spread his (mis-)interpretation of the situation. We must never forget that the trans-Atlantic relationship does not belong to the president in Washington; it belongs to the people who fill it with life. ■



THE WHOLE IS LESS THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS



PARTS

Brexit and the future of European society

BY ROBIN NIBLETT

Britain's vote to leave the EU has added a new layer of complexity to the process of strengthening European security. It coincides with a chilling of the transatlantic relationship following the election of Donald Trump as US president; persistent Russian probing of the political and military resilience of European governments and societies; and the intensification of radical Islamist terrorist threats within Europe and a chaotic Middle East.

In this sense, Brexit could not be timed any worse. The decision has caused understandable resentment among European leaders, as evidenced in Michel Barnier's remarks in Berlin on Nov. 29, 2017: "Rather than stand shoulder to shoulder with the union, the British chose to be on their own again." These are harsh words that do not reflect the past, current or planned British contributions to European security. However, whatever arrangement the British government strikes with the EU27 after its withdrawal, each side will lose important levers of diplomatic influence.

The UK has the largest defense budget in the EU, one of Europe's most skillful and widespread diplomatic services, and a top-tier secret intelligence service and communications surveillance capacity (GCHQ). It is a world power in development assistance, a permanent member of the UN

Security Council and a recognized nuclear power. These attributes do not automatically translate into EU capabilities or into British leadership on European security. Nonetheless, drawing on these assets as a non-EU member will be sub-optimal compared to its experiences of full integration in EU arrangements.

And yet, ironically, Britain may be able to offer more to European security in practice after it leaves the EU than it did in theory when it was inside.

As it has for centuries, continental Europe will remain the frontline of Britain's national security. Irrespective of its EU membership, the UK will remain engaged in the defense of the eastern and southern borders of Europe. Its forces will continue to be deployed in Estonia and Poland as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence and will serve in NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. And Britain will try to help contain the spread of instability in the Middle East, whether from the return of the Islamic State or the collapse of the Iranian nuclear deal. Britain will still have a greater interest than EU member states like Spain and Portugal in the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and a greater interest than countries like Finland or Poland in the stability of North Africa and the Levant.

The problem for the UK has been that a majority of EU member states believe that only by deepening European defense integration will they make mean-

ingful commitments to strengthening their collective security. For Britain, the instinct has always been the reverse. Deeper EU policy integration in security is seen as leading to lowest-common-denominator outcomes that run counter to resolute action, and also to Britain's self-perception as an independent power with global interests. Moreover, loose talk of creating a "European Army" has been anathema to Britain and the ultimate proof of Brussels overreach.

As a result, after the brief British flirtation with leading European defense integration in the late 1990s under Tony Blair, the UK consistently threw sand into the gears of this process, vetoing the establishment of a permanent EU military headquarters and imposing limits on the budget and remit of the European Defense Agency. Furthermore, although it participated in a number of CSDP missions, including commanding the EU Naval Force Atalanta from its headquarters at Northwood, the number of British forces involved remain low (roughly 150 in 2017).

More broadly, Britain has been increasingly absent in EU foreign policy. It has not been involved in the Minsk process; it was only in the background of the closing stages of the Iran nuclear deal; and it is struggling to make an impact in Libya. It was as if British political leaders could not muster the sense of political agency necessary to contribute to EU strategic decision-making.

In contrast, now that it is pre-

paring to leave the EU, the UK has returned to the Churchillian approach of supporting deeper European defense integration, for it knows it does not need to be part of it. France, Germany and others have seized this opportunity, putting forward a raft of new proposals.

On the positive side, Britain is now under added pressure to deliver on its ambitious \$248 billion defense investment program and to expand its diplomatic presence internationally. If the tone and content of the British government's September 2017 Future Partnership Paper on Foreign Policy, Defense and Development is to be believed, Britain may end up having more to offer to European defense as a result of leaving the EU.

However, coordinating its capabilities with the EU will be more complicated. Today, there are few obstacles to Britain contributing to EU missions. But the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation in December 2017 among 25 of 27 EU members may lead to innovations in force generation and deployments as well as in the defense market, which could make it difficult for the UK to "dock" with a more integrated EU defense.

If the EU and NATO can build on the agreement struck at the

NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016, which aims to deepen their institutional cooperation, this will provide one avenue for the UK to collaborate with EU members on their shared security priorities, irrespective of how CSDP develops.

The British government has also offered to contribute to the European Defense Agency and European Defense Fund. In addition, Britain's growing number of bilateral defense treaties with EU members might serve as a buttress to its future security relationship with the EU.

But the precise model for the UK's security partnership with the EU will matter more over time. Will the UK be "integrated," i.e. participating, for example, as an active "observer" in the Foreign Affairs Council and Political and Security Committee and involved in developing the mandate and operational planning for future EU missions? Or will it merely be "associated," much like Norway, aligning itself with security policies, such as those on sanctions, and participating in missions on a case-by-case basis? Or will it be more "detached," privileging its bilateral relations with EU members and cooperating principally through NATO?

ROBIN NIBLETT has been director of Chatham House since 2007.



An additional challenge lies in future cooperation on counter-terrorism and the fight against organized crime. Here, the likely lack of a common legal framework for sharing data after Brexit will raise new hurdles. This may be the reason why Theresa May, in her speech in Florence on Sept. 22, 2017, proposed the idea of a "treaty between the UK and EU" to enable "future security, law enforcement and criminal justice cooperation."

Given Britain's and the EU27's shared security interests, it would be logical to integrate Britain as closely as possible with EU decision-making and operations in the fields of security and defense. Whatever the outcome of the economic negotiations, it makes no sense for Britain to treat the EU more as an object of British foreign policy than as an institution to whose security policy it is intimately connected.

And, for the EU, the idea of European "strategic autonomy" envisaged in the European Global Strategy will be significantly less feasible if Britain pulls itself, or is pushed, to the sidelines of future plans for EU security and defense integration.

Defense first

Time for a real European security initiative

BY MARK LEONARD

This is the hour of Europe – a unique opportunity to unite a divided continent by showing that unity is the first line of defense in a dangerous world. But thus far there is a continent-sized gulf between the European government's rhetoric on global disorder and the unambitious, technocratic initiatives it has launched. There is still much time remaining to close it.

A thought experiment: Imagine it was still 2007, and you were asked to identify the most extreme scenario that would lead Europeans to take seriously the idea of providing for their own security. You might have suggested that they would wake up if, say, Russia invaded two of its neighbors and annexed their territory; or if the European neighborhood was afflicted by a string of proxy wars, driving millions of people from their homes, including over a million refugees to Germany alone; or if many European countries would become victims of terrorist attacks; or if cyber war had traveled from science fiction novels to the front pages of newspapers. And if what foreign intelligence agencies were fighting information wars inside the EU, and even trying to hack our elections? And if one of the EU's two nuclear powers – the one with the highest share of the EU's defense spending – chose to leave the EU? And then to top it all off the United States began retreating from many theaters and even

questioning its commitment to NATO?

Most people in 2007 would have had to suspend their disbelief about any of these fantastic developments. Upon doing so, they might have predicted that European countries would be trying intently to tackle their vulnerabilities and launch a major new initiative to build strategic autonomy. And that is actually what happened – at least in speeches. When the horror scenarios unfolded, every one from Jean-Claude Juncker and Federica Mogherini to Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel have tried to awaken the "Sleeping Beauty of European Defense." Unfortunately, the rhetoric does not yet match reality.

There are two dominant paradigms for pondering European defense: promoting integration and building capabilities. But by trying to pursue both goals within its first few steps, the EU risks achieving neither.

The launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) triggered a big debate between the pro-integration and the pro-capability camps. PESCO now has 25 members, including some whose stated goal is to block EU integration (such as Hungary) and those whose principle goal is to obstruct cooperation with NATO (such as Cyprus). Maybe countries that fail to make progress will be expelled at some point – but that seems unlikely. As an analogy, imagine how much progress would have been made if member states had been allowed to join the euro

before making reforms to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. It is clear that the adopted model does not build capabilities.

But PESCO is equally unlikely to build unity. The development of real capabilities could have rebuilt solidarity in a union divided between north, south, east and west by showing how Europe can make a difference on the matters that most concern its citizens, from Russian aggression and uncontrolled borders to terrorism and cyber attacks. But the "fake inclusivity" of PESCO means that these issues will be addressed by small-scale technical projects rather than by a political initiative that could capture imaginations. More significantly, putting unity above effectiveness forces countries that are serious about European defense to join coalitions outside EU structures, like France with its newly launched European Intervention Initiative.

How can EU leaders launch a real security initiative to turn things around? First, Europe must look more carefully at removing the barriers to investment in military capabilities. The EU should exclude investment in European defense capabilities from the Maastricht rules and include a defense component in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). EU money could be used to form a compensation fund for defense industrial losses caused by joint procurement as well as for more generic support of states participating in EU and non-EU European military operations.



PESCO aims to improve the European Defense Policy. German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron, various officials and the PESCO commanders met in Brussels on Dec. 14, 2017.

We have known for some time that the EU could achieve more capabilities for the same price by pooling and sharing its equipment. The diversity of EU weapons is six times higher than that of the US – for every model of US destroyer or frigate, the EU has seven. But most governments are more interested in the job-creation potential of procurement than in capability. Moreover, as long as governments or parliaments of member states retain veto power over deployment of their forces – which I support – a complete pooling and sharing will not increase capabilities, but rather paralyze Europe.

The famous "European army" is therefore out of the question for now. However, common investment and acquisition is much easier to push in terms of newer technologies such as cyber, drones and artificial intelligence (AI). As these technologies have not existed for long, there are fewer national idiosyncrasies to overcome.

The second component should be the development of a flexible European security force. Macron's proposal for a European Intervention Initiative is a promising start, but it is likely to fail if other member states perceive it simply as a vehicle to rally other nations to fight France's post-colonial wars. This initiative should be widened into a broader European Security Initiative, designed explicitly to address other nations' security concerns.

Part of this could include the establishment of a combat-ready European military force made up of soldiers from different Euro-

pean member states who train together and use the same equipment. This force should eventually comprise up to 100,000 soldiers and include its own separate capability. States wanting to join this force should face ambitious entry requirements, including a minimum contribution of troops and minimum defense spending. These thresholds must go beyond the flaws of PESCO.

This could be established in parallel to a stabilization and civilian component – including police, border guards and other facilities.

This would not be a European army but rather a flexible force, and more importantly would leave fully functional national military forces intact. The gulf between the rhetoric of European autonomy and the reality of small-scale technical projects not only harms our security, but also threatens the legitimacy of the European project and the possibility of re-establishing solidarity through a union that protects. The EU must close this gulf now.

MARK LEONARD is director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, which is launching a New European Security Initiative backed by several European governments and companies.



Here to move.

Your top priority is that your cargo reaches its destination – not how it gets there.

With our global network, we perfectly combine rail, road, ocean, and air freight to ensure that your goods make it anywhere in the world. Safely, reliably, and right on schedule. And we do it quickly, efficiently, and affordably. From simple transport services to complex logistics processes, we have tailored solutions to fulfill your needs. Let us serve you: www.dbschenker.com.

Munich Security Conference
Münchener Sicherheitskonferenz

The Munich Security Report aims to serve as a companion and impulse for the discussions at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and as background for participants. At the same time, it is also made available to security professionals and the interested public. Last year's report was downloaded more than 30,000 times, with press coverage in both German and international media.

"A truly intriguing and thought-provoking paper" (on the 2015 report)
— Ursula von der Leyen, German Federal Minister of Defence

"Just like the MSC, which has successfully grown out of its original focus on defense, the report takes a broad approach to security. In addition to what you might expect to find in such a report, like analyses of Russian or Chinese foreign policy or the Syrian war, I was pleased to see that the report also looks at issues like refugee flows, health, climate change, and cyber warfare" (on the 2016 report)

— Kofi Annan, Former UN Secretary General



VISIT THE MUNICH SECURITY REPORT SITE

www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/

TOGETHER, WE FLY AS ONE.



FLY
WE MAKE IT

Airbus is a global leader in aeronautics, space and related services with a workforce of around 134,000. Airbus offers the most comprehensive range of passenger airliners from 100 to more than 600 seats. Airbus is also a global leader in providing tanker, combat, transport and mission aircraft, as well as Europe's number one space enterprise and the world's second largest space business. In helicopters, Airbus provides the most efficient civil and military rotorcraft solutions worldwide.

Together. We make it fly.



Euro GroKo

How the new grand coalition, once formed, will pursue Germany's European and foreign policy

BY ROLF MÜTZENICH
AND ACHIM POST

In recent years, certainties within international politics have become fewer for Germany. European integration appears more fragile due to growing social disparities within the EU; Brexit and nationalist trends across most of Europe are also playing a role. At the same time, international policy regimes and fundamental principles such as international law, multilateralism and the universal validity of human rights have come under pressure. The threat of a new arms race and efforts by large powers to project their influence imply additional risks and demand new political responses.

Along with our partners, we face the great challenge of preventing a return of war to Europe and its neighboring countries, and of averting Europe-bound refugee flows triggered by civil war, climate change and undemocratic and unconscionable living conditions. Even aside from these issues, sustainable German and European development policy has an essential part to play.

The new German federal government will seek to help shape this period of upheaval in a positive way – in the direction of peace and security, freedom and

human rights, and a fair globalization. Especially given the era's new risks and shifting global power relations, Germany's foreign policy will give new impetus to its principles on the global political stage. This means that international cooperation, dialogue and multilateralism, and firm commitments to the European Union and the transatlantic alliance are and will remain the cornerstones of Germany's values and interests.

More than ever, Europe as a normative and political foundation of Germany's foreign policy stands at the center of this strategy. Only together do Europeans have a chance to preserve their common values and interests in a globalized age. Strengthening the European Union internally and externally is thus the key political task for the new federal government. Working jointly with France, Germany will introduce initiatives for a strong, democratic, competitive and social Europe.

This includes resolute reform of the Economic and Monetary Union, with an investment budget for the euro zone in lieu of a one-dimensional policy of austerity. Moreover, the fight for a European social compact and against youth unemployment will be carried on as vigorously



Only together do Europeans have a chance to preserve their common values and interests. European Union Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini with EU foreign and defense ministers after signing the notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in Brussels in November 2017.

as the fight against international corporate tax evasion.

At the same time, the EU must substantially improve and expand its competences as an international political actor. For the new German government this means that Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with respect to the European Defense Union and the prospect of a European army is as much a focus as expanding EU civil structures for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. In parallel, the federal government will actively support further expansion of European development cooperation through a coherent Africa strategy.

Working with its neighbors, Germany will take on more responsibility in the future, including within the context of its United Nations, EU, OSCE and NATO partnerships and alliances. The foreign policy

of its coalition partners deems crisis prevention, humanitarian aid and development cooperation as important as a capable and well-equipped Bundeswehr. The federal government will therefore allocate appropriate investments to both the security and civil-sector policy areas. Moreover, for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, the coalition partners have agreed that additional funds in these two areas will be given investment priority in equal proportions.

With this approach, the new federal government will stay the federal course set under Chancellor Angela Merkel by the Social Democratic foreign ministers Steinmeier and Gabriel. This includes new initiatives for arms control and disarmament aimed at preventing a conventional and nuclear arms race on our continent. The coalition

agreement also lays out a limitation on arms exports, a tightening of arms-export directives, a ban on the export of small arms to third-party countries and a broad arms-export ban for countries directly participating in the war in Yemen. It is hoped that other governments will take up and support these initiatives.

A fair globalization in line with the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development remains a goal of German foreign policy.

In order to foment a just and sustainable world society, the Grand Coalition will further expand development cooperation particularly in Africa, with the aim of overcoming poverty and hunger and supporting the emergence of new opportunities. Furthermore, Germany will advocate binding standards for social issues, human rights and the environment in all EU trade, investment and economic-partnership agreements. In so doing, Germany will assume a leading role in establishing a fair EU trade policy. At the same time, the National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights (NAP) will be consistently implemented in its entirety.

If formed as expected, the new federal government will live up to and embrace its international responsibility.

ROLF MÜTZENICH (MP), deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group (responsible for foreign, defense and human rights policy issues)

ACHIM POST (MP), deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group (responsible for European and economic cooperation issues)

Game changers

Six developments that could lead to structural changes to the global nuclear order

BY MICHAEL RÜHLE

We are still living in the second nuclear age. Unlike the first nuclear age, which was shaped by the bipolar nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the second is far more complex. The spread of nuclear weapons has made deterrence a multiplayer game; Asia has emerged as the region with the greatest potential for nuclear conflict; and new nuclear aspirants can benefit from the technological progress made by others as well as from the emergence of semi-private nuclear supply networks.

Some developments indicate, however, that a third nuclear age may be approaching. Indications range from the rapid progress of North Korea's missile program to the treaty aimed at banning nuclear weapons. While these developments seem contradictory, they contribute to the emergence of a new nuclear age in which nuclear deterrence may become more important yet also more difficult to sustain. Six developments could lead to structural changes to the global nuclear order that may justifiably be termed a "third" nuclear age:

1. Nuclear use. In the summer of 2017, North Korea's foreign

minister suggested that Pyongyang may detonate a nuclear device above the Pacific. After more than 70 years of non-use of nuclear weapons, the actual employment of a single nuclear weapon – even if it were intended only for political posturing and would not cause major casualties – would be a game changer of tremendous significance. For some, it would reinforce the conviction that nuclear deterrence remains essential for prevailing in a nuclearized world, while others would see the detonation as proof that nuclear weapons have failed as a means of inducing restraint in international relations.

2. A major accident in the nuclear military infrastructure of a nuclear weapons state. Whether through sabotage or simply through insufficiently trained staff, a major accident could foster the perception among the broader public that nuclear weapons are no longer a security provider but a security liability. Similarly, the temporary loss of control over nuclear weapons due

to a cyber attack against the nuclear weapons infrastructure of a state could fundamentally change the perception of the military and political utility of nuclear weapons.

3. Nuclear terrorism. Building a nuclear weapon still requires elaborate state infrastructure. Should terrorists nonetheless manage a credible threat of nuclear use, or should a fundamentalist regime come to power in a nuclear weapons state, a new nuclear age will have arrived. With religious justifications for mass murder and the glorification of martyrdom entering the nuclear equation, the rules of the first and second nuclear age would become unhinged. Nuclear deterrence would remain an essential tool for managing interstate relations, yet its limits in the face of non-rational actors could severely reduce that concept's perceived value.

4. A nuclear tipping point. A new nuclear hegemon emerging in a volatile region could compel several neighbors to exercise the "plutonium option," i.e. use their civilian light-water reactors to produce weapons-grade plutonium. As light-water reactors continue to spread, the number of states that acquire such a "breakout" capability will grow as well. Should a major change in their security environment

compel them to declare themselves nuclear powers, it would trigger a "proliferation cascade" that would not only invalidate most of the non-proliferation efforts of the past 50 years, but also dramatically increase the risk of nuclear conflict.

5. The decline of extended deterrence. The degradation of the credibility of the US as a promulgator of extended deterrence could spell the end of the successful deal that provides allies in exchange for their nuclear abstinence. Hence, should the US appear to waver on its extended deterrence commitments, or should a new major challenger

emerge that the US cannot or will not counterbalance, some of its allies, particularly in Asia, may well conclude that the time has come to opt for national nuclear deterrence. This would deal a major blow to the global non-proliferation regime, which has always been far more dependent on US engagement than most observers dare to admit.

6. A major change in the legal framework for nuclear governance. A nuclear weapons ban treaty, which seeks to stigmatize nuclear weapons as illegal, is now a foregone conclusion. Since a treaty that they persistently oppose cannot bind the nuclear weapons states and their



A thing of the past? The US detonates an atomic bomb in the Pacific in 1962.

allies, it will not lead to global nuclear abolition. However, the ban treaty could seriously undermine the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the only near-universal framework for regulating nuclear possession and non-possession. Already under strain by the structural changes of the second nuclear age, the legal stigmatization of nuclear weapons could damage the NPT to the point of obsolescence. Thus, the third nuclear age might well be one without any agreed nuclear governance.

The return of great power competition and the emergence of new nuclear weapons states such as North Korea point to the undiminished importance of nuclear deterrence as an integral part of Western defense. However, criticism of nuclear deterrence will also grow stronger. Any sound Western security policy must therefore explain the importance of nuclear deterrence without trivializing its risks. It must also remind Western publics that managing a complex nuclear reality requires more than merely claiming the moral high ground; if proposals such as the ban treaty would make major war more likely, they do not constitute a morally superior alternative. To prevent a third nuclear age, Western leaders have their work cut out for them.

compel them to declare themselves nuclear powers, it would trigger a "proliferation cascade" that would not only invalidate most of the non-proliferation efforts of the past 50 years, but also dramatically increase the risk of nuclear conflict.

5. The decline of extended deterrence. The degradation of the credibility of the US as a promulgator of extended deterrence could spell the end of the successful deal that provides allies in exchange for their nuclear abstinence. Hence, should the US appear to waver on its extended deterrence commitments, or should a new major challenger

We make your company more resilient against all types of risks.

Well prepared – even in the event of an emergency

Whether in industry or the service sector, in hospitals, retirement or care homes, medium-sized businesses or large corporations: No one can afford long production disruptions or downtimes. Prevent, avert – and, if necessary, limit damage: Dräger offers you an extensive range of consulting and planning services for your safety management. www.draeger.com

Dräger. Technology for Life®

THE 7

THE BMW 7 SERIES PLUG-IN HYBRID:
ON BEHALF OF THE ENVIRONMENT

BAYERISCHE MOTOREN WERKE

Find out more at www.bmw-special-sales.com

Continued from Page 1

Power boost

yet be prepared for alternative scenarios.

The EU has made significant progress over the past two years. The EU and its member states have become ever more active in their crisis management, especially with regard to Africa, where European smart power can really make a difference. Our humanitarian assistance, civilian crisis prevention and our capacity building for security forces in five Sahel countries and for the Libyan coastguard are cases in point. With the Permanent Structured Co-Operation (PESCO) in European Security and Defense, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) and the European Defense Fund, we have created additional instruments to harmonize our defense efforts. In a truly comprehensive approach we have also improved the EU's abilities in civilian and military crisis management, in cyber defense and with respect to hybrid threats.

Over the course of this process, it has become ever more obvious that it often lies with France and Germany to boost European power, and that they should also play the key role in meeting the technological and innovation challenges presented by the US, China and others. We must take care that Europe remains at the forefront of technological innovation, especially with regard to cyber and Industry 4.0 – including the military domain. A European Union capable of winning only the conflicts of the past, but not those of the future, would become vulnerable to political blackmail; it would be powerless.

After Brexit, France and Germany will carry the major responsibility for ensuring that this does not happen. Together they will spend more on defense than the other 24 countries participating in the European Security and Defense Policy of the EU combined. It is thus necessary

that France and Germany cooperate closely and successfully despite disparate strategic cultures and sometimes even divergent political and geographic priorities and preferences. Our common benchmark is always to make Europe more capable, whether with regard to expeditionary operations or to collective defense and the development of military capability. Our cooperation is therefore never exclusive. Indeed, we are eager to create plenty of opportunities for our European partners to join our ambitions – for the benefit of the EU and NATO. I am confident that Great Britain, too, will find its new European role.

After all, being a strong power is not a goal in itself – and does not solve all our problems. Engaging in a foolish arms race would not automatically result in more security. It could have precisely the opposite effect for Europe. Confidence building measures and the strengthening of our nuclear and conventional arms control architecture are thus also Germany's and Europe's agenda, especially with regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Europe has power. But it is the responsibility of European leaders to ensure that this power will remain sufficient to protect the European people, their freedom and ideas, their welfare and prosperity. Only if Europe is and continues to be powerful will it be able to meet its full responsibilities towards an international world order now under stress.

SIGMAR GABRIEL was head of the Social Democratic Party from 2009 to March 2017. He was minister of economy and energy from 2013 to January 2017, when he became foreign minister. Since the election in September he has served as acting foreign minister.

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has advanced the big hand of its Doomsday Clock, which forecasts the destruction of the world through nuclear war; the time is now two minutes before midnight. The Bulletin's justification was the war threats leveled between the US and North Korea – which have aggravated tensions between America and its rivals in China, Iran and Russia – as well as the expansion of existing atomic arsenals and the complete and utter lack of arms control talks. In Asia, China is seeking to dominate its neighbors, while North Korea has risen to become yet another country in the atomic weapons club. And in Eastern Europe, former member states of the Warsaw Pact are covering before Russia. Is the world again becoming a place to fear?

What dangers do you see in Europe?

There is a general international trend of growing insecurity. We have a crisis in Ukraine; Crimea is occupied; the eastern Mediterranean is unstable; and then there's

Syria and Iraq. These are all processes that reflect the general security situation. Radicalization and terrorism also generate threats. Migration is becoming an ever-deeper problem for democratic societies in transit and host countries. This has led to the rise and development of nationalist and radical political entities in Europe, which carrying with them risks for these democratic societies.

How does Bulgaria assess the new threat posed by Russian policy in Ukraine, the Crimea and Transnistria?

The events in Ukraine changed the security environment in Europe and NATO-Russia relations. The military build-up in Crimea poses additional challenges. Breaching the principles of international law is unacceptable. The integrity of borders is inviolable, and this is especially important in today's democratic Europe. We do not need new military conflicts. We need peace, cooperation, prosperity and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Any actions that contradict these established prin-

ciples should be deemed threats. Such actions we cannot and will not accept.

NATO is pursuing a two-pronged approach in terms of Russia: While readying its defenses and focusing on deterrence, it is also reaching out to seek common understanding through direct dialogue. What are the most pressing topics for discussion?

The two-pronged approach has its logic. The deterrence activities are entirely defense-oriented and in accordance with international law. However, dialogue is absolutely necessary for two reasons: first, through dialogue we can present our arguments; and second, it is the only way we can narrow the gaps between opposing positions and find a way out of the ongoing conflict burdening international relations. Instead of an escalation of tensions, we need cooperation towards resolving conflicts and fighting terrorism. I believe we can achieve a sustainable resolution of the Ukraine crisis within the Normandy Quartet, which would also allow for the normalization of NATO-Russia relations.

How would you evaluate developments in neighboring Turkey?

Turkey is one of the most important partners of the EU. The Bulgarian president will be hosting an EU-Turkey Summit, because there needs to be direct dialogue with Turkish leadership, dialogue not funneled through the media. Yes, there are problems, with human rights protection, for example, but the right approach is to talk things through in an open and frank way. We have many topics of common interest – combatting terrorism, migration. Renewing dialogue will benefit both the EU and Turkey.

For six months now Bulgaria is going to chair the Council of the European Union. The UK is saying goodbye to the EU, while many Eastern European countries are at least partially governed by nationalist, right-wing populist or Eurosceptic parties. What are Bulgaria's plans for using its council presidency to advance European solidarity?

The motto of the Bulgarian presidency is "United We Stand Strong." This motto also hangs

President for a half-year

The Security Times spoke with Boyko Borisov, prime minister of Bulgaria and the current president of the European Council, about the country's role in and for Europe

SECURITY STRATEGY

over the entrance of the Bulgarian Parliament. Bulgaria will strive to be an honest broker in leading the discussions on the issues that connect us and unite us; we want to be part of all the integration processes of the Union – Schengen, the eurozone, asylum policy, the new security and defense policy. Our country ranks second in terms of public confidence in European values; our citizens have been seeing for themselves the benefits of European solidarity – in 2017 we witnessed 4 percent economic growth, and the same rate is expected for this year as well; the unemployment rate is now at 6 percent; highways have been constructed; waste and water treatment plants as well as energy-efficiency projects for residential buildings have been implemented; in our ten years of membership we have seen a 16-percent growth in employment; incomes have been going up; per capita GDP based on disposable income went up from 27 percent to 40.8 percent compared to EU; and our economy has grown by 41 percent. People in Bulgaria have never lived better since the country joined the European Union. We aim to work on the issues that are on the European agenda in a way that the EU citizens will feel they are the focus of European policies. This will help strengthen European solidarity, including on topics where there is currently no consensus.

What are your thoughts on the efforts to establish a European

defense union, or Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)?

The launch of PESCO is an important step for the fulfillment of the European integration project and the building of the European Defense Union. PESCO brings the EU closer to its goal of improving the cost-effectiveness of defense spending and becoming a serious partner in the field of international security. We support an adequate, ambitious and transparently functioning rule-based PESCO that will contribute to the security of the EU and the enhancement of the European pillar within NATO. PESCO's success will depend on the progress of concrete projects, which we expect to be officially adopted soon.

When you see active European policy cooperation between France and Germany, do you feel hope for new progress towards integration, or rather concern over German-French dominance within the EU?

Rather hope than concern. France and Germany are the motor of European integration. The movement ahead of the whole European structure depends on the proper functioning of this motor. Of course, the uniqueness of the EU comes from the fact that each member state has its say

and its voice is heard. The issues we have to solve require rapid solutions. Each member state carries responsibility for finding them and should make its contribution.

In 2015, Bulgaria also bore the brunt of a high number of refugees. Many now fear a new wave of refugees from Syria and Africa. What to do?

As I have said multiple times: First and foremost we should seek to address the root causes. And the activeness of European diplomacy in the process of solving the crises should increase.

The EU should continue to support development and humanitarian policies. The solution is to help origin countries eliminate the causes for migration by overcoming poverty, investing in their economies and guaranteeing political stability. Education programs are needed for young people, for it is frequently they who are encouraged to go to Western Europe just to be able to send 50 or 100 euros a week to their relatives in their home country. At the same time we should make no compromise with the smug-

glers who literally trade in human lives. How many people have died on their way to "salvation"? The entry to the EU is through the official border checkpoints, where asylum-seekers will receive adequate care. Bulgaria is a role model as the country that best guards the external EU border, despite not being admitted to Schengen. It is also necessary that we continue working with the states bordering the conflict countries, such as Turkey. Since the agreement with the EU has come into force, migration pressure from Turkey on our border has dropped 84 percent.



**Education:
The right start**

2017:

- Quarzwerke trainees top of the class again
- Quarzwerke pioneers its recognised dual training scheme at its Bulgarian plants
- As a family-run business we think in generations and for generations



Quarzwerke

A FAMILY ENTERPRISE SINCE 1884

www.quarzwerke.com

More than just mining.

BERLIN
SCHINKELPLATZ

Living in Berlin's prime location.

Exceptional condominiums for sale at the historical heart of the capital with an unique and iconic view on the new castle of Berlin.

FRANKONIA

+49 (0) 30 23 989 380 | WWW.BERLIN-SCHINKELPLATZ.DE

CHAIN OF SECESSION

All border changes in Europe since 1990 have violated international treaties

BY ANDREAS ZUMACH

What do the following places have in common: Kosovo, Crimea, Catalonia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Hungary, Scotland and the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Syria and Turkey? After the Cold War, each was the scene of secession attempts or demands to alter national borders.

In Yugoslavia, Georgia and the Ukraine, the secessionists used violence to forcibly shift national borders with the help of external actors (NATO, Russia). Otherwise, the specific circumstances and historical background in all these cases differ widely.

The four decades of global East-West confrontation saw few such efforts. And those that existed had little chance of lasting success, not least because they lacked support from the two dominant powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the other three UN veto powers of France, Great Britain and China.

In addition, there was no consensus among the member states of the UN that the three basic principles of the founding charter of 1945 should not be called into question. The Charter begins with the phrase "We the peoples..." but goes on to define national

states as actors of international law and UN members, stressing their "sovereign equality," the "inviolability of their territorial boundaries and political order," and the "principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states."

Therefore, the secession of the Igbo in East Nigeria into their own state of Biafra in 1972 found no support internationally and was reversed four years later after a bloody war initiated by the government of Nigeria. Eritrea only gained its – subsequently recognized – independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year war. By contrast, Somaliland, which announced its secession from Somalia in 1991, is still only recognized by three African countries. In all three cases, the secessionists invoked the "right of peoples to self-determination." This right is also enshrined in the UN Charter, but without any rules for its implementation and without resolving the conflict with the Charter's three basic principles.

Following the end of the Cold War, however, the EU invoked this "right" to selectively recognize the three Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent states after they had seceded from the Yugoslav Federation. This selective recognition, which at



the time was driven primarily by Germany, took place without agreement with the Yugoslav government and against the explicit warning of UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.



The Pandora's box of arbitrary changes in national boundaries was thus opened. Eight years later, NATO created the conditions for the secession and independence of Kosovo with its war of aggression against Serbia, a war that violated

international law. According to a 2010 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion, Kosovo's declaration of independence was in itself not a violation of international law, but the ICJ issued no statement on

the international status of Kosovo. Consequently, only 103 of the 193 UN member states have recognized Kosovo, including only 23 of the 28 EU members.

Kosovo became a precedent that motivated nationalists among the Bosnian Serbs to demand the withdrawal of their "Republika Srpska" from Bosnia-Herzegovina and its annexation to Serbia. To justify its annexation of

Crimea in violation of international law, the Russian government points to Kosovo and the ethnic Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. The same goes for the secessions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia –

backed by Russia and currently recognized by just three other UN states – as well as the statehood of the Moldovan province of Transnistria, recognized only by Moscow.

In ex-Yugoslavia and Ukraine, the secessionists were and are ethnically defined groups dominated by other ethnic groups or discriminated against and persecuted by the central government. In the case of the annexation of Crimea, further motivations include Russia's security interests regarding the eastern expansion of NATO, as well as attempts at historical justification – Russia claims Crimea had been part of Russia since 1783, during the reign of Catherine the Great, until Nikita Khrushchev illegally transferred the territory to Ukraine in 1954.

In Hungary, right-wing populists, now part of the ruling coalition, use ethnic claims to justify their aggressive calls for the restoration of "Greater Hungary" through the incorporation of areas inhabited by Hungarian minorities in the three neighboring countries of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine.

On the other hand, the reasons behind Catalonia's desire to leave Spain are exclusively economic. By far the country's richest province, Catalonia no longer wants

to be paymaster for the poorer remainder of Spain. Similarly, Italy's Lega Nord has long advocated splitting off the prosperous north from the poor south of the country.

The motives of the Scots and Northern Irish who want to leave the United Kingdom also differ. They want to stay on as members of the EU following Brexit.

Whatever the reasoning and specific circumstances, with the exception of the peaceful and consensual division of Czechoslovakia and dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 states, all border changes in Europe since 1990 have seen the use or threat of violence as well as an absence of agreement among concerned parties; they have also violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Paris Char-

ANDREAS ZUMACH is a Geneva-based newspaper, radio and TV correspondent. His latest book, *Globales Chaos – machtlose UNO* (Global chaos – powerless UN. Has the global organization become expendable?) was published in 2016.

ter (1990) and other agreements and arrangements that European states have concluded within the framework of the OSCE. Some of these are in breach of international laws established by the UN Charter.

The taboo of changing national-state boundaries was discarded in the 1990s and cannot be restored. Yet there must be rules for all future border changes. They must be non-violent and require consensual procedures with constitutional standards involving all those affected.

Within the framework of the OSCE, preliminary rules have been agreed upon but still must be specified and furnished with implementation provisions. As a regional sub-organization of the UN, the OSCE should work to ensure that these rules are also incorporated into global international law – with possible provisions for the "right of peoples to self-determination" proclaimed in the UN Charter.

Furthermore, the results of the cited border changes should also be scrutinized. They must either be improved or corrected, or at least achieve a widened basis of legitimacy and acceptance through consensual procedures. "Let's forget it and move on" – this frequently heard opinion

regarding the annexation of the Crimea is a dangerous miscalculation. Crimea would then become a permanent flashpoint between Moscow and Kiev, between Russia and the West, and a source of trouble within Europe.

If it remains uncorrected, Kosovo's sovereignty achieved by the NATO wars against Serbia will remain a source of instability in Southeast Europe. Kosovo is a corrupt mafia state; it offers no future for the younger generation and serves as a cautionary example that secessions and state foundations based on ethnic homogeneity do not work.

The same applies to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Established in 1995 through the Dayton Accords, the constitution proclaims a unitary state but places all essential powers in the hands of two ethnically defined entities, the Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation under the umbrella of a weak multi-ethnic central government in constant paralysis. Unless this constitution is corrected, Bosnia-Herzegovina will remain a failed state. Since the country's inhabitants are unable to make that change, the three initiators and guarantors of the Dayton Agreement – the US, Russia and the EU – must shoulder that responsibility.

CONNECTED CYBERSECURITY – CONNECTED SUCCESS

Connected cybersecurity is the basis of digital transformation and a growth driver of our economy. From September 20 to 22, 2018, Messe München will be bringing together decision-makers and experts at Europe's leading digitalization hub for the "Command Control" summit, exploring the perspectives for risk and opportunity in the field of cybersecurity.

The fact is, cyber attacks and digitization are inseparable and must be accounted for together in strategic business planning. As data, things, machines and individuals grow ever more interconnected, so do the vulnerabilities of consumers, companies and governments.

Corporate and operational management in particular face multiple complexities and uncertainties as a result of digitization. To realize their digital business potential, they need improved governance approaches toward security and risk management. Above all, management today has to answer the question of how to gain a holistic view of cyber risks facing their company.

One problem is that analogue ideas of "security" still clash with the new digital realities. This silo mentality conflicts with digital positioning and the need to think cybersecurity holistically. Closer and more agile cross-domain cooperation in the areas of strategy, governance, IT and cybersecurity has become a necessity. Only then it is possible to detect connected risks of digitization more quickly and take preventive steps. In a nutshell, the connected world's security issues require a new systemic approach.

Yet cybersecurity continues to lag, even as networked cyberattacks multiply. All too often cybersecurity is reduced to an isolated, technically complex and costly domain of experts. Hierarchical corporate structures and limited cooperation mechanisms within the industry often prevent cybersecurity from being perceived as an essential cross-sector vehicle for ensuring secure value chains and a factor in the economy's future success.

More than ever before, sustainable and qualitative growth requires an integrated approach to cybersecurity, one that in the future will, among other things, fully grasp technological, personnel and procedural complexities and operate connected risk management.

This applies in particular to tomorrow's critical IT infrastructures such as air traffic management systems, smart grids and a highly automated traffic control center for autonomous vehicles. In such infrastructures sophisticated systems including geolocation satellites, ground stations, vehicle electronics, data networks and software components interlock. Attacking just one of these components can have devastating effects on the security of the entire system, and thus on the lives of connected car users and their environments.



Digitization needs a secure foundation to continue to grow and prosper and be free. It can be protected only through holistic cybersecurity to prevent manipulation or disruption along current and future value chains. Connected cybersecurity must be understood as a strategic and interdisciplinary matter. Today more than ever, this requires inter-sector exchange, for example in the energy sector and the digital intersection of electricity, heating, production and transport. This has become an obligation rather than an option, not least for the sake of competitiveness and the future viability of our economy.

Entrepreneurial success today depends to a large extent on technological innovation. Cybersecurity, the safer networking of value chains and digital leadership skills are

the key factors for growth and success. Digitization brings with it epochal changes that have far-reaching effects on different levels of our social structure. Interdisciplinary dialogue is therefore essential for the risk-based, political and economic governance of the connected world.

Command Control takes cybersecurity to the next level. Command Control is the first interactive and interdisciplinary summit to consider the cross-sector relevance of connected cybersecurity – and address related fields of action and growth along connected industries and value chains. Command Control offers decision makers and specialists innovative showcases with answers to growing complexities in fields such as digital factories, integrated risk management, critical infrastructures, data management and the human factor in cybersecurity.

Become part of Command Control from September 20 to 22, 2018, and take advantage of a new innovative and interdisciplinary cyber security format that:

- Brings together all relevant national and international cybersecurity stakeholders through a guided interactive exchange dialogue,
- Maps the superordinated context for securing connected industries, services, critical infrastructures and the protection needs of today's value chains through connected cybersecurity,
- Conveys a holistic understanding of cybersecurity along secure digital value chains as an internationally leading interdisciplinary decision-making platform,
- Demonstrates the cross-industry bridge to future topics and new growth markets with cybersecurity,
- Visualizes strategic and operational dependencies for the industrial and service sectors as well as critical infrastructures using forward-looking cybersecurity showcases,
- Sets a user-centered focus on managing growing digital complexities and uncertainties through leading practices and a steered dialogue,
- And as a thought leader in the field, provides important impulses for driving new leadership cultures and processes, as well as quality standards and synergies for cybersecurity.

CMD CTRL
Munich 2018
cmdctrl.com



WE ARE SHAPING MOBILITY FOR TOMORROW

How will people travel in the future, and how will goods be transported? What resources will we use, and how many will we need? The passenger and freight traffic sector is developing rapidly, and we provide the impetus for innovation and movement. We develop components and systems for internal combustion engines that operate more cleanly and more efficiently than ever before. We are also pushing forward technologies that are bringing hybrid vehicles and alternative drives into a new dimension – for private, corporate, and public use. The challenges are great. We deliver the solutions.

www.schaeffler-mobility.com

SCHAEFFLER

TEN CONFLICTS TO WATCH IN 2018

BY ROBERT MALLEY

1. North Korea

North Korea's nuclear and missile testing coupled with America's bellicosity make the threat of a Korean Peninsula war – even nuclear confrontation – higher than at any time in recent history. In response to Pyongyang's weapons testing, the US has adopted a "maximum pressure" strategy: tougher sanctions and implicit threats of military action. Sanctions will not bite immediately, however, and ordinary citizens are certain to suffer before the regime will. Graver still, any military action by Washington would likely provoke a response from Pyongyang, risking an unpredictable escalation. All sides should use the lull during the South Korea Winter Olympics to prepare for a diplomatic initiative that includes freezes on North Korean weapons testing and some US-South Korean military exercises presaging talks toward a more durable resolution.



Nuclear missile test in North Korea.

2. US-Saudi-Iran rivalry

The rivalry is enabled by the growing authority of Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia's crown prince; the Trump administration's aggressive strategy toward Iran; and the end of the Islamic State's self-proclaimed caliphate, which allows Washington and Riyadh to shift attention to Iran. Their goal – to roll back Iranian regional influence – is clear; whether they can achieve it is not. Tehran and its allies look strong. The Assad regime is prevailing in Syria. In Iraq, Iran-linked militias are entrenched. In Yemen, Tehran's modest investment has helped the Houthis survive. Thus far, US belligerence has done little to erode Tehran's reach. Any more determined attempt could prompt Tehran to respond through partners across the region. With so many flashpoints, and so little diplomacy, the risk of escalation is great.



Iran demonstrating strength.

3. The Rohingya Crisis

Myanmar's Rohingya crisis has entered a dangerous new phase. An August 2017 attack by the militant Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) prompted indiscriminate operations by the Myanmar army against the Muslim Rohingya community; at least 655,000 fled to Bangladesh. Refugees will not return unless Myanmar guarantees their security, freedom of movement and access to services and other rights, which it appears unlikely to do. International pressure is critical but unlikely to positively change Myanmar's policies. The refugee population creates dangers for Bangladesh; tension between refugees and the host community is an immediate risk. In Myanmar, ARSA could regroup or, along with other groups, launch cross-border attacks. Implementing the recommendations of the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State would put Myanmar on a better path.



Solidarity with Rohingyas in Naples, Italy.

4. Yemen

With 8 million people on the brink of famine and over 3 million displaced, the Yemen war could escalate further. In December 2017, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced that his General People's Congress (GPC) was abandoning the Houthis in favor of the Saudi-led coalition; he was immediately killed by his erstwhile partners. Riyadh, encouraged by Trump's anti-Iran rhetoric, appears determined to intensify its campaign. The Houthis will likely continue to fire missiles across the border. Negotiations, already distant, have become more complicated. The Saudis and their allies should take steps to ease civilian suffering. Were they to embrace a peace initiative, pressure to accept it would shift to the Houthis.



Protests against the war in Yemen.

5. Afghanistan

Afghanistan's war looks certain to intensify. The new US strategy raises the tempo of operations against the Taliban insurgency. The aim, according to officials, is to halt the Taliban's momentum and force it into a political settlement. However, insurgents control or contest more territory than at any time since 2001, are better equipped and can mount spectacular attacks – like those in Kabul in late January – that erode confidence in the government. The US should keep lines of communication to the insurgency open and explore a settlement with regional powers. For now, however, Trump's statements suggest that is unlikely. The stage is set for further civilian suffering.



Peace mission: policeman in Kabul.

ROBERT MALLEY is president and CEO of the International Crisis Group.



IS is gone, new wars ahead?



Defense Minister von der Leyen in Mali.



Riots against president Kabila, Dec. 2017.



Remains of war in Eastern Ukraine.



President of downfall: Nicolás Maduro.

6. Syria

While President Bashar al-Assad's regime has the upper hand, thanks to Iranian and Russian backing, the fighting is not over. Swaths of the country remain beyond the regime's control and foreign powers disagree on a settlement. With the IS gone, risks of clashes elsewhere increase. In the southwest, Israel could take military action to repel Iran-backed militias around the Golan Heights. Turkey's early 2018 offensive into the Kurdish-held Afrin enclave introduces a dangerous new element. A regime offensive in Syria's northwest, where rebel-held areas host some 2 million Syrians, would provoke massive destruction and displacement. A deal between Turkey and Russia that sees Ankara deploy forces along front lines and Moscow deter a regime attack appears the only way to avert such an offensive.

7. The Sahel

States across the Sahel are struggling with intercommunal conflicts, jihadist violence and fighting over smuggling routes. Their leaders' predation often makes matters worse. In 2012, the Malian army's rout from the north and a coup showed how quickly things can unravel. Since then, instability has spread from the north to Mali's central region as well as to Niger and Burkina Faso. Over the past year, alarm at mounting insecurity has prompted an increasingly militarized response, with a French-backed African force, the G5 Sahel, deploying into a field already crowded by France's counterterrorism operations, US Special Forces and UN peacekeepers. The G5 force risks stirring up a hornets' nest unless accompanied by efforts to win over local populations and defuse local disputes.

8. Democratic Republic of the Congo

Over 2017, President Joseph Kabila's continued rule worsened the DRC's political crisis and a humanitarian emergency that is now one of the world's worst. The Saint Sylvester December 2016 agreement appeared to offer a way out by requiring elections by the end of 2017, after which Kabila would leave power. His regime backtracked, exploiting the opposition's disarray and waning international attention; in November 2017, electoral authorities announced a vote at the end of 2018. Despite unrest in many provinces, the regime maintains the initiative. It may push toward elections in 2018; a presidential spokesman recently said the Kabila would not seek election, but he may still be keeping options open. The risk of further deterioration or even a descent into chaos remains.

9. Ukraine

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine has claimed over 10,000 lives and wreaked enormous humanitarian suffering. Implementation of the Minsk II peace deal has stalled. Both sides exchange fire across the line dividing Ukrainian from separatist and Russian forces. Yet the east is only part of the story. President Petro Poroshenko has struggled against systemic corruption. Ukrainians are losing faith in institutions, elites and the Minsk agreement, which many see as a concession to separatists. Russia's September 2017 draft of a UN Security Council resolution proposing peacekeepers for Ukraine could be an opportunity. While the lightly armed force envisaged would more likely freeze the conflict than resolve it, Moscow's proposal opens a window for Kiev and its Western allies to explore how peacekeepers might help.

10. Venezuela

Venezuela took yet another turn for the worse in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro's government ran the country further into the ground while strengthening its political grip. Expect the humanitarian crisis to deepen in 2018 as GDP continues to contract. In November, Venezuela defaulted on part of its international debt, sanctions will make debt restructuring highly impossible. Food shortages, a collapsed health system and spiraling violent crime are perpetuating the conditions for unrest. Expect the humanitarian crisis to deepen as GDP contracts. A presidential vote, due in 2018, appears unlikely to offer a way out. The weak Venezuelan state will continue providing opportunities for money laundering, drug trafficking and people smuggling, further disquieting Venezuela's neighbors already facing an exodus of Venezuelans. Only sustained domestic and international pressure – as well as immunity guarantees – could push the government toward compromise.



Mosul – freed from IS but heavily destroyed.

BY VOLKER PERTHES

Bismarck would blush

The political geometry of the Middle East has been redrawn in the last year

Three issues are likely to determine the Middle East agenda in 2018: ongoing efforts to unwind the war in Syria, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and, of course, the positioning and policies of Russia and the US. Other unresolved conflicts will continue to be enormously consequential to the people affected by it – the war in Yemen and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular – but are likely to have a lesser impact on the overall political geometry of the region.

In Syria, as well as in neighboring Iraq, the war against the Islamic State is almost over, at least against IS in its form as a territorially based jihadist state-building project or self-declared Caliphate. The civilian population and original parties to the conflict – government, opposition, rebel forces – have all suffered enormous losses. The government of President Bashar al-Assad has re-established control over some two-thirds of the country. Given its ongoing reliance on the massive support of Russia, Iran and Iranian-sponsored forces to regain and hold territory it had previously lost either to opposition forces or to IS, it is much weaker today than in 2011. If any party has won the war, it is Russia, not the government and certainly not the rebels.

The opposition has not been totally defeated, but it has certainly lost the war. Armed opposition groups have largely been relegated to four de-escalation areas. Altogether, opposition-held territory accounts for less than 10 percent of Syria's total area. More than one-fifth of Syria remains under the control of the Kurdish PYD (Party of Democratic Union), which is less interested in who rules Damascus than how much autonomy it can achieve for Syria's majority-Kurdish areas in the north.

Most of the relevant regional and international players tend to agree that the end of the war against IS provides an opportu-

nity to reach a negotiated settlement between government and opposition. Almost all recognize the risk of a continued fragmentation of the country and even of the emergence of an "IS 2.0" if the internal war were to continue and no basic settlement reached. This does not mean they agree on the best way to settle the conflict. It remains to be seen whether Russia will use its influence on the ground to enforce a pacification with rather limited constitutional changes; this would basically preserve the current political system while co-opting a number of leaders from the political and armed opposition. Alternatively, UN efforts to engage the parties in real peace negotiations will eventually lead to a more genuine form of power sharing, a new constitutional reality, significant guarantees for political and human rights, and credible, UN-supervised presidential and legislative elections. Given the structure of influence and leverage, the former seems more achievable, but also more brittle. And the latter can only succeed if Russia, the US and the EU, but also Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and smaller but more aggressive players like Qatar, actively supported it.

Moreover, the Syria conflict remains linked to the second issue that defines current regional dynamics: the Saudi-Iranian struggle for regional hegemony. Both Riyadh and Tehran tend to see the other as the main competitor for regional leadership and thus a threat.

Saudi Arabia remains the main sponsor of the Syrian opposition, and Iran the main regional backer of Assad. Tehran is unlikely to cede its enormous political investment in Syria, its strong influence on the government and security

apparatus in Damascus, considerable economic opportunities and what amounts to a secure land connection from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. In contrast to Russia, Iran has allies and clients yet no friends in Syria. At some point it may find it has overreached. It is also unclear whether domestic opposition and protest can or will push the Iranian leadership towards a less confrontational regional and international posture, and concentrate more on economic reform and constructive relations with other powers. There are certainly political actors in Iran who would favor such an adjustment, yet others who would rather try to compensate any sign of domestic weakness with a more aggressive foreign-policy stance.

Ankara and Tehran do not see the world through the same lens, but they do share similar threat perceptions. Both want to make sure not to end up as junior partners to a Russian-planned and Russian-managed settlement of the conflict in Syria. They want to quash Kurdish aspirations for independence or autonomy in Iraq, and at least Turkey is determined to prevent the emergence of a contiguous zone along the Syrian-Turkish border, which would be dominated by the PYD (the sister organization of Turkey's banned PKK, or Kurdish Workers Party). Add to this Ankara's increasing lack of trust with regard to the US, particularly since Washington made the PYD its main military partner in Syria. While Turkey's recent military incursion into the northern Syrian district of Afrin was driven by the long-held goal of degrading and ideally eliminating PYD control over this isolated Kurdish enclave on the western edge of the Turkish-Syrian border, it was

arguably triggered by the Pentagon's announcement that the US would create a 30,000-strong Kurdish "protection" force in the large PYD-controlled territory stretching along Turkey's southern perimeter from the Euphrates to the Iraqi border.

Both Turkey and Iran have thus fallen in line with the Russian approach to conflict resolution in Syria. We should not be astonished if Ankara at some point re-establishes official links with the government in Damascus.

While much of the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out in Syria over the past seven years, the two countries have been geopolitical rivals for much longer, since even before Iran became the Islamic Republic. But none of the features of this rivalry is an unchangeable given. As regards Syria, Saudi Arabia no longer opposes a settlement that would leave Assad in power, but wants to prevent what it would regard as an Iranian takeover. There could be room for compromise here.

However, since his elevation to minister of defense in 2015 and crown prince in 2017, Muhammad bin Salman has been the driving force behind a highly assertive and strongly anti-Iranian regional policy. This includes an utterly destructive war in Yemen, which seems far from reaching either a military resolution or a negotiated settlement and may have encouraged much of the Iranian presence and influence the Saudi leadership claims to be fighting there. Similarly, the Saudi leadership may have helped Iran to strengthen its reputation in Lebanon by trying to force Lebanon's Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign under rather murky circumstances while in a TV studio in Riyadh.

The Qatar crisis of 2017 did not come out of the blue; it emerged as a poorly engineered eruption of long-standing differences. With no serious efforts to resolve it, the dispute seems to have become something of a frozen conflict à l'Arabe, whose chief result has been the weakening of the one functioning sub-regional organization in the Middle East – the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council. Qatar bears the brunt of the economic losses of the boycott enforced upon it by its neighbors and Egypt. But Saudi Arabia and its allies, primarily the UAE, have been ineffective in enforcing their will on their smaller neighbor.

Rather than scaling down its relations to Iran, Doha became dependent on Iranian air space and imports, upgraded the relationship and invited Turkey to enlarge its military presence in the Emirates.

Saudi Arabia's increasingly assertive regional policy should not be seen in isolation from the ambitious and much-needed efforts of the crown prince to embark on a form of belated nation-building in a state that, since its inception, has defined itself in religious terms more than in national terms.

It is small wonder that Saudi, Emirati, Israeli and other regional leaders are eager to inject the Trump administration's more hardline stance on Iran into their own political projects. Other allies of the US – particularly Turkey – have become more skeptical of a US approach that seems to put military considerations of expediency above alliance considerations. By de-emphasizing diplomacy and making rash policy such

These efforts include the attempt to mobilize younger generations and to reform the country's society and economy under a wide-ranging "Vision 2030" program, which aims to prepare Saudi Arabia for a less

oil-dependent future. They also include attempts to make fuller use of Saudi Arabia's human potential – both male and female – to promote scientific and technical education, downgrade the influence of the religious establishment and the appeal of radical Wahhabi Islam, and foster a sense of nationalism instead. This is quite the Bismarckian challenge, and history tells of more than one example where such an endeavor accompanied a rather aggressive foreign policy.

It is an irony of sorts that both the Saudi crown prince and Iran's President Hassan Rohani, who was re-elected with a convincing majority in 2017, are highly aware of the need for domestic reform in their respective countries. There would be something to gain from regional cooperation between these two powers, but each may lose the opportunity to see his reform programs to fruition due to costly external confrontations.

While his regional policies have thus far brought mixed results at best, Mohammad bin Salman was able to boost his domestic and regional posture by securing the personal support of US President Donald Trump and a US acknowledgement of Saudi's lead role in a loose coalition of Arab states. It was no great feat for the crown prince to align himself with the Trump administration's two priorities in the region: the fight against terrorism, by whichever definition, and a rollback, as it were, of Iran.

It is small wonder that Saudi, Emirati, Israeli and other regional leaders are eager to inject the Trump administration's more hardline stance on Iran into their own political projects. Other allies of the US – particularly Turkey – have become more skeptical of a US approach that seems to put military considerations of expediency above alliance considerations. By de-emphasizing diplomacy and making rash policy such

SECURITY CHALLENGES

Continued from page 17
Bismarck would blush

as the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, Trump has been undermining the America's role as the ultimate mediator, which almost all regional states have relied upon irrespective of Washington's never-hidden pro-Israeli bent.

Russia, in contrast, seems to have learned something from previous US-policy books for the Middle East, particularly in presenting itself as an interlocutor for all while making no secret of its strategic interests. It is cooperating with Iran to stabilize the Assad government, but also received the Saudi monarch before even Washington had. It is Syria's most important military ally yet continues to demonstrate its excellent relationship to Israel, not least through the well-publicized visit of its defense minister to Tel Aviv. There have even been suggestions that Russia may be acceptable as a mediator on Jerusalem. And whereas the US has been ignoring – at least in Ankara's eyes – some of Turkey's main national security priorities, Russia has been able to restore a relationship that was on the verge of war in 2015.

Moscow may not come across as a benign actor. The brazen announcement by Russia's ministry of defense that the Russian military had used the war in Syria to test "more than 160 modern and prospective types" of weaponry will certainly be seen as utterly cynical by members of Syria's opposition. Russia may appear as a brute – but it is a brute with a plan both to end the war in Syria and to broaden its reach across the region.

In contrast, while militarily spearheading the anti-IS coalition, Washington has become somewhat of a diplomatic bystander in the region. In 2015 and 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov co-chaired four ministerial meetings of the International Syria Support Group, which helped launch the UN-led intra-Syrian talks in Geneva and succeeded in establishing a first short-lived cessation-of-hostilities. In 2017, the US was content with its observer status in the Russian-led Astana talks. Even America's new Syria policy, as laid out by Secretary of State Tillerson in January 2018, has confirmed the military's lead on Syria. It calls for an open-ended US military presence in the country even after the defeat of IS, mainly to deny an expansion of Iranian influence, but shows no ambition to reassume a lead political role with regard to Syria's future.

Observers may be forgiven for seeing similarities between this lesser US role and the position the EU has occupied for quite some time, minus the preparedness to dump substantial amounts of money into regional schemes. It is yet unclear whether the EU, most probably under French leadership, would be able to fill some of the diplomatic void created by America's absence in the region; given the habit of Middle East leaders to balance their external relations rather than leave the politics and diplomacy to one of the great powers, it is likely there would be takers for such a European role.

Observers may be forgiven for seeing similarities between this lesser US role and the position the EU has occupied for quite some time, minus the preparedness to dump substantial amounts of money into regional schemes. It is yet unclear whether the EU, most probably under French leadership, would be able to fill some of the diplomatic void created by America's absence in the region; given the habit of Middle East leaders to balance their external relations rather than leave the politics and diplomacy to one of the great powers, it is likely there would be takers for such a European role.



Problems with the neighbors

Erdogan wanted Turkey to embrace its Western and Arab allies. Now he's tied to Putin

BY CAN DÜNDAR

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to power in 2002 with a commitment to full membership of the EU. His then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu initially endeavored to deliver on his promise of "zero problems with neighbors," making advances to Armenia and the Kurds of Northern Iraq while promoting commerce with Russia. On the back of amicable breezes blowing between Greece and Turkey, attempts to engineer a solution to Cyprus accelerated. Radical legislative steps were taken to facilitate the EU accession process and close relations were forged with Syria's Assad.

All this took place in the first six years of Erdoğan's rule.

Serious cracks in his diplomatic course first appeared in 2009. Turkey faced the Islamic world in the East. Forsaking its centuries-old westward direction and abandoning Atatürk's principle of "Peace at home, peace in the world," it embarked upon an adventurous path of advancing Turkish influence. No longer would Turkey preserve the status quo. The result was a friendless Turkey that soon ran aground.

The first indication of this change was Erdoğan walking out of the 2009 Davos Conference after accusing the Israel of reverberations of his name on Arab streets, Erdoğan indulged in dreams of transforming Turkey into a major power in the Islamic world.

The 2010 Israeli commando raid on the MV Mavi Marmara, the lead vessel in an aid convoy to Gaza, resulted in the death of ten activists; Erdoğan immediately severed relations with Jerusalem.

The Arab Spring of 2011 might have been just the opportunity he was looking for; but he soon found himself out of favor in the Muslim world as the uprising was quashed, and he realized he had fallen out with the Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian regimes.

The Syrian leader, his "brother Assad" for so long, had all at once become his "foe Esed." In 2012, as Erdoğan mentioned "praying at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus," Turkey's parliament resounded with exclamations of "reaching Damascus in three hours." Thus did Ankara embroil itself in the swamp at its southern flank. It shipped weapons to Syrian rebels in order to topple the regime in Damascus and unseat the increasingly more powerful YPG in northern Syria, opened the borders to jihadists and turned a blind eye to the rise of IS cells in big cities. This traffic intensified further in the refugee flood of 2014.

Next came the big crisis with the big neighbor. In 2015, Turkey downed a Russian fighter jet for allegedly violating Turkish airspace. Putin promptly instructed Russian tourists to steer clear of Turkey and halted imports of Turkish foodstuffs. The cost to Turkey was some \$10 billion.

Foreign policy driven by unrealistic ideology and chauvinist posturing had suddenly left Ankara with countless enemies. His "zero problems with neighbors" had led to the opposite dynamic: "problems with every neighbor." It was time for a volte-face, and a scapegoat. Davutoğlu was forced to resign in 2016. Settling into the chair still warm from his predecessor, the new Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım asserted: "We shall increase the number of our friends and decrease the number of our enemies." Ankara had once again adopted a more pragmatic diplomacy.

It took two apologies for Yıldırım to solve two crises. First, the five-year rift with Israel was settled when Jerusalem apologized for the sinking of the Mavi Marmara and paid reparations. Next, Turkey apologized to Putin, thereby resolving the

coup attempt in July 2016. His declaration of a state of emergency and his subsequent regime of oppression effectively burned all bridges with Europe. The European Parliament promptly recommended, and acted upon, suspending negotiations.

"Nazism," the Germans withdrew their forces from Incirlik.

An inauspicious start with Trump was soon to follow. Turkey's demand to extradite Fethullah Gülen was refused, which led to Erdoğan accusing the US of engineering the coup attempt

suspended all visa applications by Turkish passport holders. The coup de grace was US National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster's condemnation of Turkey and Qatar as the new sponsors of radical ideology.

Cast adrift as a result of his break with the West, Erdoğan proved easy pickings for Putin. Moscow invited Ankara – along with Tehran – to the table to discuss solutions to Syria. In its loneliest hour, Turkey was turning to its traditional enemy to the north. Erdoğan's recent decision to purchase Russian S-400 defense missiles could easily signal a departure from NATO.

Stuck in a quagmire in Syria, without a single friend in the West and unsuccessful in securing Trump's backing, Erdoğan is going all in with Putin. As a reward, the Russian president has opened Syrian air space to Turkish forces engaged in the Afrin operation that began in January. However, a potential clash between Ankara and Washington, the sponsors of Syrian Kurds, would have only one winner: Moscow.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan finds himself in a struggle to transform the risky war he has embarked upon in Syria into a step that will elevate his presidency on the domestic front.




CAN DÜNDAR was editor-in-chief of the Turkish daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. His article about Turkish arms deliveries to the Islamic State earned him an indictment for alleged espionage. He is now living in exile in Germany.

SECURITY CHALLENGES

Kurds Divided

The Kurdish parties are divided into two opposing international networks: the Marxist-leaning Turkish PKK and the nationalist PDK in Iraq.



Downward Kurdish momentum

Turkey seeks to destroy Kurdish self-government in Syria – but it just might achieve the opposite effect

BY MICHAEL MARTENS

The Turkish invasion of the Kurdish canton of Afrin has added yet another facet to the proxy war in Syria. The Turkish army and its Arab auxiliaries are now fighting against Syrian Kurds in north-western Syria. However, events in the area involve the interests of at least four other actors, namely Washington, Moscow, Tehran and the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Ankara had announced an attack on Afrin Canton years ago and the assault was in the works there for months. The policy also represented a break in Turkey's original approach to Syria. When the Syrian civil war broke out in spring 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – then prime minister of Turkey – waived briefly, but then made a decisive turn away from Assad, his former favored partner. Erdoğan announced that removing Assad would now be his main goal; Ankara also claimed Assad to be the worst of all evils and his rule the root cause of all other terrorist threats. In summer 2012, however, something happened in the Syrian theater of war that Ankara had not expected; the regime in Damascus largely withdrew its troops from its Kurdish areas in the north – troops it badly needed in other parts of the country. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed People's Protection Units (YPG) subsequently took power there, proclaiming three Kurdish cantons: Jazira and Kobani in the east and Afrin in the northwest. Since that moment, Ankara's goal of bringing down Assad has been increasingly overshadowed by the fear of a "Kurdish threat."

Given the prospect of a permanently Kurdish-controlled region in the north of Syria, Assad was downgraded from Turkey's main enemy to a second-tier menace. What Ankara now feared most was that the Kurds would be able to establish a land connection between the two cantons in the east and Afrin in the west. If the Kurds also succeeded in gaining access to the Mediterranean from Afrin, it would jeopardize the balance of power in the Middle East,

at least from a Turkish perspective. Indeed, it would mean that the autonomous Kurdish regions in northern Iraq, which are able to export their oil only via Turkish territory, would theoretically gain sea access independent of Turkey – a true nightmare for Ankara. As early as February 2016, then Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu warned: "Turkey's position is clear: The YPG will not pass to the west of the Euphrates River and the east of Afrin." The first Turkish campaign in Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield lasted from August 2016 to March 2017 – was designed to drive an Arab wedge between the eastern Kurdish cantons and Afrin; and it succeeded in doing just that. The goal of the second campaign is now to replace the Kurdish administration in Afrin with a leadership that does Ankara's bidding. Turkey officially insists that its attack is not aimed at the Kurds, arguing that its real goal is to defeat the PYD, which is closely affiliated to the PKK and thus deemed a terror organization. But this is only half the story at best. It is true that the PYD is closely linked to the PKK in terms of ideology and personnel. In the 1980s, then Syrian ruler Hafez al-Assad permitted PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to wage his war against the Turkish state from a base in Syria. During this time, the PKK gained a lot of momentum from Syrian Kurds, in particular in Afrin. It is also true that the PYD is a Syrian offshoot of the PKK. However, two other factors serve to considerably weaken the Turkish argument. First, the Syrian Kurds – unlike the PKK – never carried out attacks on representatives of the Turkish state. Second, statements by Turkish politicians have made it clear that their goal is not only the dissolution of PYD/YPG rule in Afrin, but indeed the abolishment of any form of Kurdish self-government whatsoever, no matter who is in charge. Ankara's approach is motivated by a desire to avoid a repeat of the "first sin" of Kurdish autonomy as it exists in Iraq.

The conflict also has an ideological component that is often overlooked: The sociopolitical model of the Kurds in Afrin represents

what can be described as the polar opposite of any concept of social organization to which Erdoğan would subscribe, especially with regard to issues like the quota system designed to encourage the participation of women in public life, decentralized structures and the subordinate role accorded to Islam in Afrin. Approaches such as these are alien to Erdoğan. Instead, Turkey is trying to export the image of the Islamic Turkish ruling party (AKP) to Syria. In

Without the Kurds, the fight against IS would most likely continue to rage today. Washington also sees the Kurdish territories as a buffer zone against the influence of Iran. This is the point at which the interests of Ankara and Washington intersect, as both countries are highly suspicious of Teheran's military and financial involvement and the Iranian-supported fighters in Syria. In Turkey, however, mistrust of the Kurds surpasses such misgivings,

For precisely these reasons, Moscow has always used Kurdish political aspirations to increase its political influence in the region. The Syrian Kurds were even permitted – much to the consternation of Turkey – to open a quasi-diplomatic representative mission in Moscow. Nevertheless, Russia, which has deployed its S-400 missile defense system in Syria and controls the airspace in the north of the country all the way to the Euphrates, has given

And yet, whether or not Turkey will profit in the long term from the Afrin operation is questionable. In the short term, the offensive has strengthened Erdoğan in the domestic arena. Turkey is currently experiencing a phase of war hysteria. In fact, anyone who refuses to join in becomes automatically suspicious. Nonetheless, it will most likely be hard for Turkey to find even partially influential collaborators in Afrin. Instead, Kurd-

ish terrorism will undoubtedly gain new momentum. Indeed, for at least five decades, Turkey has learned the bloody and recurring lesson that the terror carried out by the Kurds and Kurdish aspirations for self-government cannot be repressed simultaneously in the long term. Turkish politicians have been threatening for years that they will never permit the emergence of a "terror corridor" in Syria. However, Turkey's intervention in Afrin might just have the opposite effect; it may lead to the creation of precisely such a "terror corridor." That is, of course, if Turkey continues its attempt to combat this possibility by military means alone.



Battle ready. Turkish soldiers before departing from their battalion within the Turkish Armed Forces' Operation Olive Branch to Afrin on Feb. 6, 2018, in Siirt, Turkey.

other words, Turkish tanks are also carrying Erdoğan's ideas with them. This means that a country only recently praised as a democratic model for the Middle East has now become an exporter of autocracy.

Turkey is also eager to generate a factsheet for a regional post-war order. In this sphere, however, it comes up against a complicated web of strategic interests held by the other players involved in Syria. The United States was previously allied with the Syrian Kurds. Indeed, the YPG was the Americans' most effective ground force in the fight against the Islamic State, which, until last year, was considered the greatest threat in the region.

especially as their interests intersect with those of Iran in this case; indeed, Iran also has a Kurdish minority, and Tehran sees the suppression of any efforts by the Kurds to form self-government as one of its many *raison d'état*. In a certain sense, the Kurds are the only link between Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus – nobody wants to give the Kurds anything.

MICHAEL MARTENS is a correspondent for Southeast Europe and Turkey at the German daily newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.

SECURITY CHALLENGES



PICTURE ALLIANCE/LAURA SCHMIDT

Refugees from Libya are one of Europe's most pressing political challenges. But both terrorism and uncontrolled migration are symptoms of broader problems stemming from the lack of a functioning Libyan state.

BY SILVIA COLOMBO
AND NATHALIE TOCCI

(Tri)poli-sci

Squaring the triangle of security, migration and state-building in Libya

Making sense of Libya through the lens of the nation state was never easy. This has been all the more true since 2011 when the country plunged into chaos and violence, triggering seven years of multi-layered intra-state conflicts, the proliferation of non-state actors, external interference and regional rivalries. The outcome has been the disintegration of the Libyan state in all but name.

But rather than targeting efforts on (re)constituting state institutions and governance with a view to achieving sustainable stability, most external interventions have focused almost exclusively on security and migration control. These two issues unquestionably affect European interests at their core. But the myopic way they have been addressed risks jeopardizing the very construction of a sustainable Libyan state.

Since September 2017, UN Special Envoy Ghassan Salamé has launched a new round of the Libyan political dialogue process. The roadmap guiding this work is centered on three goals: achieving a new constitution, fostering national reconciliation and holding elections. While there is little clarity about the timing and sequencing of these goals, holding elections by September 2018 has become the new mantra among Libyan politicians and international players.

Nevertheless, in light of the persisting violence, few genuinely believe that Libya can meet the technical, legislative, political as well as security conditions to go to the polls. Trapped between an unclear sequencing of political goals and ongoing instability on the ground, the renewed dialogue process in Libya has witnessed scant concrete action as of late.

By contrast, genuine action has marked the security and migration dossiers. Europeans are increasingly concerned that following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Libya will become the primary safe haven for terrorists fleeing the ranks of the IS after the fall of Mosul and Raqqa. Indeed, Libya is an obvious destination for such groups given its condition of "limited statehood" and its hosting of jihadist groups made up of indigenous people and foreigners.

One need only recall the case of the Islamic State in Libya, whose activities have picked up again only a year after Sirte's liberation in early December 2016. At the regional level, around 25,000 to 30,000 foreign jihadist fighters are expected to seek their way home, with Libya representing both an appealing transit country as well

as a logistical hub for launching terrorist attacks in Europe or elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East. Against this backdrop, stabilizing Libya is rightly viewed as imperative.

However, the lack of national institutions in the country coupled with the sense of urgency posed by the terrorist threat has led the international community and regional players to bypass national authorities in engaging directly with local non-state actors – including militias – as a more effective way of delivering short-term security. Doing so has delegitimized those fragile national institutions the international community in principle supports and empowered further local actors. In other words, the pursuit of short-term security risks jeopardizing the strategic goal of state-building in Libya, which is critical to long-term security in Libya, Europe and the entire region.

The case of migration presents a similar paradox. The perceived migration crisis in Europe, and most acutely in Italy with its disproportionate exposure to irregular flows, has elevated migration control to a top policy priority.

This has created an irresistible temptation for European political leaders, notably Italy's non-nonsense Interior Minister Marco Minniti, to seek the cooperation of a wide range of local actors in Libya in pursuit of stop-gap measures.

The significant drop in the number of migrants reaching Italy along the Central Mediterranean route in the second half of 2017 – with an 83 percent reduction in August arrivals in Italy compared to the previous year – has been the result of the co-option of militias previously enmeshed in the smuggling and trafficking business. This co-option has taken the form of cash incentives to local elites and militias, offering them – and the population they cater to – less illicit forms of livelihood.

Minniti does not deny the short-term benefit of such forms of cooperation, which may be necessary to diffuse the perceived crisis and thus hopefully create the political conditions for more structural long-term measures. Alas, the reverse may well occur, with the empowering of local militias for the sake of migration control further debilitating those national

institutions the international community claims to support.

In parallel, the international community, with Italy at the forefront, has sought to strengthen the capacities of Libyan security forces – most notably the Libyan Coast Guard – with a view to stemming migration flows. While a coast guard may be one feature of a functioning state, it is hardly the first institution to consider in the context of genuine state-building efforts.

In a fragmented context such as Libya, the local level cannot be ignored. But the perceived urgency of dealing with terrorism and the so-called migration crisis has led to a disproportionate empowerment of such local forces at the outright expense of central state institutions. Any strategy of co-option tends to empower certain groups at the expense of others, thus fueling further confrontation. The fight against jihadist terrorism and the management of migration are unimpeachable goals. Yet pursuing them in a hyped and securitized political and media climate has minimized space for a meaningful Europe-backed, UN-led transition and reconciliation process.

Terrorism and uncontrolled migration are two very different symptoms of broader problems stemming from the prolonged lack of a functioning Libyan state. Filling this gap is only possible through a constitution, national reconciliation and elections. In addition, Libya's European partners should demonstrate that they care about the future of the country through the meaningful broadening of their footprint and their engagement with Libya beyond security cooperation and the management of migration. Addressing the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the country, particularly in the south, is a key priority for the Libyan people.

Enforcing security and controlling migration should not be the only two lenses through which Libya is viewed and approached. Doing so not only means relegating the country to a future of state implosion and perpetual conflict; it also means – paradoxically – that both terrorism and uncontrolled migration will remain European challenges for many years to come.

SILVIA COLOMBO is head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Program at IAI.
NATHALIE TOCCI is director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), honorary professor at the University of Tübingen and special adviser to EU HRVP Federica Mogherini.

"Frequently acts on the most high-profile cases of public interest"

[Europe's Best Lawyers and Law Firms – Chambers and Partners]

LANSKY, GANZGER + partner is a Central European law firm bridging businesses, media and national and international political institutions. Native language experts, lawyers and advisors from more than 20 nations bring the necessary skills to the table to solve a wide range of problems. Through its offices in Vienna (Austria), Bratislava (Slovakia), Astana (Kazakhstan) and Baku (Azerbaijan), as well as by numerous partner firms in more than 50 countries, LGP is present throughout Europe and worldwide. The firm draws on excellent ties in governmental networks within the European Union and CEE/SEE as well as in CIS/Central Asia and provides clients with the capacity to work across several jurisdictions in a wide range of fields.

**LANSKY,
GANZGER**
+ partner
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Biberstrasse 5, A-1010 Vienna (Austria)
T: +43 1 533 33 300
F: +43 1 532 84 83
E: office@lansky.at

www.lansky.at

VIENNA BRATISLAVA BAKU ASTANA



SECURITY CHALLENGES

Home-made weaponry

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are planning a massive boost to domestic weapons production by 2030

BY MARKUS BICKEL

The goal is ambitious. Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) will create 40,000 new jobs by 2030. And that's not all: The new state-owned defense contractor would produce half of the Saudi forces' weapons requirements by the end of the next decade. The Saudi Kingdom, which of late has made headlines primarily through vast imports of state-of-the-art weaponry, plans to start exporting to all parts of the world. Most recently, on a visit to Riyadh in May 2017, US President Donald Trump and King Salman bin Saud agreed on contracts and memoranda of understanding worth \$110 billion in arms sales.

However, if the ambitious 32-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has his way, transactions such as these will soon be a thing of the past. The new boss in Riyadh plans to make SAMI one of the world's top 25 defense contractors by 2030. But in view of the aggressive foreign policy pursued by the kingdom – itself threatened by Islamic State terrorist attacks – following the death of King Abdullah in 2015, this is a headlong rush.

The rearmament is the consequence of the worsening rivalry with Iran over regional hegemony; with well over 7,000 heavy weapons systems each, the countries are more or less at parity. The Saudi arsenal is, however, far more modern. But for Israel, their military is the best equipped in the region. At \$12.7 billion, Iran's military expenditure is only one-fifth that of the Saudis.

But Saudi resources are not unlimited, especially given the shortfalls in revenue resulting from low oil prices. In the long run, the kingdom cannot fight the costly wars it is waging while spending many more billions on arms imports. Neither in Yemen, where the Saudi Air Force and ground forces are directly involved in the conflict, nor indirectly in Syria is an end to the fighting in sight.

To terminate this dependency – particularly on the US – bin Salman is relying on a home-grown solution. His goal is to fortify Saudi Arabia's own military-

China. For 2018, \$56 billion is earmarked for the armaments budget. In view of the ongoing operations in Yemen, this sum will almost certainly be exceeded, as it was the previous year. The kingdom wants that money to benefit its own economy in the near future; by 2030, the goal is for SAMI to generate annual revenue of 14 billion riyals, or \$3.7 billion.

What applies to Saudi Arabia also applies to Riyadh's main ally in the fight against IS and Iran: the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the wake of the US military's creeping retreat from the region, the crown princes known in the Arab world as MBS (Mohammed bin Salman) and MBZ (Mohammed bin Zayed) have been working to overhaul their import-dependent economies before the oil era ends. In both countries, Agenda 2030 is the name of the program to massively expand and diversify local industry, including defense technology.

The UAE is already ahead of Saudi Arabia in the development of an independent defense industry. Over the past five years, Abu Dhabi's leadership has invested an average of \$23.4 billion in defense. In 2005, that figure was only \$9.4 billion. Since 2014, the Emirates Defense Industries Company (EDIC) has comprised a powerful coalition of domestic companies that now produces munitions with more or less autonomy. The biennial Abu Dhabi International Defence Exhibition & Conference (IDEX)

has become one of the world's major arms exhibitions. In 2019, organizers expect more than a thousand producers from over 50 countries.

The 36-year-old heir to the throne, Mohammed bin Zayed, is driving the UAE's independent arms sector. The wealthy gulf state's military entanglements have not slowed the trend. In the war against IS in Syria and Iraq, the Emirati Air Force has flown more missions than any other country involved in Operation Inherent Resolve, with the exception of the US. Moreover, UAE pilots have repeatedly attacked jihadist positions in Libya, 4,000 kilometers away.

And in Yemen, 4,000 soldiers from the Emirates, including 1,500 special forces, constitute the most significant ground force of

coming to an end. This shift in military thinking was accelerated by the refusal of then-US President Barack Obama to intervene militarily in Syria, even after the government's poison gas attacks on opposition-held areas in September 2014.

Only by expanding their own industries can the two major powers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) assert their leadership in the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), founded last year and headquartered in Riyadh. Thirty-nine other, mostly Muslim states have since joined the alliance, which is all but certain to intensify its collaborative efforts in the medium term.

To be sure, the rich Arab Gulf States cannot do without technology transfer from the West for the foreseeable future, despite all their efforts towards autonomy. Part of the SAMI strategy is thus to expand through joint ventures with foreign defense companies. Deals with arms giants Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and General Dynamics were penned last year. During a visit to Moscow in autumn 2017, SAMI Chairman Ahmed Al-Khatib agreed to projects with Russian arms giant Rosoboronekport.

To ensure lasting access to Western expertise, SAMI hired Andreas Schwer as its new CEO in December 2017. His previous employer, Düsseldorf-based Rheinmetall Defense, has been

MARKUS BICKEL is editor-in-chief of *Amnesty Journal*. From 2012 to 2015 he was based in Cairo as Middle East correspondent for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. His book *Die Profiteure des Terrors – Wie Deutschland an Kriegen verdient und arabische Diktaturen stärkt* (The Profiteers of Terror – How Germany makes money through war and strengthens Arab dictatorships) was published by Westend-Verlag in 2017.

working to internationalize its defense portfolio for years. Since 2012, Schwer had headed Rheinmetall's combat systems division – a growth sector, not least because of the wars on the Arabian Peninsula.



FOTOA

IRAN SO FAR AWAY

Western allies continue their search for the right way to handle the Islamic Republic

BY CORNELIUS ADEBAHR

The violent unrest in many Iranian cities took officials and foreign observers by surprise. It stemmed from the pent-up frustration of regular people in the provinces over unemployment, price hikes and corruption, while the world focused more on Iran's increasing regional might and the uncertain state of the nuclear deal.

The relative calm inside the country has given way to a domestic quarrel over how to respond to the hitherto unknown outburst of anti-regime sentiment among ordinary people, who are generally considered the Islamic Republic's conservative bulwark. Today, almost 40 years after the 1979 Revolution, is a watershed moment for both politics in Tehran and transatlantic policy towards Iran.

As it turned out, rather than killing the 2015 nuclear deal outright, a reluctant President Donald Trump threw it another lifeline by again suspending important US sanctions for another 120 days. However, in the same breath he handed his European allies an ultimatum: Work with him to confront Iran's "malign activities" by cutting off funding to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, designating the Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and constraining Iran's development and proliferation of missiles – which in his eyes would "fix the terrible flaws of the Iran nuclear deal" – or he will withdraw the US from the deal when the next sanctions waiver is due in mid-May.

Trump's early tweets in support of the Iranian demonstrators ("Time for change") led some to believe he would use the street protests as a justification for the immediate termination of sanctions relief. He had forged an Arab-Israeli-American coalition against Iran during his first trip abroad in May 2017. In this he declared Tehran, alongside Pyongyang, to be one of the two

main threats to the US National Security Strategy adopted in mid-December 2017. There is little doubt that he wishes to be the president "overseeing" regime change in Iran, even if it were not orchestrated by Washington but by "the great Iranian people" (Trump on Twitter).

Yet Trump has held back for now, if only – and this is the second point – to issue a stern ultimatum to America's allies to change course. The Europeans are adamant to preserve the nuclear deal precisely for its ability to block Iran's path to the bomb – an analysis they share with the Russians and Chinese as well as with the majority of international experts. While they have concerns over the country's regional policy, they see Tehran as a key player in the Middle East that must be engaged rather than isolated. The EU thus aims to open the country through economic exchanges and to involve it in regional conflict resolution.

However, America's persistent questioning of the deal has already undermined the position of the West (i.e. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU and the United States) vis-à-vis the other signatories (China, Russia and Iran itself). Trump purposefully conflates the deal's core bargain – roughly speaking, a substantive inspection of Iran's nuclear program in return for the lifting of international economic sanctions – with Tehran's growing regional power projection. His argument is that the former has enabled the latter.

Yet the opposite is actually true: The deal, which Tehran has thus far strictly observed according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entrusted with overseeing the agreement, has at least reduced the nuclear threat.

A US withdrawal from the deal would not only reopen the nuclear issue, but also give hardliners in Iran a welcome reason to put down domestic dissent. The credibility of international diplomacy would be severely undermined, with consequences for other hotspots such as North Korea and America's global rivalry with China and Russia.

As the nuclear deal's lead negotiator, what can the EU do now? The Europeans have thus far been looking for a way to stop Washington from withdrawing and not to jeopardize their developing relations with Iran. This was a difficult diplomatic feat even before the recent unrest and Trump's four-month ultimatum. The US has now added insult to injury. The measures demanded from the Europeans would not only render even a limited partnership with the Iranians impossible, they would also violate explicit provisions of the agreement.

To avoid risking further transatlantic alienation at a time of global insecurity, the Europeans will seek a face-saving compromise. A solution could evolve around stricter EU measures against Iranian missiles in return for a US reaffirmation of the 2015 deal. Yet the EU can never be certain whether Trump is open to a way out of the impasse. More than ever US, Iran policy is based on Washington politics, not on questions of transatlantic partnership or even the facts on the ground in Iran.

Far beyond the questions of nuclear proliferation, regional security and human rights, the dispute over the correct approach to Iran is a palpable – and rather frightening – symptom of traditional allies drifting apart.

CORNELIUS ADEBAHR is an independent political analyst and consultant. He is a non-resident fellow at Carnegie Europe in Brussels and an associate fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin. He is the author of *Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond* (2017).



MBS and MBZ are arming the Gulf. Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates.

industrial complex – producing rockets, guided missiles, drones, ammunition and land vehicles – in just over a decade, with SAMI spearheading the effort. "The company will seek to be a key catalyst," said Salman in the spring of 2017 on the occasion of SAMI's founding, "to localize 50 percent of total government military spending by the year 2030."

In 2017, the defense budget – under direct control of the aged King Salman's favorite son – reached just over \$60 billion, according to Jane's Defense Industry. Only two states spent more money on their armed forces and new weapons: the US and

the anti-Iranian military alliance. The soldiers from Abu Dhabi are fighting not only against the Houthis rebels, who are supported militarily by Tehran, but also against members of al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). UAE, which gained independence from Britain only in 1971, has seen dozens of its soldiers killed in Yemen.

Through their homegrown policy, the two mighty crown princes could revolutionize how the global defense industry does business in the long run; the practice of Gulf Arabs using their oil wealth for arms purchases and investments in the West is slowly

Both in the Emirates and in Saudi Arabia, the German arms contractor is doing good business. In 2016, Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM) – a South African joint venture – completed a munitions factory on the premises of Saudi Arabia's Military Industries Corporation (MIC) in Al Kharij, southeast of Riyadh. Its goal is the daily production of 300 artillery and 600 mortar rounds for the Saudi armed forces, but also for export.

Ziel ist die Produktion von 300 Artillerie- oder 600 Mörsergeschossen täglich. Für die saudischen Streitkräfte. Aber auch zum Export.

01 MALI

The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and military missions led by G5 Sahel countries – Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger – were deployed to combat extremism in the region in April 2013. France is leading Operation Barkhane, having deployed approx. 1,600 soldiers to protect civilians and aid local military efforts. Over 13,000 peacekeepers are working in Mali on one of the UN's most dangerous missions. Despite increased foreign involvement, some militant groups still maintain control of areas in northern Mali. Other militant groups have been driven across borders to territories outside the G5 Sahel mission's mandate. In late January 2018, the UN threatened sanctions against individuals blocking the implementation of provisions of a 2015 peace agreement. The accord includes demobilization and reintegration of the warring parties, decentralization and the establishment of a regional police force.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MALIAN REFUGEES: 140,100 (UNHCR)

02 LIBYA

Rising violence since the ouster and subsequent death of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011 has stymied Libya's attempts to rebuild state institutions. The country's secular-leaning Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) has tried to claim legitimacy as Libya's main authoritative power. The General National Congress (GNC) – initially tasked with writing a constitution after Qaddafi's ouster – was voted out in August 2014. Yet the GNC reconstituted itself as a rival government in Tripoli, pulling together former GNC members and Islamist militias. In September 2014, HoR appointee General Haftar of the Libyan National Army (LNA) began attacking Islamist militant groups in Benghazi and called for the dissolution of the GNC. In response an alliance of Islamists and militias formed Libya Dawn. The conflict pits the Libya Dawn coalition, which controls Tripoli and much of western Libya, against Haftar's coalition. Haftar is a likely contender in potential national elections at the end of 2018.

NUMBER OF COMPETING POWER CENTERS: 3 (ECFR)

03 EGYPT

Egypt's military campaign against Wilayat Sinai (formerly Ansar Beit al-Maqdis) in the Sinai Peninsula has intensified since it declared allegiance to IS in November 2014. In October 2015, Wilayat Sinai claimed responsibility for downing a Russian airplane in response to Russia's fight against IS in Syria. The previous year, the group carried out the largest terrorist attack in Egypt since 2005, killing 31 soldiers. The intense military campaign led by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has targeted the insurgency in Sinai and near the Gaza Strip. The military has bulldozed hundreds of homes in Rafah on the border with Gaza, suspecting that Hamas is arming the Sinai militants. Sisi has also sought to clamp down on Muslim Brotherhood supporters, labeling the group a terrorist organization in December 2013. Egyptian security forces are also closely monitoring IS fighters returning from Syria and Iraq. They worry an influx of battle-hardened IS veterans could add new volatility to Egypt's militant environment.

ESTIMATED YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT: 33% (WORLD BANK)



04 NIGERIA

The Nigerian military – with assistance from Chad, Cameroon and Niger – has pushed Boko Haram out of a number of provinces in northeastern Nigeria, but the group continues to launch deadly suicide attacks and wield considerable influence. While the conflict has been primarily contained in the Muslim north, Nigeria's intelligence agency has identified attempts to expand the group's activities into Lagos and neighboring countries. Amnesty International reports that hundreds were killed by Boko Haram violence in Cameroon. Boko Haram has been trying since 2009 to establish an Islamic state in northeast Nigeria, from where it has launched attacks and suicide bombings in Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Over 15,000 people have been killed and millions displaced. In October 2017, Chad withdrew 2,000 troops it had sent to Niger. In January 2018, Nigerian authorities insisted Boko Haram had been vanquished, yet the group's fighters continue to attack military and civilian targets.

ESTIMATED DISPLACED PEOPLE IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN: 2.3 MILLION (UNHCR)

05 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) of the Fulani ethnic group and the Popular Front for the Renaissance (FPRC) of the Gula and Runga ethnic communities are battling for control in the Ouaka and Haute-Koto prefectures. The conflict has left 60 percent of the country in poverty. Repeated attacks have been carried out against UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, further undermining security. Fourteen UN peacekeepers were killed in 2017. Most armed groups, e.g. the anti-Balaka and FPRC forces, have ignored President Touadera's attempts at disarmament.

NUMBER OF UN PEACEKEEPERS: 11,500 (UN)

06 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

At least 70 armed groups are believed to be operating in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite the stabilizing presence of over 19,000 UN peacekeepers, the stronger militant groups in the region, e.g. the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), terrorize communities, control weakly governed areas of the country and finance their activities by exploiting the country's natural resources. The UN estimates there are at least 2.7 million internally displaced persons in the DRC, and c. 450,000 DRC refugees in other nations.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX RANK: 176 (UNDP)

America's new relationship to the world, China's amplified international assertiveness, Russia's claims to influence and the EU's internal struggles have dominated headlines in 2017. Yet armed conflicts around the globe have not vanished. Our status report reflects the multi-faceted state of affairs with potential ramifications for all players on the international stage.

Additional data compiled from the Council on Foreign Relations, the BBC and The New York Times

09 LEBANON

Lebanon has absorbed more than one million Syrian refugees since the start of the conflict in 2011. This equals nearly one-fourth of Lebanon's population and more refugees than were accepted by any other country bordering Syria. The World Bank predicts these refugees will cost Lebanon close to \$7.5 billion. The spillover from Syria has also heightened sectarian tensions in Lebanon. The divisions in the country have been exacerbated as IS battles with Hezbollah and other Shia groups in Lebanon. Hezbollah is deeply involved in Syria's civil war, siding with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. An estimated 1,200 Hezbollah fighters have been killed in Syria since the start of the conflict. In November 2015, IS targeted a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, killing 43 and injuring over 200 in double suicide bomb attacks – the deadliest since the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990. Hezbollah areas in southern Beirut had been targeted in 2013 and 2014, but mostly by Sunni militants opposing Hezbollah's decision to join the fight in neighboring Syria.

Further complicating the situation, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri temporarily resigned in November 2017, accusing Iran of plotting his assassination. He then traveled to Saudi Arabia, where his stay drew criticism from many who felt his hosts had manipulated the situation and were keeping him from returning. Hariri returned to Lebanon on Nov. 21 and by early December had rescinded his resignation and returned to power.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF REGISTERED REFUGEES: 1,012,969 (UNHCR)

10 YEMEN

The intervention of regional powers in Yemen's conflict – including Iran and Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia – threatens to draw the country into the broader Sunni-Shia divide. The insurgency led by the Houthis, a Shiite rebel group with links to Iran, has pushed the country into further turmoil. UN-brokered peace talks between allied Houthi rebels and the internationally recognized Yemeni government stalled in summer 2016. The Houthis ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government and announced the formation of a "political council" to govern the capital Sanaa and much of northern Yemen. Fighting continues between rebels and the Saudi-backed government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Saudi Arabia, which has led a bombing campaign in Yemen to restore power to exiled President Hadi, pledged \$1.5 billion in humanitarian aid to the country in January 2018.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DISPLACED PERSONS: 3 MILLION (UNOCHA)

11 AFGHANISTAN

In August 2017, US President Donald Trump announced a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan, deepening US involvement in the Afghan government's fight against the Taliban and terrorist groups. Unconfirmed reports cite plans to send an additional 4,000 troops to Afghanistan, which will redefine success away from timetables and toward a conditions-based approach yet to be elaborated. In June 2017, NATO vowed to increase troop levels under the ongoing Resolute Support Mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). In late January 2018 Taliban terrorists conducted a series of attacks, killing more than 130 people in 10 days in Kabul. Afghan officials said they had expected the attacks to escalate after the US had put pressure on Pakistan, long seen as supporting Taliban insurgents as proxies in Afghanistan, and intensified the air campaign against the Taliban in the countryside.

US AID TO AFGHANISTAN: \$18.8 BILLION (USAID)

12+13 PAKISTAN AND INDIA

Continued violence in Kashmir and looming terrorist activity by Pakistan-based militant groups have sustained the threat of serious military confrontation between India and Pakistan. In September 2016, armed militants attacked a remote Indian Army base in Uri near the Line of Control, killing 18 soldiers in the deadliest attack on the Indian armed forces in decades. Indian officials have blamed the attack on Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad, which has alleged ties to the Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's main intelligence agency. In response, the Indian military announced it had carried out "surgical strikes" on terrorist camps inside Pakistan-controlled territory across the Line of Control. The Pakistani military denied that any such operation had taken place. Territorial disputes over the Kashmir region sparked two of the three major Indo-Pakistani wars in 1947 and 1965, and a limited war in 1999. Tensions remain high between the neighboring countries, each with a nuclear arsenal. In 2016, India and Pakistan temporarily expelled each other's diplomats on charges of espionage, while an uptick in cross-border firing along the Line of Control continued throughout 2017 and into 2018, with military and civilian casualties on both sides.

AREA OF DISPUTED TERRITORY: 118,950 SQUARE MILES (BBC)

14 MYANMAR

Violence and tensions between Buddhist and Muslim communities continue in Myanmar's Rakhine State. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas have fled the country. After winning Myanmar's first national election in more than 25 years, the National League for Democracy, a party unofficially led by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, has moved slowly to address the status of the Rohingya people, who were not allowed to vote in the election. Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed in January 2018 to a two-year time frame for returning the displaced Rohingyas refugees to Myanmar.

ESTIMATED BURMESE ROHINGYA POPULATION: 1.3 MILLION (BBC)

VOLKSWAGEN
GROUP

Approaches to security are most effective when shared. So is mobility.

Whether it's security or mobility, sharing is the most effective way of making progress. Ride pooling from MOIA, the Volkswagen Group's mobility startup, is just one example of how Volkswagen is helping to create a smarter, safer and better world for everyone.

SECURITY CHALLENGES

Balkan troubles

Two decades after the Yugoslav Wars, security in the Western Balkans is again in peril, this time by organized crime and political and religious extremism

BY RÜDIGER ROSSIG

On the morning of January 16, 2018, Oliver Ivanović, 64, was on his way to the office of his citizens' initiative "Serbia, Democracy, Justice" in Kosovska Mitrovica when several shots were fired at him from a passing car. The Kosovo-Serb politician was soon pronounced dead on arrival at the local hospital.

Ivanović's murder raised eyebrows far beyond the borders of Kosovo, a state of 1.8 million inhabitants on the southeastern edge of Europe. One of the few Albanian-speaking Serb politicians in Kosovo, he was intent on maintaining good relations with the Albanian majority in this ethnically divided country.

The town of Kosovska Mitrovica has been divided since the Kosovo War in 1999. The part north of the Ibar River forms the largest Serb enclave in the otherwise Albanian-dominated former Serbian province, which declared independence ten years ago. For Serbia, Mitrovica is a symbol of its claim to Kosovo; for the international community it is a touchstone for the new multi-ethnic society it wants to see established in Kosovo. That also means that a lot of money flows into Mitrovica. Accordingly, political camps are fighting over the hearts and minds of the town's 84,000 people – and a good deal more.

Following Ivanović's killing, the editors of Vreme – an independent newspaper published in the Serbian capital of Belgrade

– speculated that he had become trapped between various criminal organizations and their political patrons, which cost him his life.

Whether this is true or not, the murder shows that, 19 years after the end of the Yugoslav Wars, threats to security in the Western Balkans no longer emanate from armies commanded by nationalist politicians. The armies of the countries in the region have all been firmly integrated into NATO structures (Serbia through an Individual Partnership Action Plan); Alliance troops are stationed not only in Kosovo, but also in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.

However, organized crime tied to local political and economic power structures could easily spark fresh violence, and it could come from more than just the former Kosovo Albanian Liberation Army, the UÇK. In Bosnia, both local and international institutions expressed astonishment when, in January, it came to light that armed paramilitary groups still exist in the country, which has been a de facto European protectorate since 1996.

This should come as no surprise. It is well known that, with the exception of in a small area in eastern Croatia, the weapons used in the wars of the 1990s were not confiscated or eliminated in any way. Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia all have their own arms industries and export weapons ranging from pistols to tanks. There is no lack of hardware for lethal conflict.

Moreover, the state institutions, armies and security structures of ex-Yugoslavia have seen no

real reform. Over the course of the wars, the ex-Communist-turned-nationalists joined forces with criminals to become today's Balkan elites, which is why SUVs without license plates can be seen on roads all over the region.

Drugs are sold openly on many street corners. Organized crime has little to fear from police or the courts in the Western Balkans.

Only Slovenia has succeeded in establishing institutions that can compare and compete with those of its Western neighbors. Croatia, on the other hand, has increasingly retreated to "Balkan" posturing since joining the EU nearly five years ago. Although acceptance of arbitration was a prerequisite for its EU accession, the conservative-nationalist government in Zagreb has recently abandoned EU arbitration over sovereignty rights in the Bay of Piran, which is claimed by both Croatia and Slovenia. Border disputes with Bosnia are also an issue. Moreover, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro have disagreed over their common borders as well.

Autocratic leaders and semi-authoritarian governments in these countries pose a threat to the rule of law, the separation of powers and media freedoms – it is no small wonder that people are "voting with their feet." According to conservative estimates, 100,000 people in the region leave their home countries every year – most of them for Western Europe. They are driven away by chronic unemployment, which impoverishes 30 to 60 percent of the population, as well as cor-

ruption and political patronage at all levels.

The EU, its member states and the US are well aware of the situation. Probably no other area in Europe hosts as much foreign military, police and intelligence personnel. Then there are the international institutions, such as the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and EULEX, the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo – the largest assemblage of EU staff outside Brussels. Although conditions in the region are clear to see, policies of foreign players do not seem to change. German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel announced last year that a plan for the entire Western Balkans would be forthcoming. So far, nothing has happened.

The same goes for EU development projects. Brussels supports the Western Balkans each year with millions of euros, but the plans for major road projects such as European traffic corridors V, VIII and X – which would create plenty of jobs – never get off the ground. As a result, China is now building roads and railways in the region.

Islamic extremism is also on the rise in the Balkans. More than a thousand volunteers from Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia fought for the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Their mere return could jeopardize the already fragile security in their home countries. At the same time, Salafists and Wahabists – ultra-conservative sects heavily financed by Saudi Arabia – are gaining an ever-firmer foothold in Muslim regions. Turkey, too, continues



Mourning Oliver Ivanović: The citizens of Kosovska Mitrovica light candles for the murdered Serb leader of the "Freedom, Democracy, Justice" initiative in Kosovo.

to increase its influence in the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire, while Russia woos the Orthodox populations of Serbia and Montenegro. The Russian news agency Sputnik is the most important media outlet in the region.

When Oliver Ivanović was assassinated – or, according to local media, "executed" – police were patrolling a mere 70 meters from the scene. Yet the officers noticed nothing suspicious. A few hours later, an Opel Astra without a license plate was found in flames at the outskirts of Kosovska Mitrovica. It had apparently been used by the gunmen, who remain at large.

It is high time for the EU to act decisively in the Western Balkans. A failure to do so now will mean a major security problem in the near future.

RÜDIGER ROSSIG is an editor at the German daily newspaper *taz* in Berlin. He is the author of the book (Ex-)Yugos: Junges Migrantinnen aus Jugoslawien und seinen Nachfolgestaaten in Deutschland ((Ex-)Yugos: Young migrants from Yugoslavia and its successor states in Germany) and the documentary *Bosnia and Kosovo – Europe's forgotten protectorates*.

SECURITY CHALLENGES

PUTIN FOREVER?

Russia's perennial leader is bent on completing his country's return to superpower status and recasting the global order in its favor

BY KATJA GLOGER

In February 1990, a young KGB officer departed from his first – and last – foreign posting and returned to a country that was still called the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin had spent five years in East Germany and bought a used car ("Volga") with his savings. His return luggage also included a used washing machine – a gift from his neighbors.

In Dresden, Vladimir Putin had experienced the fall of the Berlin Wall and learned to view civil rights activists as a threat. A similar implosion of state institutions took place in the Soviet Union. Like many Russians, Putin did not regard Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika as a new beginning, but as a collapse, a humiliation and a dangerous sell-out to the West: a "paralysis of power," as he would later say. He regarded the West's de facto victory in the Cold War as a kind of "Russian Versailles."

Fortunately for him, the old networks – contacts mostly cultivated by intelligence agents and (former) party members – survived the upheaval. This old and new elite enabled his ascent to the inner circles of power. He was "steadfast in a military way," as Boris Yeltsin, described his successor in late 1999.

One of the most notable political careers in recent history had begun. Now in power for 18 years – longer than Angela Merkel – Vladimir Putin is one of the world's longest serving leaders. He is the overwhelming favorite to win the Russian presidential "election" for the fourth time when it is held in March of this year. There is no alternative.

Opposing candidates? Several were permitted to register, all belonging to the official opposition and therefore bit players who know their roles in a staged democracy. Putin's only serious rival in the long term, Alexei Navalny, is barred from running. The Kremlin's political strategists are reported to be aiming for a "70/70" outcome: 70 percent turnout, 70 percent for Putin.

The turnout, however, is a source of concern. Not voting could be seen as a sign of protest. Faced with growing repression and condemned to political passivity, younger people in particular are turning their backs on the cynical farce of Russian politics. Although participants numbered only in the low tens of thousands, nationwide youth protests of the past year were certainly a warning to the elites, as "Generation Putin" took to the streets against Russia's bleak authoritarianism. Young people protested against the false values of an alleged new "Russian world" that is strictly anti-Western and demands patriotic obedience – a world in which Russia resembles a besieged fortress. Thousands of demonstrators were arrested and harsh sentences imposed – authorities would not permit a repeat of the 2012 mass demonstrations that the Kremlin says were instigated by the West.

In Putin's brand of "sovereign democracy," nothing can be left to chance. Accordingly, election day – March 18 – has its own significance as a historic date for

the new Russia; it is the fourth anniversary of the "homecoming" of the Crimea, the peninsula's reintegration into the Russian Federation following an illegal annexation from Ukraine.

Unassailable and unassailable, Vladimir Putin can be voted for as an "independent" candidate, a ruler seemingly with his own, unique, czar-like power who is now cementing his place in history. With apparent tirelessness, the "nationalist leader," as he is known in Russia, is working to fulfill his mission to complete Russia's resurrection and shape a new world order as the ruler of a sovereign superpower.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov postulated a "post-Western era" almost nonchalantly at the Munich Security Conference last year. Indeed, it can be assumed that a globally confrontational foreign policy will mask the essential social and economic structural reforms the Russian elite is unprepared for.

Unlike Russia, China, for example, has taken advantage of globalization, staking its claim to global leadership through gigantic economic projects such as the "New Silk Road." Russia, meanwhile, remains a structurally weak country. Putin's new strength and the legitimacy of his power are manifested in his willingness to opportunistically use Russia's resurgent military strength, if necessary in hybrid form. The reality that the West, and especially Germany, must face is one of confrontation over cooperation, mistrust over trust, as well as conspiracy theories and deadlocked narratives on both sides. And there is no end in sight. "Our biggest mistake was to trust you too much," Putin said in response to a question from a German participant at the 2017 Valdai Discussion Club, "and your mistake was to interpret and abuse this trust as weakness."

In this respect, Vladimir Putin agrees with the majority of Russia's population, which follows a centuries-old reflex comprising a fateful mix of feelings of inferiority and self-deception; they believe that Russia is respected only when Russia is feared. "We are morally right," said Sergei Karaganov, one of the Kremlin's better-known foreign policy advisers, and "we are smarter, stronger and more determined."

In any case, in Moscow's view, the US-dominated "liberal order" is coming to an end – a view Donald Trump seems to confirm day after day. The "post-Cold War order" and its democratic declarations such as the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe have had their day. Now, the new multipolar, post-Western world is returning to the principles of classical power politics – a balance, however unstable, among the major powers of Russia, the US and China.

In this sense, Putin's Russia is a revisionist power. Neither treaties nor laboriously negotiated compromises are what really matter, but rather the right of the strongest. It is no coincidence that in his speech to the UN three years ago, Vladimir Putin explicitly referred to the "order of Yalta," the division of Europe into spheres of influence.

Russia's decoupling from the West has been going on for a good ten years. Clear warning signs were ignored. Putin's fiery Munich speech against US hegemony in 2007 was just the beginning. One year later, then-Russian (interim) President Dmitry Medvedev was already talking about a zone of Russian "privileged interests," which basically includes

all post-

Second, Moscow sees a historic opportunity to end the era of US hegemony,

it regards as the

it regards as the "unipolar" aberration. The US is on the retreat strategically as it suffers under its inner contradictions. Although Moscow had initially placed its hopes on real political deals with Trump, he appeared to be the far better alternative to the despised Hillary Clinton.

But this optimism quickly vanished, and not just because of "Russiagate." The apparent resurgence of the US president, his unpredictability and his rhetorical readiness to escalate, such as in the conflicts with North Korea and Iran, make Moscow uneasy, not to mention the almost hysterical proclivity in the US Congress for anti-Russian sanctions. Moscow's relationship with the US has never been so bad since the end of the Cold War.

But the foreign policy vacuum left by the US is being filled wherever the opportunity arises. Putin is a risk-taking tactician who views politics as a zero-sum game. Every day in Syria, Russian bombers and helicopters defied Angela Merkel's mantra that there could be "no military solution." Putin wagered that neither the US nor Europe would intervene. His bet paid off. The Islamic State suffered defeat and Bashar al-Assad won the war. This is how Russia is establish-

ing itself as a new global player, above all in the Middle East.

With two military bases in Syria, Russian presence in the Mediterranean seems secured for a long time to come. Deployment of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system effectively grants Moscow sovereignty over the country. The potential reconstruction of the war-ravaged country with the help of international funds promises lucrative business for Russian companies. And with US Middle East policy in disarray, Moscow – as during the Soviet era – is proving itself a major diplomatic power in the region as it defines common security interests with Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Putin maintains good relations with Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and not only regarding arms exports.

It has been an astonishing success. Russia, once a declining regional power, is establishing itself as an "indispensable" nation.

In dealing with this new Russia, Western capitals have been counting – rather helplessly – on dual strategies from the Cold War, as was spelled out long ago in 1967 by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel: The West should advocate deterrence and containment while signaling desire for de-escalation. The implication here is an emphasis on dialogue, strategic patience and "principled pragmatism," as it was called – all the while seeking to maintain strategic stability. But this approach too is under threat.

This is because the nuclear card is back on the table, in both the East and West. Critics even fear the complete collapse of nuclear arms control. The INF Treaty, which was concluded in late 1987 between Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and US President Reagan and allowed the destruction of some 3,000 nuclear missiles stationed on land, is being undermined. The first real ban on a category of weapons was both a military and political turning point in Europe; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) ended Western Europe's direct nuclear threat from Soviet SS-20 missiles while the withdrawal of American Pershing 2 missiles from Western Europe enhanced the security of the Soviet Union. The INF Treaty heralded the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

For years, the US has been suspecting Russia of violating the treaty. Beyond (permitted) development and testing, it is believed that new SS-8 (9M729) medium-range missiles have actually been deployed in at least two battalions of the Russian armed forces. The NATO partners were informed of these movements last November by the US, although hard evidence was apparently not submitted.

Whereas one NATO member state – Poland – is debating the possible stationing of US nuclear weapons, another member – Germany – wants to avoid all discussion of an arms buildup.

The Russian leadership denies it is breaching the treaty. According to Putin, Russia can defend itself with ship-based medium-range missiles, like those used in Syria, for example. The Kremlin points to NATO's conventional superiority and the US anti-missile shield, currently based in Romania, whose launchers are similar to the ship-based Aegis Ashore anti-aircraft system. Aegis, Russia suspects, can also launch medium-range missiles.

Each side accuses the other of seeking pretexts for breaking out of the INF treaty. The looming security dilemma could lead to a new nuclear arms race, and of course that would be bad business for arms companies on both sides. The US Congress approved initial funds for the development of new medium-range missiles.

Vladimir Putin is claiming his place in history as architect of Russia's survival against the West and subsequent resurgence. Monuments built to commemorate his rule are only a matter of time. The remainder of his tenure will feature about as much democracy as it will profound economic or political modernization; an increase in any of these would mean the beginning of the end of the Putin system. Yet, as his oligarchs plunder the country in an unprecedented manner, it must also be noted that under Putin, many everyday Russian lives have improved for the first time in decades, at least temporarily. While the center of power increasingly resembles a czar's court, political stagnation at home is halted as stability.

Perhaps he is grooming a successor from the group of newcomers who have arisen amid his extensive staffing reshuffling of recent years – quiet, efficient, smooth technocrats such as chief of staff Anton Vaino or the new Minister for Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin. They are all loyal followers who, like the younger Putin, seem "steadfast in a military way."

In 2024, at the end of his next term, Vladimir Putin would be 72 – not exceedingly old. But the country is hostage to Putin – just as he is a prisoner of the system he created. "As long as there is Putin, there is Russia," his deputy chief of staff once said of him. "Without Putin – no Russia."

Putin forever? People initially laughed at the thought. No one is laughing anymore.

Russia could well have a strategic interest in breaking out of the INF Treaty, for example to better shield itself in the east against the unstoppable rise of China. At the same time, Moscow can use the INF crisis to test NATO's unity. Whereas one NATO member state – Poland – is debating the possible stationing of US nuclear weapons, another member – Germany – wants to avoid all discussion of an arms buildup.

The Russian leadership denies it is breaching the treaty. According to Putin, Russia can defend itself with ship-based medium-range missiles, like those used in Syria, for example. The Kremlin points to NATO's conventional superiority and the US anti-missile shield, currently based in Romania, whose launchers are similar to the ship-based Aegis Ashore anti-aircraft system. Aegis, Russia suspects, can also launch medium-range missiles.

Each side accuses the other of seeking pretexts for breaking out of the INF treaty. The looming security dilemma could lead to a new nuclear arms race, and of course that would be bad business for arms companies on both sides. The US Congress approved initial funds for the development of new medium-range missiles.

Vladimir Putin is claiming his place in history as architect of Russia's survival against the West and subsequent resurgence. Monuments built to commemorate his rule are only a matter of time. The remainder of his tenure will feature about as much democracy as it will profound economic or political modernization; an increase in any of these would mean the beginning of the end of the Putin system. Yet, as his oligarchs plunder the country in an unprecedented manner, it must also be noted that under Putin, many everyday Russian lives have improved for the first time in decades, at least temporarily. While the center of power increasingly resembles a czar's court, political stagnation at home is halted as stability.

Perhaps he is grooming a successor from the group of newcomers who have arisen amid his extensive staffing reshuffling of recent years – quiet, efficient, smooth technocrats such as chief of staff Anton Vaino or the new Minister for Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin. They are all loyal followers who, like the younger Putin, seem "steadfast in a military way."

In 2024, at the end of his next term, Vladimir Putin would be 72 – not exceedingly old. But the country is hostage to Putin – just as he is a prisoner of the system he created. "As long as there is Putin, there is Russia," his deputy chief of staff once said of him. "Without Putin – no Russia."

Putin forever? People initially laughed at the thought. No one is laughing anymore.

KATJA GLOGER writes for the German weekly *Stern* and is a longtime correspondent in Moscow. In 2017 she published *Fremde Freunde. Deutsche und Russen – Die Geschichte einer schicksalhaften Beziehung* (Foreign friends. Germans and Russians – The history of a fateful relationship).

AMAXX YOUR INDUSTRY!

MENNEKES®
Plugs for the world

www.MENNEKES.COM



Ukraine is still divided: everyday life at Stranitsa Luganskaya Village checkpoint.

Minsk Schminsk

The situation in Ukraine may seem calm. Underneath, it is anything but

BY REINHARD VESER

The daily reports issued by the OSCE Observer Mission in Ukraine testify to a constant stream of ups and downs. Sometimes the number of ceasefire violations increases over the previous day; other times it decreases. There is no definite direction either way – like a barely fluctuating wave that flares up on rare occasions. Today, as the war prepares to enter its fifth year, the political situation surrounding the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is similar to the state of affairs on the battlefield itself: moments of mounting tension alternating with signs of de-escalation. There is, of course, one difference; this wave spiked when Russian President Vladimir Putin requested a UN peacekeeping mission in the Donbass region in September of last year.

For the first time since the Minsk II negotiations in February 2015, a serious proposal came into play that had not been part of the agreement negotiated in the Normandy Format made up of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia. After a long standstill – marked by occasional disputes about the interpretation of the Minsk document, which was imprecise in many places – Putin's suggestion seemed to open up the possibility, if not for a solution to the conflict, then at least for an improvement to the overall security situation and living conditions of the people in the conflict zone. The suggestion to send in a UN mission was not new; in fact, the only new and surprising element was that the proposal came from Moscow,

which had wanted nothing to do with UN forces up until that point.

Any hopes associated with Putin's UN move have not materialized. Discussions of the mandate for a UN mission have become little more than another pretense for a brand of diplomatic trench warfare between Moscow on one side and the West and Ukraine on the other. The exchange of prisoners between Ukraine and the separatists at the end of December – as well as other potentially positive signals emanating from the region – has failed to have much positive impact.

Of course, the same applies to the developments that may lead to a destabilization or escalation of the conflict. Indeed, there were many such developments in the past several months, such as the overthrow in the "Luhansk People's Republic," the removal of Russian officers from the Russian-Ukrainian Coordina-

tion Center, the announcement regarding the delivery of American arms to the Ukraine and, at the end of January, the Ukrainian parliament's adoption of a law on the reintegration of occupied territories. However, in spite of everything that has happened in the past several months, there have been no real changes, for better or for worse.

The main reason for this stasis lies in Moscow. The Russian leadership brought the war to Ukraine in 2014, and it is the only party to the conflict that would be able to put a stop to it. And yet, the Kremlin's ongoing military and economic support for the "People's Republics" of Donetsk and Luhansk shows that it is eager to keep the conflict alive. For Russia, the de-facto Russian-occupied territories are a means to continue influencing developments in Ukraine; at the moment, they are doing so only indirectly and at the considerable political, economic, social and psychological cost of a devastating war for Ukraine. If elections in Ukraine in 2019 produce results that are even more confusing or have fundamentally different majorities,

the Donbass region might again become a lever for even more direct Russian influence on politics in Kiev.

Then again, the Russian leadership currently has no interest in any form of escalation in Eastern Ukraine. First of all, the Soccer World Cup is set to take place in Russia in June and July, and the success of this event is extremely important to Putin and his associates. Any form of escalation of the situation would cast a dark shadow over this prestigious project – and could even call it into question. Secondly, it is easy to see that as the conflict persists, the EU is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain unity regarding sanctions. Any intensification of the fighting in Ukraine would only serve to close ranks in the EU. Why would the Russian leadership contribute to such a development?

Apart from that, the Ukrainian political sphere continues to come to better terms with the situation in the Donbass region, which in any event they are powerless to change. For President Petro Poroshenko and

the other oligarchs, the ongoing conflict serves as a justification for slowing down or even reversing any judicial reforms that might hinder their power and business interests. At the same time, just like in the old days, this is a war fought in a realm where state coffers meet private pockets; in other words, there is a great deal of profiteering to be done, all of which requires very little effort to drape in the cloak of patriotism. Indeed, the needs of the army can be used to justify considerable expenditures. For the future of Ukraine, this relapse into former patterns now poses a danger that is at least as great as the daily skirmishes on the eastern front.

The fact that both sides have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo does not mean the situation is at all stable. All sides continue to hold to the Minsk II package of February 2015, at least in form; after all, they have nothing else. And yet, it is clear to everyone that things are not working, and nor will they ever as long as the fundamental constellation does not change, that is, as long as Russian interest

in the conflict remains. The only merit of Minsk II – one we should not underestimate – is that it ended open warfare. Since then, however, there has been very little progress in implementing the agreement. Nei-

ther the provisions regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines nor any of the political items have been complied with in any way.

The greater the degree to which all parties to the conflict see the three-year-old text as a lifeless piece of paper, the greater the danger of a new escalation – even if such an escalation were not intended by the parties. One major risk factor is the business interests and power struggles of the criminal groups who have played a significant role in the "People's Republics" since the beginning. However, even coincidences, misunderstandings and misjudgments can transform a local incident into a major conflagration, especially with the removal of Russian officers from the Russian-Ukrainian Coordination Center, which brought with it the loss of a direct channel of communication. With regard to the number of incidents and the constant stream of daily ups and downs in the Donbass region, there can be no doubt that a great wave of violence could break out again at a moment's notice.

Unlocking the deadlock

The underlying tensions and mistrust at the core of the conflict between Russia and the West

BY STEPHANIE LIECHTENSTEIN

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine is in its fourth year. More than 10,000 people have died so far, and the number of ceasefire violations is on the rise. The humanitarian situation is dire, especially for people living close to the line of contact. The area around the line is polluted with land mines, leading to civilian casualties and making it difficult for farmers to use their land. Moreover, critical infrastructure close to the line of contact has come under fire, cutting off water, electricity and gas and risking ecological disaster.

In addition, one of the few coordination bodies between Ukraine and Russia, known as the Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC), has been rendered all but useless by Moscow's decision in December 2017 to withdraw its officers. This makes it more difficult to reach local ceasefires and is a further impediment to ensuring the safety of the civilian

monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

While the situation remains dangerous, the conflict has largely slipped out of the public eye, as global political leaders have become preoccupied with a series of other challenges.

For the sake of European security and the future of Ukraine, the conflict cannot be allowed to fester. But what can be done?

First, the Minsk Agreements must be implemented fully. They foresee a ceasefire and a series of steps to be taken by Ukraine and Russia to settle the conflict. However, implementation has reached a deadlock as Ukraine and Russia have opposing positions on the sequence of necessary steps. Kiev is requiring a list of security aspects to be implemented before

agreeing to Moscow's political demands for local elections in Donbass and special status for the region. The list includes full implementation of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign troops and weapons. The significant lack of trust between the two sides has discouraged any readiness for compromise.

Second, international diplomatic efforts should be revived. The Normandy Format (Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany) has weakened due to domestic political deadlock in Germany following unresolved parliamentary elections and a seeming reluctance by France to take a more active role.

Third, close coordination between former US Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker, appointed Special Representative for the

Ukraine Negotiations by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in July 2017, and the Normandy Format is vital. Volker has held several meetings with Vladislav Surkov, Putin's personal adviser on Ukraine. They are currently both working on reconciling different views on a proposal made by President Vladimir Putin for a UN Peacekeeping Mission in Eastern Ukraine.

While the views are still far apart, Volker took up the issue again during his latest meeting with Surkov in Dubai on Jan. 26, 2018, and the idea seems still to be alive. There is hope that under the right circumstances, an armed UN peacekeeping mission could help unblock the impasse with regard to the Minsk Agreements. While this is still a controversial discussion, some experts believe

that such a mission could help create security in Eastern Ukraine, which Kiev has been demanding for some time. This in turn would enable Ukraine to move forward on implementing the political aspects of the Minsk Agreements, such as the holding of the local elections Moscow is asking for.

The UN peacekeeping mission would have to be deployed throughout the entire territory of Donbass – including at the Ukrainian-Russian border – to prevent the continuous flow of arms, military equipment and soldiers. It would also have to serve as more than just a protection force for the civilian monitors of the OSCE. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Eastern Ukraine has been on the ground since the start of the conflict and has established a valuable basis of trust with all sides. Through its daily reporting, the SMM currently provides the only reliable source of information about events on the ground in Eastern Ukraine. It will thus be important to establish close coord-

ination between the UN mission and the OSCE SMM from the outset. There is hope that with a more secure environment, the OSCE monitors could fully carry out their mandate. As it is now, their mission is often impeded and the monitors are frequently threatened at gunpoint.

Finally, the bigger challenge is to address the underlying tensions and mistrust at the core of the conflict between Russia and the West. Russia considers Ukraine a buffer between NATO and itself and is wary of losing any distance between its own territory and that of the Alliance. This begs the fundamental question of whether the current Euro-Atlantic security architecture meets the security demands of all key players – an issue that must be resolved at some point in the future.

STEPHANIE LIECHTENSTEIN is web editor-in-chief of the Security and Human Rights Monitor.

The disruptor

Russia seeks to exploit divisions in the West. But how big is the threat?

BY DMITRI TRENIN

General Curtis LeMay, chief of staff of the United States Air Force in the early 1960s, once interrupted one of his officers who described the Soviet Union as an enemy. The USSR, LeMay said, was not an enemy, but an adversary. The enemy was the US Navy, the general clarified, referring to the bitter and never-ending rivalry among the US military services.

Definitions matter. Today, Russia is variously and officially described in the United States as a competitor, rival or adversary – but not yet the enemy, a title implying war. Three of the US Government's guiding documents – the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review – adopted in the last six weeks point to great-power rivalry as a salient feature of the global geopolitical and security landscape. While Russia is no longer America's principal challenger – that title has gone to China – it is considered to be the main disruptor of the liberal world order designed, led and policed by Washington.

As such, Russia poses a definite political threat to US global dominance, and that threat is not hollow. Moscow's actions in Georgia in 2008 and again in Ukraine in 2014 have effectively stopped the heretofore open-ended enlargement of NATO to the east. The Russian military intervention in Syria in 2015 prevented the

ouster of Bashar al-Assad at the hands of the US-backed opposition. Moscow has entered into a situational alliance with Tehran; it has its own views and policies on Afghanistan and North Korea; and it is friends with Venezuela's current government. At the United Nations, Russia is not shy to use its veto power. It also works closely with China, often at cross-purposes with the United States. The Sino-Russian "entente" effectively limits the global writ of the United States and its allies.

However, it would be quite a stretch to claim that Russia has the power to do much political disruption within Western countries. While RT and Sputnik were hardly friendly to Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign, their activities, alongside those of any number of suspected Russian hackers and their partners, were not more than a drop in the ocean. Indeed, blaming Russia for all sorts of recent disappointments, including the Brexit vote and the strong electoral performance of some of non-systemic parties in Europe, from Germany's AfD to the Austrian FPÖ to France's Front National, works to downplay the failures of the ruling elites in various countries to respond to the fast-moving changes in their own societies. The same is also true of separatist movements, from Scotland to Catalonia to Corsica.

To be sure, Russia seeks to exploit divisions in the West to its advantage, and this is nowhere clearer than in the information sphere. With the mainstream

media almost completely dominating the public debate in Europe and North America, Russian government-funded outlets have turned themselves into purveyors par excellence of Western-originated dissent and even fringe analysis and views. In doing so, Russians are aiming to do to the West something akin to what the Voice of America or Deutsche Welle did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War: promote local alternatives to not only official government policies, but the established political narratives as well. This is an undeniable irritant, yet Russia is hardly the creator of the divisions it tries to fan.

In economic terms, Russia, a medium-sized economy in relation to GDP, is more on the receiving end. It must bear the brunt of the Western sanctions imposed in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. The message the sanctions are sending to the entire world is stark: those who wish to do business with Russia will have to deal with the United States. Russia's own counter-sanctions against the West have hurt a few European economies, but the damage they have felt has been far less than critical. Under

DMITRI TRENIN is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

the current circumstances, Russia would have been insane to use its "energy weapon" against Gazprom's clients in Europe, and since 2014 there have been no tempo-



Challenging the US global dominance: Russia's President Vladimir Putin during a joint Russian and Belarusian military exercises at Luzhsky training ground.

rary interruptions of Russian gas supplies to Europe. Rather, it is busy laying new pipelines, such as Nord Stream 2 and Turkish Stream. Ukraine's refusal to buy gas directly from Russia has also helped by precluding any potential squabbling over gas prices, non-payment under existing contracts or theft of transit gas designated for EU countries.

Over the past ten years, Russia has reconstituted its recently much-dilapidated military. Its defense modernization has resulted in a better-equipped, better-trained and better-led force capable of serving as a policy instrument. The Crimea operation, the military support given to the rebels in Donbass and the Syria campaign are testament to both the new capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces and the Kremlin's willingness to use those capabilities to achieve geopolitical objectives. The modernization program, begun in 2010, is still incomplete. However, it has already transformed the Russian military and revitalized the country's defense

industry, which was only recently considered moribund. Russia's elevation, alongside China, as a major military rival of the United States is a badge of achievement for the country's military.

The new confrontation between Russia and the United States has already resulted in the reemergence of a military standoff along Russia's borders with NATO countries in Eastern Europe. The more strained strategic environment in the region can be seen in recent developments such as the deployment of the Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and the emphasis on small-yield nuclear weapons in the US Nuclear Posture Review. In contrast to the Cold War, however, the danger of this confrontation lies less in the fundamental ideological antagonism between Moscow and Washington and more in the increased likelihood of incidents between Russian and NATO aircraft, an escalation of the unprovoked conflict in Donbass as well as proxy attacks and the asymmetrical responses they provoke in out-of-area locations such as Syria.

That said, the threat of a military collision is real enough and – to make matters worse – generally underappreciated. To keep Europe safe, it would behoove the West and Russia to take certain measures to minimize the risk of incidents involving their military forces: make sure there is a cease-fire worth the name in Donbass; restrain their proxies elsewhere, including in the Middle East; and establish reliable communication to avoid miscalculation. This is why the January visit to Washington of three Russian intelligence chiefs – of the FSB (Federal Security Service), SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service) and GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) – was so important. Unlike in the 1990s, when such contacts were trumpeted as a sign of growing trust, the mission now is to avoid tragic miscalculation in an environment where there is no trust. Russia and the United States may be adversaries again, but they must not be allowed to become enemies.

MISSILE DEFENSE • COMMAND AND CONTROL • SENSORS AND IMAGING • CYBER
ELECTRONIC WARFARE • PRECISION WEAPONS • TRAINING • MISSION SUPPORT

PROVEN INNOVATION. TRUSTED PARTNERSHIP.

Raytheon trusted, innovative solutions help customers in more than 80 countries protect people, secure information, defend infrastructure — to make the world a safer place.

 Raytheon.com
 @Raytheon
 Raytheon
 @raytheoncompany
 Raytheon

*Blue Marble™ image of Earth captured by Raytheon's Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite.

© 2018 Raytheon Company. All rights reserved.

Raytheon


Trusted solutions from a single source.

From compact IT security products for SMEs to scalable enterprise solutions, Rohde & Schwarz Cybersecurity provides:

- Secure and transparent networks
- Secure web applications
- Tap-proof communication
- Endpoint security and trusted management

Our award winning solutions protect companies, operators of critical infrastructures and public institutions from cyber threats. They are developed according to the "security by design" principle and prevent complex cyberattacks proactively, rather than reactively.

cybersecurity.rohde-schwarz.com



The Minsky Moment

The Minsk Protocol in the absence of trust

BY FYODOR LUKYANOV

Stock exchange traders know what a Minsky Moment is. It's when a market fails or falls into crisis after an extended period of market speculation or unsustainable growth. This phenomenon was named for Hyman Minsky, an economics professor famous for arguing that a long bull market tends to end in large collapse.

As we live in a world dominated by a market economy, some concepts seem to apply to political life as well. If we were to consider European security after the Cold War in market terms, it was undoubtedly a bull market for Euro-Atlantic institutions, featuring a spectacular rally that more than doubled collective assets. NATO increased in value (members) from 16 to 29 points, and the EU from 12 to 28. This rise was relatively smooth, as market bears could neither break nor significantly retard this trend, although markets became increasingly heated over time. The risk of losing a most attractive asset forced bears to perform a massive market intervention, which succeeded in breaking the trend.

The Minsky Moment arrived and caught the bulls by surprise, as they had become used to a linear market surge and forgot to hedge. Moreover, the fall of the market inflated previously earned assets as other market players started to doubt the sustainability of the investors who had boosted the rally. Yet the bears did not gain much either – intervention exhausted their resources as the market's overall depreciation devalued many stocks, including the one in question.

While the stock exchange analogy may be an oversimplification, especially as the "assets" are human and possess their own aspirations, this scheme can serve as an illustration of the genesis of the Ukrainian crisis. What happened in 2014 was not a sudden eruption of a geopolitical volcano, but rather the result of tectonic shifts that the bulls had seen as unavoidable, yet dismissed them as inconsequential. The fact that the collision of Russian and Western interests was formally caused by the expansion of the EU, not of NATO, was symbolic. The European Union had always claimed to have overcome old-fashioned geopolitical thinking and proposed a post-historical approach to community building in Europe. Yet the perception of their actions by others was just the opposite – a hypocritical, sophisticated disguise for traditional expansionism.

When the EU pushed for association agreements with the Eastern Partnership countries, no one predicted the migration crisis, the meltdown of major political parties across Europe or the brittle transatlantic relations in the wake of the political earthquake in the US. When Russia fiercely responded

to EU activities, few believed that Eastern Europe – the "East" of the Cold War and a traditional area for geopolitical controversy – would cease to remain the most important issue for Moscow. As it turns out, a reckoning with the real East – the Asia-Pacific dimension and the prospect of the "Asian century" – would become much higher priorities for Russia. The need for domestic transformation is also acute in Russia, as socio-economic and political schemes that had served development purposes in previous decades were complete and needed replacement by a new model.

The Minsk Protocol will only succeed as a prelude or first stage of a more comprehensive dialogue over Europe and Eurasia in the decades to come. None of the pasts, be it the 19th-century Vienna-style "concert of powers" or the late-20th-century Brussels-led "Wider Europe" can be reinstated in our 21st century. Competitive interdependence and the rising propensity and clash of "me first" concepts require a finely calibrated set of rules for mutual behavior. The sooner this work begins, the greater the chance of achieving the sustainable growth of markets in any sense.

Hyman Minsky was born in Chicago, but his parents had fled to America from Minsk, a city at the periphery of the Russian Empire. Both were active social democrats but belonged to a minority group of Mensheviks who opposed Vladimir Lenin's revolutionary radicalism and promoted evolutionary changes in a European style. Lenin's Bolsheviks prevailed and Russia embarked on its tragic path through the 20th century. Lenin's most hated denizen of Europe's social democrat scene was Berlin SPD politician Eduard Bernstein, who said that movement is everything, but the final goal nothing. But what would a final goal look like in Ukraine? This is not to say that the negotiations based on Minsk Protocol should proceed indefinitely through its various stages, but rather that in the contemporary world, movement is more critical than the endgame. This is especially true in light of the fatal deficit of trust among the key players; for, trust is a critical element everywhere – on Wall Street as well as in geopolitical talks.

These are some of the immediate challenges confronting policymakers across the Asia-Pacific. But in the long term, how do we develop a mechanism to manage the region's most pressing security tensions? One of the problems has been the failure of the wider region to generate a political security institution capable of entrenching pan-regional norms, practices and cultures for the management of underpinning

to EU activities, few believed that Eastern Europe – the "East" of the Cold War and a traditional area for geopolitical controversy – would cease to remain the most important issue for Moscow. As it turns out, a reckoning with the real East – the Asia-Pacific dimension and the prospect of the "Asian century" – would become much higher priorities for Russia. The need for domestic transformation is also acute in Russia, as socio-economic and political schemes that had served development purposes in previous decades were complete and needed replacement by a new model.

The Minsk Protocol will only succeed as a prelude or first stage of a more comprehensive dialogue over Europe and Eurasia in the decades to come. None of the pasts, be it the 19th-century Vienna-style "concert of powers" or the late-20th-century Brussels-led "Wider Europe" can be reinstated in our 21st century. Competitive interdependence and the rising propensity and clash of "me first" concepts require a finely calibrated set of rules for mutual behavior. The sooner this work begins, the greater the chance of achieving the sustainable growth of markets in any sense.

Hyman Minsky was born in Chicago, but his parents had fled to America from Minsk, a city at the periphery of the Russian Empire. Both were active social democrats but belonged to a minority group of Mensheviks who opposed Vladimir Lenin's revolutionary radicalism and promoted evolutionary changes in a European style. Lenin's Bolsheviks prevailed and Russia embarked on its tragic path through the 20th century. Lenin's most hated denizen of Europe's social democrat scene was Berlin SPD politician Eduard Bernstein, who said that movement is everything, but the final goal nothing. But what would a final goal look like in Ukraine? This is not to say that the negotiations based on Minsk Protocol should proceed indefinitely through its various stages, but rather that in the contemporary world, movement is more critical than the endgame. This is especially true in light of the fatal deficit of trust among the key players; for, trust is a critical element everywhere – on Wall Street as well as in geopolitical talks.

These are some of the immediate challenges confronting policymakers across the Asia-Pacific. But in the long term, how do we develop a mechanism to manage the region's most pressing security tensions? One of the problems has been the failure of the wider region to generate a political security institution capable of entrenching pan-regional norms, practices and cultures for the management of underpinning

FYODOR LUKYANOV is editor-in-chief of *Russia in Global Affairs* and chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow.

Long peace

A mechanism to manage security tensions in the Asia-Pacific region

BY KEVIN RUDD

As we meet this year at Munich, global tensions are at their highest point since the end of the Cold War. Like much of the rest of the world, Asia saw a number of security crises unfold over the last year. Tensions between China and South Korea flared over Seoul's deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. The return of maritime tensions in the South China Sea continues to threaten the "long peace" that has underpinned Asia's prosperity for the last quarter of a century. And the most important overall bilateral relationship in the Asia-Pacific is also badly frayed, with Sino-American relations at their lowest ebb in several years. Two major tensions are at the core of this friction: North Korea, and the bilateral economic and trade relationship.

Armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula is a growing possibility, but not a likely one; I put it somewhere in the range of 25 to 30 percent. There is no question that a "bloody nose" strike by the United States against North Korea would lead to retaliation by Pyongyang. The US wants China to do more to bring about a change in North Korea's behavior, though there remain serious questions over China's ability to do so. And many of us have deep doubts about the substance and intention of the North's conciliatory gestures around the Pyeongyang Winter Olympics. Serious diplomatic efforts must remain at the fore, including possible variations on a "freeze-for-freeze" (i.e. the North Koreans cease missile or nuclear testing in return for a halt on US-South Korea joint military exercises), along with other measures such as carefully targeted sanctions.

There is also the increasing possibility of a US-China trade war. The Trump administration recently raised tariff barriers on solar panels and washing machines, leading to immediate retaliatory action from Seoul and threats from China of retaliation against key US export sectors.

The truth is that most policymakers in the US and China know a full-blown trade or currency war would be deeply damaging to the economic prosperity of both countries and to the global economy. Hundreds of thousands of Americans and Chinese would lose their jobs, and GDP in both countries would take a serious hit. Where this goes next is deeply uncertain, but more generally I fear for the future of the international trading regime in the absence of US global leadership.

Indeed, the single most point-less wound inflicted by the United States on both itself and the Asia-Pacific over the past year was its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Once a great free-trade nation, America has left the global trading system completely rudderless, with the deeply concerning consequences of calling the entire global trade regime into question and undermining the source of much of the world's prosperity.

These are some of the immediate challenges confronting policymakers across the Asia-Pacific. But in the long term, how do we develop a mechanism to manage the region's most pressing security tensions? One of the problems has been the failure of the wider region to generate a political security institution capable of entrenching pan-regional norms, practices and cultures for the management of underpinning

geopolitical tensions. Despite ASEAN's success, for half of a century we have failed to replicate a parallel political security institution for the whole of East Asia, let alone for all of Asia itself. APEC has evolved into a successful regional economic institution, although India is not a member. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which does indeed have a security policy mandate for the wider region, does not meet at head-of-government level and has never really worked. ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea and Japan) evolved into ASEAN+6 (including India, Australia and New Zealand), which in turn evolved into the East Asia Summit (EAS – now including both the US and Russia).

To begin with, the EAS needs a permanent secretariat, which should be empowered to create temporary EAS working groups on current and emerging security policy challenges. Over time it could also consider aligning the existing ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) with the EAS heads of government process. Its overall objective should be to establish the habits, protocols and procedures for crisis prevention and dispute resolution within the wider region.

In the absence of such a secretariat, the brittle, usually bilateral nature of existing security policy tensions across the wider region will simply get worse. Indeed, this problem would be

BY CARLYLE THAYER

Security alignments in the Asia-Pacific are quickly hardening in response to China's rise and regional assertiveness.

These realignments have led to the formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or simply the Quad, which comprises the United States, its two close allies Australia and Japan, and India. The Trump administration's endorsement of the term "Indo-Pacific" gives these alignments a maritime focus on the sea lanes traversing the Western Pacific, South China Sea and Indian Ocean.

The Quad is not a formal military alliance, but each of its four

Short fuse

World powers are scrambling for influence over Asian maritime routes

order to advance their country's own political objectives. Ethnic and religious communities in Australia were also the subject of covert influence operations designed to diminish their criticism of foreign governments."

In late January, it was reported that ASIO listed China as an "extreme threat," the highest level on a secret country-by-country counter-intelligence index. ASIO's assessment was backed by widespread media reports of Chinese influence operations in Australia, including cash donations to political parties. The United Front Work Department – an organ of the Chinese Communist Party – and Chinese businessmen were identified as key actors in activities designed to

picked up the strategic slack and engaged more with like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Prime Minister Abe have stepped up defense cooperation between their two countries.

The United States has long-standing concerns about freedom of navigation by naval vessels and military aircraft over the South China Sea. In May 2017, President Donald Trump approved the defense department's plan for a full-year regular schedule of freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs). As these are officially considered routine operations, they are not widely publicized.

China, however, publicly criticizes FONOPs as a threat to its security and a violation of its sovereignty. The US Navy reportedly conducted four FONOPs in the South China Sea in 2017 and one in January of this year.

At the end of his first year in office, Trump approved a new US National Security Strategy (NSS) that singled out China and Russia as strategic competitors. With respect to the Indo-Pacific region, the NSS focused almost entirely on the maritime domain, freedom of navigation, and free and reciprocal trade.

The NSS bluntly declared: "China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations."


References in the NSS to US support for high-quality infrastructure promoting economic growth indicates that Washington will push back against China's Belt and Road Initiative and offer regional states an alternate source of funding.

Shortly after the release of the NSS, the Pentagon issued a new US National Defense Strategy (NDS) that highlighted strategic competition among the major powers as the primary concern of the United States. China and Russia were explicitly identified as revisionist powers seeking to

influence Australian politicians, the Chinese community and Chinese-language media. In a high-profile case in 2017, a Labor Party frontbencher, Senator Sam Dastyari, resigned from parliament after it was revealed that he had accepted cash donations from a Chinese businessman, reportedly in return for supporting China's territorial claims in the South China Sea.

On Nov. 23, 2017, the Australian government released its Foreign Policy White Paper. This document, without specifically naming China, highlighted the challenge to US primacy "by other powers" that openly contested the principles and values on which international order is based. The white paper assessed that China's power and influence will grow to match, "and in some cases exceed," that of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. A Chinese spokesperson called the white paper "irresponsible."

The white paper depicted territorial disputes in the South China Sea as a "major fault line" in the region, noting that Australia was "particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China's activities... (and) opposes the use of disputed features and artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes." It also stressed the importance of US leadership and participation in a rules-based international order. At a time of growing strategic uncertainty, Australia has



Over the past two years, an independent policy commission of the Asia Society Policy Institute has worked together on how we can strengthen the existing East Asia Summit – created a decade ago – to enhance its effectiveness as a political security institution for the wider region. The commission is made up of former foreign ministers Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia, Yoriko Kawaguchi of Japan, Kim Sung-hwan of South Korea and Igor Ivanov of Russia; former national security advisers Shivshankar Menon of India and Tom Donilon of the United States; Wang Jisi, a member of the foreign policy advisory group of the Chinese foreign ministry; and myself.

KEVIN RUDD was Australia's 26th prime minister and is president of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York.

The EAS has the mandate to expand its activities in the security domain. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005 makes this clear. Furthermore, signatories to the EAS have all signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which commits partners to peaceful dispute resolution. Moreover, EAS is unique in having all necessary players around the one table.

exacerbated by the emerging system of competing alliances across the region: on one side of the divide are the US allies, while on the other is the expanding network of Chinese semi-alliance structures unfolding through a combination of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and perhaps the Belt and Road Initiative.

An expanding East Asia Summit, perhaps one day evolving into a wider East Asian community or an Asia Pacific community, will not serve as a substitute for the development of existing alliance structures. But it could help take the sharper edges off what is currently unfolding, while simultaneously promoting the evolution of concepts such as common security, military transparency and common military exercises, which over time could help preserve the "long peace" from which we have collectively benefited since the end of the last Korean War.

members is pushing back against a rising China that has been assertive in pursuing its interests at their expense. Last year, for example, Indian and Chinese military forces were involved in a two-month confrontation on the Doklam Plateau, a tri-border area shared by China, India and Bhutan. In February, satellite images revealed that both sides were building up defenses, with China's efforts far outweighing India's.

Japan faces constant challenges by Chinese naval and air forces operating in waters around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands. In January alone, Chinese Coast Guard vessels intruded twice into Japan's territorial sea while a Chinese frigate and a submerged Shang-class nuclear attack submarine entered Japan's contiguous zone.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been instrumental in knitting closer political ties with India and enhanced defense ties with Australia. Australia, which is not geographically proximate to China, faces challenges of a different sort: Chinese interference in its domestic affairs. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) stated in its 2016-17 annual report that they had "identified foreign powers clandestinely seeking to shape the opinions of members of the Australian public, media organizations and government officials in

order to advance their country's own political objectives. Ethnic and religious communities in Australia were also the subject of covert influence operations designed to diminish their criticism of foreign governments."

In late January, it was reported that ASIO listed China as an "extreme threat," the highest level on a secret country-by-country counter-intelligence index. ASIO's assessment was backed by widespread media reports of Chinese influence operations in Australia, including cash donations to political parties. The United Front Work Department – an organ of the Chinese Communist Party – and Chinese businessmen were identified as key actors in activities designed to

picked up the strategic slack and engaged more with like-minded democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Prime Minister Abe have stepped up defense cooperation between their two countries.

The United States has long-standing concerns about freedom of navigation by naval vessels and military aircraft over the South China Sea. In May 2017, President Donald Trump approved the defense department's plan for a full-year regular schedule of freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs). As these are officially considered routine operations, they are not widely publicized.

China, however, publicly criticizes FONOPs as a threat to its security and a violation of its sovereignty. The US Navy reportedly conducted four FONOPs in the South China Sea in 2017 and one in January of this year.

At the end of his first year in office, Trump approved a new US National Security Strategy (NSS) that singled out China and Russia as strategic competitors. With respect to the Indo-Pacific region, the NSS focused almost entirely on the maritime domain, freedom of navigation, and free and reciprocal trade.

The NSS bluntly declared: "China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China's infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations."

References in the NSS to US support for high-quality infrastructure promoting economic growth indicates that Washington will push back against China's Belt and Road Initiative and offer regional states an alternate source of funding.

Shortly after the release of the NSS, the Pentagon issued a new US National Defense Strategy (NDS) that highlighted strategic competition among the major powers as the primary concern of the United States. China and Russia were explicitly identified as revisionist powers seeking to

influence Australian politicians, the Chinese community and Chinese-language media. In a high-profile case in 2017, a Labor Party frontbencher, Senator Sam Dastyari, resigned from parliament after it was revealed that he had accepted cash donations from a Chinese businessman, reportedly in return for supporting China's territorial claims in the South China Sea.

On Nov. 23, 2017, the Australian government released its Foreign Policy White Paper. This document, without specifically naming China, highlighted the challenge to US primacy "by other powers" that openly contested the principles and values on which international order is based. The white paper assessed that China's power and influence will grow to match, "and in some cases exceed," that of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. A Chinese spokesperson called the white paper "irresponsible."

The white paper depicted territorial disputes in the South China Sea as a "major fault line" in the region, noting that Australia was "particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China's activities... (and) opposes the use of disputed features and artificial structures in the South China Sea for military purposes." It also stressed the importance of US leadership and participation in a rules-based international order. At a time of growing strategic uncertainty, Australia has

CARLYLE THAYER is emeritus professor at The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra.

THE CALL OF THE TIMES

Beijing's plans for a globalization that is more open, inclusive, and beneficial for all

BY FUYI YING

As we enter 2018 and move toward the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the world is witnessing new instabilities and turbulent situations. Having attended forums in Munich, Sochi and Rome in late 2017, I could sense the anxieties in international strategic circles. People were asking: What is happening in the world today? Is our current global system collapsing? Will mankind fall back into confrontations and isolationism?

This year marks the 40th anniversary of China's policies of openness and reform. Forty years ago, China made the historic decision of shifting the focus of the Communist Party and the country to make the economy grow. "Peace and development are the themes of the times," as Deng Xiaoping would later sum it up. And they are still the dominant themes of today. China has been riding the tide of economic globalization ever since and has become both a hub and an important engine for the world economy. From China's perspective, globalization must be improved, but backtracking is unlikely. China is thus calling for globalization to be made more open, inclusive, balanced and beneficial for all.

The security challenges in today's world are globalized. Common threats are widespread, including extremism, terrorism and cybersecurity challenges. But major countries find it hard to extricate themselves from the geopolitical tug of war and are returning to competitive and exclusive security approaches, making it harder to create effective global security cooperation. The US-led Western world has attempted to westernize all the globe by exporting its own values and models. Those attempts have not only failed to address old problems but have also created new ones.

China is not pursuing its development goals in a vacuum. We need a peaceful international environment. We need to engage in more extensive and comprehensive cooperation with the rest of the world. As President Xi Jinping said in his Geneva speech on Jan. 18, 2017: "China will do well only when the world does well, and vice versa."

The 19th CPC National Congress established China's new central leadership with President Xi at its core, and "The Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" was adopted as the guide to China's development. It mapped out the objective of completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020 and turning China into a great modern socialist country in two steps by 2050. It also charted the course for China's economic policy over the next couple of years. China's economy has been going through a transition from a phase of rapid growth to one of quality development. Put more simply, whereas our concern had been about whether there is

enough – it is now about whether it is good enough. The focus of our attention must therefore also be changed, with our emphasis shifting to more coordinated and comprehensive development and our attention targeting not only the economy but also political, cultural and social progress as well as the improvement of the environment.

The Party Congress reiterated that peace and development remain the call of our day, while admitting that the world faces growing uncertainties and destabilizing factors. In this context, China's diplomatic goals in the new era include promoting the creation of a new type of international relations, with more prominence given to lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity and a call for the building of a community with a shared future for mankind. These are not only our expectations for the world's future, but also a necessity for our domestic development.

Some may worry that as China becomes stronger, it will embark on the traditional path of seeking hegemony while exporting its political system and ideology. The outside world wants to understand what China means when it vows to "move closer to center stage." Does it mean that the country is prepared to replace the US and play a "leading role" in the world? When China offers "Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach," is that tantamount to China exporting its development model?

We are keenly aware of the long and arduous path ahead of us in our domestic development and also recognize the huge gap between China and the United States. We are still at the stage of learning and growing. There is a lot we need to improve in areas like technological innovation as well as product research and development. We wish to play a role in world affairs and make an even greater contribution to mankind. But it must be done within our means and in a manner consistent with our values.

China has offered a new option to countries that seek rapid development while retaining their independence. But this does not mean that China's model and ideology are to be exported. The success of China proves that there are alternative options to those proposed by the West. Yet China is not interested in the so-called "competition of systems."

In the realm of security, the pursuit of exclusive security by the United States and its alliance will unavoidably clash with the security interests of countries outside their alignment. Furthermore, countries not belonging to any alliance also face challenges in the handling of security differences between them. It is therefore important that all countries work together to set out some basic common principles.

In 2014, President Xi proposed that "we should actively advocate a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security strategy for Asia. We need to

innovate our security concept, establish a new regional security cooperation architecture and jointly build a shared, win-win road for Asian security."

What China is advocating is in response to the call of the times. If China and the United States – and ideally Europe, Russia and others as well – can begin exploring the basic principles of major dispute resolution, this will not only help maintain overall stability in relations between the major powers, but will also facilitate the resolution of hot-spot regional issues.

The 19th CPC National Congress report has stated that "we will make it our mission to see that by 2035 the modernization

and avoid a collision. But apart from their differences over trade, they are deeply divided over the South China Sea.

Territorial disputes over islands and shoals in the South China Sea are not new. In the process of improving relations in the 1990s, China and the ASEAN countries reached a basic agreement on shelving disputes and pursuing joint development through dialogue and negotiations. But in 2010, the US adopted a new strategy: its "pivot to Asia," making China its target. The fact that the US is taking sides and condoning the provocative rhetoric and moves of others has only intensified China's concern over

and avoid a collision. But apart from their differences over trade, they are deeply divided over the South China Sea. Territorial disputes over islands and shoals in the South China Sea are not new. In the process of improving relations in the 1990s, China and the ASEAN countries reached a basic agreement on shelving disputes and pursuing joint development through dialogue and negotiations. But in 2010, the US adopted a new strategy: its "pivot to Asia," making China its target. The fact that the US is taking sides and condoning the provocative rhetoric and moves of others has only intensified China's concern over

THE US-LED WESTERN WORLD HAS ATTEMPTED TO WESTERNIZE THE GLOBE BY EXPORTING ITS OWN VALUES AND MODEL

of our national defense and our forces is basically complete, and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces." Some have rushed to interpret this as "setting a timetable for achieving global hegemony," while ignoring the fact that China has always pursued a national defense policy that is defensive in nature.

The white paper on China's military strategy published in 2015 explicitly identified the strategic tasks to be shouldered by China's military: to deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats as well as effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea; to resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland; to safeguard China's security and interests in new domains; to safeguard the security of China's overseas interests; to maintain strategic deterrence and carry out a nuclear counter-attack; to participate in regional and international security cooperation and maintain regional and world peace; to strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability; and to perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, domestic safety, and support for national economic and social development.

The white paper also pointed out that "the armed forces will actively participate in both regional and international security cooperation and safeguard overseas interests." However, China's approach regarding its overseas interests is not exclusionary or confrontational. China has vowed never to pursue hegemony nor to seek spheres of influence, military alliances or expansion. China will not fall into the trap of "strategic competition" with other powers. We will remain committed to international secu-

nuclear issue to be fully implemented. The US, emphasizing its own security and its allies' safety, has exerted mounting military pressure and calls for continued sanctions, while North Korea, hoping to achieve ultimate safety, has accelerated its nuclear and missile tests, resulting in a vicious cycle of action and reaction. Is there any hope for a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue?

It is an encouraging sign that an opportunity for easing tensions between South Korea and North Korea has emerged as the South has capitalized on the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics to open dialogues with the North, which responded positively. The fact that the US and South Korea have agreed to delay their regular joint military exercises during the Winter Games in February and March has paved the way for future talks and consultations.

This can be seen in part as an early-stage implementation of the "suspension for suspension" idea, which China has been promoting – suspension of nuclear and missile tests and suspension of military maneuvers.

While China believes that sanctions are necessary and has fully complied with the UN Security Council resolutions concerning sanctions on North Korea, we also hold that sanctions only work when the door for negotiation is open. For this reason, China has made painstaking efforts to promote dialogue and negotiation.

China-US coordination is essential. Since President Donald Trump took office, the relationship between China and the US has been smooth, with both countries demonstrating a willingness to tackle bilateral issues

FUYI YING is chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress of China.

Rivalry or rapport

China's relations with its neighbors and the West will define the next world order

BY THEO SOMMER

For seven decades now, the world's most perilous flashpoints have all been in Asia: Kashmir, Taiwan and Korea. India and Pakistan fought three bloody wars over Kashmir, in 1947-48, 1963 and 1971, and still face one another at gunpoint in the contested Himalayan region. Beijing's determination to reunify Taiwan with the mainland has triggered several international crises; in the 1950s US President Dwight D. Eisenhower even considered using nuclear weapons to ward off an invasion by Mao Zedong's troops. Korea, partitioned since the end of World War II, was the scene of a devastating three-year war pitting the Americans against the Chinese; a peace treaty has still not been signed.

These three flashpoints were reason enough for some observers to hoist a red flag years ago. Unless the Asians were careful, they warned, Europe's past – one of contention, rivalry and war – might well become the template for Asia's future. But meanwhile, the meteoric rise of China from rags to riches and from international impotence to global influence has given their warnings added relevance. Taiwan remains a contentious issue. "Reunification," postulates Beijing's recent Defense White Paper, "is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation." Kim Jong-un's nuclear ambitions have once again made armed conflict on the Korean peninsula a distinct possibility. At the same time, tensions are rising in the entire Indo-Pacific region: between India and China, China and Japan, China and the littoral states of the South China Sea and – most alarmingly – between the People's Republic and the United States.

"China's economic development is transforming it into a formidable political and military competitor," writes Graham Allison, the founding dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. In 2015 he asked: "The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for War?" Writing about the conflict that devastated Athens and Sparta 2,500 years ago, he concluded: "When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: danger ahead." Reviewing the past five hundred years, he found sixteen cases in which a major nation's rise disrupted the position of the dominant state. Twelve of these rivalries ended in armed conflict. Allison granted that war between the US and China is not inevitable, but expanding his thesis into a book last year, he entitled it *Destined for War*.

Others took up the idea. The Rand Corporation published a 96-page study by David Gompert *War with China. Thinking the Unthinkable*. John Davis chimed in with his analysis "How would a war between the US and China play out?" Steve Bannon, President Trump's erstwhile adviser,

was adamant: In five or ten years, he maintained, the US will be fighting a war in the South China Sea; China's rise to world domination has to be stopped.

There is a very simple reason I find such bellicose musings not only irresponsible, but also unrealistic. China has made enormous strides, but it is still a developing country. Ahead of it lies a long and arduous path to complete modernization and more than modest prosperity. In this endeavor, China can only succeed in a peaceful international environment. Peace is the precondition of development.

However, in our world of ever growing uncertainties it is only natural that several aspects of China's policy pose concerns to the rest of the world: its massive arms build-up; its expansive strategy in the South China and East China Seas; the ramifications of its boundless Silk Road Initiative.

Forty years ago the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was an armed force of 5 million troops mostly busy with producing tofu and raising cabbage; the Vietnamese easily beat back the Chinese when they invaded their southern neighbor in February 1979. In Deng Xiaoping's reform era, modernization of the PLA was not accorded priority. From 1979 to 1989, defense expendi-

corps will boost from 12,000 to 40,000 men; that China has established a naval base in Djibouti and secured port facilities in Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Gwadar (Pakistan) and Port Darwin (Australia); and that it is now building its third aircraft carrier.

As its economy has expanded, China has increased its defense budget by 10 to 17 percent annually. In the past two years it grew only 7 percent annually, reaching \$151 billion in 2017, which is tantamount to 1.3 percent of GDP (US: 4.35 percent). That makes it the world's second largest defense budget – still only a quarter of the Pentagon figure, but twice as large as Russia's, and three times more than India's and Japan's. If growth continues by about 10 percent each year, it will reach \$300 billion in 2025. What for? The pernicious effect is an enormous arms race in a world region that should not waste its scarce resources on guns, tanks, frigates and jet fighters.

Of the 3.3 million square kilometers of the South China Sea, through which about 5 trillion tons of shipborne trade passes each year, China has claimed back 2.6 million square kilometers. Its Nine Dash Line includes the whole region down to the southern tip of Vietnam and eastward close to the Philip-

CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS TRANSFORMING IT INTO A FORMIDABLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMPETITOR

ture dropped by 6 percent annually. But then the US-led wars in Iraq, with Serbia and against the Taliban in Afghanistan convinced the leadership that they had a lot of catching up to do to turn the PLA into a modern force.

It was reduced to two million men. The PLA structure was totally revamped. Information, cyber and space warfare were emphasized. Territorial defense is no longer the only mission; "safeguarding China's security and interests" in remote regions of the world and in "local wars" was added to the military portfolio.

Just as important was a fundamental revision of China's strategic posture. The traditional view that the land is more important than the sea has been abandoned. The greatest importance, said the 2015 Defense White Paper, should henceforth be accorded to the seas and oceans as well as to safeguarding the security of China's overseas interests. "Open seas protection" is being added to "offshore waters defense." Small wonder, then, that the Navy as the ideal instrument of power projection has profited most from the increases in the defense budget; that the Marine

sovereign territory and security interests. The Pentagon replied that it would continue to carry out regular Freedom of Navigation Operations missions.

For almost 20 years China and the ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been negotiating about a code of conduct for the South China Sea. To this very day, Beijing continues to stall on these negotiations. To be fair, in August 2017 ASEAN and China agreed on a draft code of conduct. But the essential point was left unresolved: China refused to include the Spratly and Prata Islands into the code's remit. Yang Jiechi, then Chinese foreign minister, seems to have prevailed. Several years ago he had told an ASEAN conference in Hanoi: "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact." One cannot exclude that Beijing's assertive stance will have the desired effect. The 13th ASEAN summit pointedly omitted references to "land reclamation and militarization" in the South China Sea previously included in its final communiqué. Given their economic dependence on China and the retreat of Donald Trump's America from the Pacific (witness his pulling out of the Transpacific Partnership TPP), the ASEAN states may have no other option but to accept that the South China Sea has become a Chinese lake.

China's claims to the Senkaku Islands, which it refers to as the Diaoyu Islands, in the East China Sea are a different story. They have been administered by the Japanese since 1895. A bone of contention since the mid-1990s, they have become the scene of repeated military confrontation. However, rather than causing Tokyo to give in, they strengthened the tendency there to amend Japan's pacifist constitution and to marshal support for its stance through increased foreign aid as well as closer military cooperation with India, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

Yida Yulu – One Belt, One Road – was the name given to the ambitious development project unveiled by China's President Xi Jinping in 2013. At first it aimed only at the resuscitation of Marco Polo's old Silk Road from China to Europe and the century maritime Silk Road opened up by Admiral Zheng Sen in the 15th century. But as it has changed its label several times and now goes by the name Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has also kept expanding its geographical scope. It now encompasses "all countries from either Asia, Europe, Africa or the Americas" (Xi Jinping). Even a "Polar Silk Road" has become part and parcel of the scheme.

The basic idea is connectivity and cooperation along the

two ancient Silk Roads. Huge infrastructure projects – building roads and railways, bridges and dams, power stations and pipelines – are to create corridors of peace and prosperity. Spearheading the initiative, the Chinese invited more than 100 countries and organizations to participate in the enterprise. They have signed cooperation agreements with over 40 states and invested about 50 billion dollars themselves, but all told they are prepared to make almost one trillion dollars available for the 900 Silk Road projects identified so far. This is ten times more than the US Marshall plan provided to Europe after World War II (\$13.2 billion, roughly \$130 billion in 2018 dollars).

What is China's purpose? There is no shortage of high-minded official explanations: "Development holds the master key to solving all problems" – "What we hope to achieve is a new model of win-win cooperation" – "We can embark on a path leading to friendship, shared development, peace, harmony and a better future."

There are, of course, less lofty explanations. The most innocuous is that BRI provides China with an outlet for its excess production of steel, cement, solar panels etc. Moreover, it secures employment for hundreds of thousands of Chinese workers and opens up new markets for Chinese firms.

China has also made no secret of the fact that it aims at "promoting connectivity of policies, rules and standards" (Xi Jinping), i.e. replacing Western policies, rules, norms and standards. It will also boost the market power of the Chinese currency.

In the latest analysis, however, any realistic assessment of Xi's project of the century will arrive at the conclusion that the Silk Road Initiative, despite his disclaimer that it is not "a case of outdated geopolitical maneuvering," is quintessentially an exercise in geopolitics. Where the West insists on political and economic reforms, the People's Republic uses its enormous capital reserves, its engineering knowhow as well as its production and building capacity to give globalization a Chinese face. It is welcome wherever money is in short supply and political stipulations regarding human rights or financial rectitude are unappreciated.

No matter how often and how loud Beijing's spokespersons keep denying it China is creating for itself an old-fashioned sphere of influence that reaches far beyond the boundaries of its former tributary states. China seems to have internalized both of the classical theories of geopolitics: Halford Mackinder's Heartland Theory, according to which whoever dominates the pivot area from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic commands the world; and Admiral Alfred Mahan's vision of sea power as the main attribute of national greatness.

"We have no intention to interfere in other countries' internal

THEO SOMMER is executive editor of *The Security Times* and *The German Times* and a former editor-in-chief of the German weekly *Die Zeit*.



No state is an island? China is building facilities on Fiery Cross Island

affairs, export our own social system and model of development, or impose our own will on others," is Beijing's mantra. It does, however, expect all those who benefit from its calculated largesse to toe the Chinese line. They must support its "core interests" and refrain from any kind of criticism, however well founded.


This is a challenge, particularly to the EU. The China-sponsored "16+1" group – embracing eleven EU member states from Greece to the Baltic and five non-EU Western Balkan countries – is patently seen as an instrument to influence the internal EU decision-making process. "China is not just knocking on Europe's door," says a recent study of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. "It's already in the room."

Undoubtedly, Beijing is not merely seeking to expand its economic footprint; it expects political compliance. Already Greece and Hungary prevented the EU from passing joint statements on the South China Sea and on human rights violations in the People's Republic. The easterners among the "16+1" states also felt obliged to sign a Memorandum of Understanding endorsing the thrust of the Belt and Road Initiative – something the US, Germany, France, the European Commission and even Britain refused (one reason being that in their view BRI has by no means turned out to be an exclusive enterprise open to all; only 11 percent of the infrastructure projects have been awarded to non-Chinese companies.) The attempts to divide Europe and the lack of reciprocity when it comes to investments will continue to cast a shadow over EU-China relations.

While the Asian superpower is increasingly seen from Brussels, Paris and Berlin as a political and economic challenge in Central and Eastern Europe and on a wider global scale, it should not be ignored or forgotten that when it comes to climate change, free trade and the maintenance of peace in Asia, the Europeans and Chinese are sitting in the same boat. They are allies in the fight against climate skeptics and protectionists. And preserving peace is not only the precondition of China's continued development, it is the only way to avert global chaos.

A China bent on reclaiming its past greatness must realize that others have core interests and core values, too; that the US will have to restrain President Trump's impulse to unleash a preemptive strike against nuclear North Korea; and that Washington and Beijing should manage their disagreements and negotiate a long peace. Priority should be given to warding off the mega-threats of an atomic Armageddon, of anarchic nuclear proliferation, of global terrorism and of climate change.

All of them should, in Henry Kissinger's words, "move from crisis management to a definition of common goals, from the solution of strategic controversies to their avoidance."



BY MATTHIAS NASS

One can be forgiven for doubting that Kim Jong-un is an “absolutely competent and mature politician,” as Russian President Vladimir Putin has called him. He is rather a cold cynic risking the lives of millions of people to secure his own political survival. Indeed, the sole reason he is amassing a nuclear arsenal is to forestall meeting to same fate as Saddam Hussein or Muammar al-Gaddafi. He is striving for unassailability.

While Kim is not unassailable, the price of a military strike to destroy North Korea's nuclear weapons would be terribly high – a price that no one in their right mind could condone.

That makes Kim Jong-un commensurately self-confident. He

seized the initiative with his New Year's speech in 2018. He offered North Korea's participation in the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, and proposed political talks with the government in Seoul. South Korean President Moon Jae-in responded immediately. Within days, representatives of both governments met in the border town of Panmunjom. They discussed the North joining the Olympics as well as family reunions and possible North-South military talks.

Relief was felt the world over. The standoff over North Korea's nuclear program had escalated sharply in 2017. The regime tested about 20 rockets last year, including three ICBMs. Pyongyang now claims its warheads could reach the entire United States. The North also tested a further nuclear device on Sept. 3,

the sixth overall and the strongest

yet. Western experts have concluded that North Korea's claim to have tested a hydrogen bomb is credible; the explosive force was about 15 times stronger than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Impoverished North Korea, today's most backward dictatorship, has established itself as the world's ninth nuclear power – quite an achievement for the young Kim Jong-un. Whether the country now has between 20 and 30 devices, as most estimates put it, or even more than 50, as the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency suspects, the Pyongyang regime has established itself among the global nuclear elite. It has even claimed nuclear (albeit “asymmetric”) parity with the US. Confronting Washington on equal footing, forcing America's recognition and guaranteeing the regime's existence – such are

North Korea's strategic goals, and Kim believes they are getting closer and closer to reaching them. But in doing so he has alienated the entire world.

Since North Korea detonated its first atomic bomb in 2006 under Kim's father, Kim Jong-il, the United Nations Security Council has imposed economic sanctions on the country ten times, including three times in the past six months. The punitive measures have become progressively onerous and by now resemble an economic blockade. Even if the North Koreans have become inured to the hardest deprivations, even starvation, the regime cannot afford to completely seal itself off from the outside world.

This is the underlying reason for the recent moves toward de-escalation. The tactic has worked time and time again: Pyongyang escalates to the limit, springs

a surprise and then reaps the rewards in economic and humanitarian aid from South Korea, the US and their allies.

But even the Obama administration did not want to be blackmailed this way anymore. “We do not buy the same horse twice,” said Obama's National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. One can imagine how much less Donald Trump will be willing to reward the North's putative concessions. Neither does he have to worry about Kim driving a wedge between the US and South Korea.

Moon has reacted very positively to the North's offer of talks, and no wonder; the presence of North Korean athletes, officials and spectators guarantees the Winter Games will be shielded from Pyongyang's disruption. But Moon continues his explicit support for the North's policy of “maximum pressure” and insists on

“denuclearization” of the Korean peninsula. He does not accept Kim's position that nuclear weapons are a topic exclusive to talks with the Americans. He wants to have a say in the process. The liberal Moon is wary of South Korean conservatives accusing him of naïveté or of endangering the alliance with the United States. It was not long ago that Donald Trump was still accusing him of “appeasing” the North. Moon is not picking a public fight. Indeed, he has been praising the US president: “I think Trump deserves big credit for bringing about the inter-Korean talks, and I want to show my gratitude. It could be the result of US-led sanctions and pressure.”

No, Moon is not naïve. He did not fail to hear that in addition to offering dialogue to the South, Kim Jong-un's New Year's address included a second, very

different message aimed at the US: North Korea, now established as a nuclear power, will mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles in 2018.

However, a North Korea with nuclear weapons remains unacceptable to Washington, as Trump's National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster recently affirmed. It would be “intolerable” for North Korea to be able to attack the US with a nuclear weapon. After Pyongyang tested a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on Nov. 29, which would be capable of reaching the East Coast of the US, McMaster said the odds of war were “increasing every day.”

Some accuse McMaster of hyperbole regarding a highly sensitive topic, but Defense Secretary James Mattis is not one of them. He, too, warned just before Christmas that “storm clouds are gathering.” Similar talk could be overheard in many conversations with politicians, diplomats and think tank analysts: The situation in Korea is “very dangerous” and “highly explosive”; North Korea's habit of nuclear brinkmanship could lead us to the abyss. Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Dec. 31 in an interview on ABC's This Week

inclined to see over time that the rhetoric seems to be where the President is.” Mullen said in his television interview.

In the conflict with North Korea, Washington has not taken the military option off the table. On the contrary, talk of a preemptive strike became louder at year's end. Some planners in the Pentagon apparently believe that a war can be limited, that it need not inevitably extend to the whole region, let alone escalate

to nuclear war. Targeted military strikes, a “kick in the shin” and a “bloody nose” are topics of discussion in Washington. For some time now, South Korean and US special forces have been training for a “decapitation strike” against the North Korean regime.

As realistic as such scenarios may be, the idea of a “surgical strike” has proven often enough to be pure illusion. While the US and allied forces are vastly superior to those of the North,

and their victory would be a foregone conclusion, the consequences of a war remain incalculable. Not only does the North have 1.2 million soldiers under arms and some 13,500 artillery pieces aimed at the south, these are also aimed directly at Seoul, just 30 miles from the border and home to 10 million inhabitants, with 15 million more living close by. Even if the US could use a preemptive strike to destroy all North Korea's nuclear weapons

– a highly unlikely prospect – and eliminated most its artillery – nearly impossible – they still have large stocks of chemical and probably biological weapons. It would still be Armageddon.

So, war on the Korean Peninsula is not an option. What is promising, however, is the current strategy of “maximum pressure” through economic sanctions and political isolation. But success is contingent on the dogged cooperation of all parties – the Americans, South Koreans, Chinese, Russians and Europeans.

Will Kim Jong-un make a deal? Or will he drag his country and its citizens with him into the abyss? Mattis, warning of the “gathering clouds,” recommends that his troops read the book *This Kind of War*, which describes the woeful unpreparedness of the US as it descended into the Korean War in 1950. There is still time for diplomacy, Mattis said, but “there is very little room for optimism.”

MATTHIAS NASS is an international correspondent for the German weekly *Die Zeit* and author of *Countdown in Korea*, published in 2017.

Party on: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspecting a test of the surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile Hwasong-10 at an undisclosed location in North Korea.

the US is “closer to a nuclear war with North Korea” than ever. He added that he did not “see opportunities to solve this diplomatically at this particular point.”

For Mullen, Trump's martial rhetoric shares responsibility for escalating the conflict. It was Trump who threatened “fire and fury” last summer, who warned the UN to “totally destroy” North Korea and accused “little rocket man” Kim of embarking on a suicide mission. “I'm just more



Party on: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspecting a test of the surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile Hwasong-10 at an undisclosed location in North Korea.

different message aimed at the US: North Korea, now established as a nuclear power, will mass-produce nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles in 2018.

However, a North Korea with nuclear weapons remains unacceptable to Washington, as Trump's National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster recently affirmed. It would be “intolerable” for North Korea to be able to attack the US with a nuclear weapon. After Pyongyang tested a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile on Nov. 29, which would be capable of reaching the East Coast of the US, McMaster said the odds of war were “increasing every day.”

Some accuse McMaster of hyperbole regarding a highly sensitive topic, but Defense Secretary James Mattis is not one of them. He, too, warned just before Christmas that “storm clouds are gathering.” Similar talk could be overheard in many conversations with politicians, diplomats and think tank analysts: The situation in Korea is “very dangerous” and “highly explosive”; North Korea's habit of nuclear brinkmanship could lead us to the abyss. Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Dec. 31 in an interview on ABC's This Week

inclined to see over time that the rhetoric seems to be where the President is.” Mullen said in his television interview.

In the conflict with North Korea, Washington has not taken the military option off the table. On the contrary, talk of a preemptive strike became louder at year's end. Some planners in the Pentagon apparently believe that a war can be limited, that it need not inevitably extend to the whole region, let alone escalate

to nuclear war. Targeted military strikes, a “kick in the shin” and a “bloody nose” are topics of discussion in Washington. For some time now, South Korean and US special forces have been training for a “decapitation strike” against the North Korean regime.

As realistic as such scenarios may be, the idea of a “surgical strike” has proven often enough to be pure illusion. While the US and allied forces are vastly superior to those of the North,

and their victory would be a foregone conclusion, the consequences of a war remain incalculable. Not only does the North have 1.2 million soldiers under arms and some 13,500 artillery pieces aimed at the south, these are also aimed directly at Seoul, just 30 miles from the border and home to 10 million inhabitants, with 15 million more living close by. Even if the US could use a preemptive strike to destroy all North Korea's nuclear weapons

– a highly unlikely prospect – and eliminated most its artillery – nearly impossible – they still have large stocks of chemical and probably biological weapons. It would still be Armageddon.

So, war on the Korean Peninsula is not an option. What is promising, however, is the current strategy of “maximum pressure” through economic sanctions and political isolation. But success is contingent on the dogged cooperation of all parties – the Americans, South Koreans, Chinese, Russians and Europeans.

Will Kim Jong-un make a deal? Or will he drag his country and its citizens with him into the abyss? Mattis, warning of the “gathering clouds,” recommends that his troops read the book *This Kind of War*, which describes the woeful unpreparedness of the US as it descended into the Korean War in 1950. There is still time for diplomacy, Mattis said, but “there is very little room for optimism.”

MATTHIAS NASS is an international correspondent for the German weekly *Die Zeit* and author of *Countdown in Korea*, published in 2017.

Party on: North Korean leader Kim Jong-un inspecting a test of the surface-to-surface medium long-range strategic ballistic missile Hwasong-10 at an undisclosed location in North Korea.

the US is “closer to a nuclear war with North Korea” than ever. He added that he did not “see opportunities to solve this diplomatically at this particular point.”

For Mullen, Trump's martial rhetoric shares responsibility for escalating the conflict. It was Trump who threatened “fire and fury” last summer, who warned the UN to “totally destroy” North Korea and accused “little rocket man” Kim of embarking on a suicide mission. “I'm just more

Ready to turn your island dream into a dream island?

1 The World's Number One Island Broker

2,650 Certified Island Sales

38,400 Island Holiday Bookings

Pepin Island
1,300 acres • Price on request • A stunning private island in New Zealand, complete with commercially-successful farm, easy airport access and great lifestyle opportunities

Partridge Island
19.4 acres • EUR 178,000 • Island gem in Canada's most beautiful Atlantic province

Prince Cay
9 acres • EUR 871,000 • A perfect place to build a Bahamian dream home

Discover beauty and adventure on Canada's Atlantic coast:

with Vladi Private Islands, your reliable real estate partner in Germany & Nova Scotia

Vladi Private Islands GmbH • Ballindamm 26 • 20095 Hamburg • Phone: +49 40 33 89 89 • Email: info@vladi.de

www.private-islands.com

VLADI
Private Islands
SINCE 1973
CANADA • GERMANY • NEW ZEALAND • CHINA

NAVAL SOLUTIONS
MEETING YOUR CHALLENGES.

From frigates and corvettes to our support services – Lürssen has more than 140 years of experience in building naval vessels of all types and sizes. We develop tailor-made maritime solutions to answer any of your requirements, whatever your international focus! Whenever the need arises, our logistic support services and spare parts supply are always there to help you. Anywhere in the world. All across the seven seas.

More information:
+49 421 6604 344 or www.luerssen-defence.com

LÜRSEN



From president to president: Donald Trump met with Xi Jinping in Beijing on Nov. 9, 2017

Commander-in-Xi

China's long-term strategy for becoming the world's number one power

BY KISHORE MAHBUBANI

When Donald Trump became US president on Jan. 20, 2017, the world could and should have seen a downturn in Sino-American relations. During his election campaign, Trump had criticized China fiercely: "We can't continue to allow China to rape our country, and that's what they are doing." He also declared he would "label China a currency manipulator."

A year later, in January 2018, it is remarkable how stable the US-China relationship has become. What happened? Did Trump change? Or did China adapt? Did events intervene? Did North Korea help or hurt?

The real story is a complex one. Just as the ancient Chinese emperors perfected the art of "barbarian" management, the current Chinese leaders have learned the art of "America" management. They know that American presidential candidates must criticize China in election campaigns. President Bill Clinton threatened in 1992 that he would never "mollycoddle the butchers of Beijing." But just a year later, at the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in November 1993, I personally saw Bill Clinton "mollycoddle" President Jiang Zemin. It was an amazing sight.

This is why despite Trump's election campaign and his subsequent provocations – e.g., accepting a congratulatory call from Taiwan – China decided to take the initiative to stabilize the US-China relationship by sending President Xi Jinping to call on Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. Given Trump's mercurial personality, the meeting could have gone badly. Instead, it went well.

Curiously, the issue of North Korea may have helped. North Korea carried out provocative nuclear tests and missile launches

throughout 2016 and 2017. In theory, as China is seen as an ally of North Korea, these tests should have driven a wedge between China and the US. Instead, it managed to highlight the countries' common interest in preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Trump made a candid admission: "After listening for ten minutes [to Xi who

China had done their calculations and decided that the cost of war would be too high; it has been estimated that one million residents of Seoul could die from a North Korean artillery barrage on day one of the conflict.

Such is the ultimate paradox of East Asian security: The differences between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands continue unabated; the differences between China and the four

locked in a perilous eyeball-to-eyeball standoff. This, too, could have erupted in conflict. Ultimately, China blinked. Both sides agreed to return to status quo ante. India wisely decided not to crow about its victory.

A clear pattern has thus emerged in the way China manages the challenges and problems on its borders. It will stand firm where its fundamental interests are involved. However, it is also ready to make pragmatic adjustments to dial down the temperature on any potential bilateral dispute. For example, while the level of trust between China and Japan – two key regional rivals – has not improved, the relationship has assumed a certain calm and stability.

And why is China being pragmatic in the short term? The answer is simple. Chinese leaders, unlike Western leaders, think in the long term. They know time

locked in a perilous eyeball-to-eyeball standoff. This, too, could have erupted in conflict. Ultimately, China blinked. Both sides agreed to return to status quo ante. India wisely decided not to crow about its victory.

ASEAN claimant states (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam) in the South China Sea remain unresolved; new tensions have emerged between China and South Korea over the deployment of the American THAAD Radar System in South Korea; China has frozen its relations with South Korea and encouraged massive boycotts; the number of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea plummeted nearly 50 percent from January to August 2017.

An even more dangerous standoff emerged between China and India when China sent in construction teams to extend an existing road in Doklam, a disputed border area between China and Bhutan. India's immediate reaction was to send in military reinforcements. For several weeks, Chinese and Indian soldiers were

locked in a perilous eyeball-to-eyeball standoff. This, too, could have erupted in conflict. Ultimately, China blinked. Both sides agreed to return to status quo ante. India wisely decided not to crow about its victory.

edly makes clear that China is a more predictable partner. Consequently, the election of Trump may prove a useful trump card for China. Nevertheless, China remains acutely aware that it must maintain a calm and stable relationship between Trump and Xi Jinping, and so far it has played a winning hand.

Third: On the positive side of the ledger, China is significantly increasing the interdependence between China and its neighbors through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is already the number one trading partner of most of its neighbors, including Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Laos and Vietnam. It could also emerge as the biggest investor in the BRI partner countries. Over time, the links between China and its "near abroad" will only become stronger. Already, 85 percent of inward and 33 percent of outward BRI investment goes through Singapore.

It will not all be a smooth sailing. Growing interdependence can create challenges. After the Chinese built the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, debt payments became too onerous for the Sri Lankan government, which wisely decided to hand over the port to Chinese firms on a 99-year lease. Other big infrastructure projects could create similar bilateral issues. However, if Chinese leaders continue their pragmatic approach, all these issues and challenges should also be managed with deftness.

Over time, China's emergence as the world's leading economy and power will become an undeniable reality. The big question is whether the rest of the world will prove as pragmatic as China. Most of China's neighbors have already adapted to its pragmatism. As a result, East Asia is likely to remain calm, even as several bilateral issues and tensions simmer away under the surface.



India sees the Belt and Road Initiative for what it is: evidence of China's unconcealed ambition for hegemony

BY SAMIR SARAN

For 73 days between June and August 2017, Indian and Chinese troops were locked eyeball to eyeball over a small strip of land marking the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China: the Doklam Plateau. The clash was ostensibly triggered by Chinese road construction activities around disputed territories. But military tensions at Doklam are only the symptom, not the cause of conflict. The standoff itself is the naked manifestation of a long simmering conflict over regional primacy. India sees itself as an indispensable actor in influencing the future of the Asian century. China, on the other hand, is intent on shaping a unipolar Asian order that will be defined by deference to the Middle Kingdom and its increasingly imperial rulers.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officially unveiled in May 2017, historians were hard-pressed to miss the symbolism of world leaders stepping up to shake hands with President Xi – a 21st-century vision of the Middle Kingdom's ancient tributary system. Through debt, political influence and outright coercion, the BRI is a roadmap for structural servility to Beijing.

Countries with agency and regional heft are not likely to succumb to this lure. Yet India sees many of its neighbors straddled with bad loans and white elephant projects, which China uses for strategic leverage. Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, over which

China now enjoys a 99-year lease, is perhaps the most obvious example of Beijing's "debt-trap diplomacy." New Delhi is also acutely aware that states in the region are slipping into China's orbit, making it difficult for them to criticize Beijing. ASEAN's inability to develop a cohesive response to China's maritime aggression in the South China Sea underscores

sovereignty. For a country that has always preferred multipolarity and multilateralism, both globally and regionally, acquiescing to Pax Sinica was never truly an option.

The India-China relationship is thus coming to signify a contest for the future of Asia, as well as the world at large. At issue is whether nation states that

case the message China sends is clear: Accede to Chinese interests and enjoy good relations, or resist and face fury.

This effort to sabotage the relevance and the principles of the liberal international order has prompted the concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific." First made popular by the United States when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited India in October 2017, the geographical definition of this space, and the values that must define it, has since caught on in the strategic calculus of several regional powers. The resuscitated Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – a partnership of four maritime powers, including India – has coalesced around this region with the vocal intention of providing a democratic bulwark against China's unconcealed ambition for hegemony. As a result, the Indo-Pacific, which spans the West Indian Ocean and stretches towards the Eastern Pacific, is now primed to become the battleground for the future of the liberal order.

Three imperatives will guide this contest: norms, connectivity and security. Regional democracies will have to invest considerable resources and synergize their own connectivity initiatives to address the region's burgeoning infrastructure finance demands. They will also have to develop political and military partnerships to ensure that states in the region are capable of resisting Chinese pressure. However, a democratic

alternative by definition cannot be exclusive; it must be capable of accommodating Beijing's projects and security concerns as long as they abide the well-established principles of international law. Only by doing so will the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific provide a viable and attractive rules-based alternative to the autocratic strain of the BRI.

The India-China relationship is ultimately defined by the differing worldviews of both actors. From China's perspective, India – whether through diplomacy, coercion or force – must understand its place in a hierarchical Asian order that pays obeisance to Beijing. However, according to a famous Chinese adage: "One mountain cannot contain two tigers." Nonetheless, as a confident democratic power, India will increasingly exercise its heft to shape the world around it, without being browbeaten by the dragon. The competition over values, norms, ethics and influence, both within Asia and around the world, will continue to exacerbate tensions between India and China. The standoff between the two countries over the Doklam Plateau – their most serious border conflict since the 1962 – was likely a prologue for what is to come.

exercised their hard-won right to self-determination and democracy will now be forced into a client-satellite relationship with Beijing as its economic dominance continues. Over the past seven decades, the international liberal order – as it is often called – was carefully crafted with the intention of promoting free markets, rule of law and democracy. Leadership with Chinese characteristics, discernable most visibly through the BRI, is ominously lacking in these qualities. China has used its trade relationships to silence political opposition, bribed its way towards closer diplomatic ties and militarily coerced many of its neighbors. In each

exercised their hard-won right to self-determination and democracy will now be forced into a client-satellite relationship with Beijing as its economic dominance continues. Over the past seven decades, the international liberal order – as it is often called – was carefully crafted with the intention of promoting free markets, rule of law and democracy. Leadership with Chinese characteristics, discernable most visibly through the BRI, is ominously lacking in these qualities. China has used its trade relationships to silence political opposition, bribed its way towards closer diplomatic ties and militarily coerced many of its neighbors. In each

exercised their hard-won right to self-determination and democracy will now be forced into a client-satellite relationship with Beijing as its economic dominance continues. Over the past seven decades, the international liberal order – as it is often called – was carefully crafted with the intention of promoting free markets, rule of law and democracy. Leadership with Chinese characteristics, discernable most visibly through the BRI, is ominously lacking in these qualities. China has used its trade relationships to silence political opposition, bribed its way towards closer diplomatic ties and militarily coerced many of its neighbors. In each

exercised their hard-won right to self-determination and democracy will now be forced into a client-satellite relationship with Beijing as its economic dominance continues. Over the past seven decades, the international liberal order – as it is often called – was carefully crafted with the intention of promoting free markets, rule of law and democracy. Leadership with Chinese characteristics, discernable most visibly through the BRI, is ominously lacking in these qualities. China has used its trade relationships to silence political opposition, bribed its way towards closer diplomatic ties and militarily coerced many of its neighbors. In each

SAMIR SARAN
is vice president of the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

... CHINA DECIDED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO STABILIZE THE US-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

is on their side. China's economy will become much bigger within a decade, and it is shrewd enough to know that both its neighbors and the world will make careful, pragmatic alterations to adjust to a world where China becomes number one.

The only country that could potentially derail China's emergence is still the US, which is another key reason why China is so careful and pragmatic with its neighbors. Each regional dispute presents the US with an opportunity to step in and stir the waters. This was on full display in the

China's long-term strategy of managing its rise to becoming the number one power can be described with just a few key brushstrokes.

First: Be patient; time is on our side.

Second: Maintain stability in the US-China relationship, where – paradoxically – Trump's unpredictability has helped China. By walking away from the Iran deal and TPP, recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and courting public squabbles with the prime ministers of key allies like the UK and Australia, Trump repeat-

BAYERISCHER HOF

MUNICH OFFERS LOTS OF TOURIST ATTRACTIONS. YOU CAN EVEN SPEND THE NIGHT IN THIS ONE.

Since 1841, the privately managed, award-winning Hotel Bayerischer Hof is valued internationally for its elegant atmosphere and the amiable, highly personal service. Here, the highest levels of luxury come as standards with its stylish 337 rooms, including 74 suites, set in the heart of Munich, within walking distance of the renowned museums, art galleries and the Opera, as well as of the finest shopping areas. The hotel offers a choice of five restaurants (Gourmet, Mediterranean, Polynesian, Bavarian and Spa Cuisine), among them the restaurants Atelier (3 Michelin stars) and Garden, restyled by Axel Vervoort, the famous Belgian interior designer. Guests have a choice of 40 function rooms with a capacity of 10 up to 2,500 persons, six bars and the Night Club with live jazz. French architect Andrée Putman designed the Blue Spa, the wellness area on four floors, with a panoramic rooftop terrace. You will also find a 38-seat luxury cinema, the astor@Cinema Lounge (Axel Vervoort, 2011), which can be rented as a screening room. Axel Vervoort also designed the multipurpose function room Palais Hall in 2016 and since 2018 we are very pleased to present his newest project - the „South and North wing“ - with 28 rooms and the luxurious 350-square metre Penthouse Garden Suite. We are very proud and delighted to welcome the MSC guests since 1963 and wish the very best for this important conference this year.

Promenadeplatz 2-6
D-80333 München

Fon +49 89.21 20 - 0
Fax +49 89.21 20 - 906

www.bayerischerhof.de
Info@bayerischerhof.de

LEGEND
LEADING
HOTELS
Depot
HOTEL

FOUR TRENDS PREVENTING US FROM SAVING THE WORLD

When we started the company back in 1997 I was a tech-geek with tons of energy and ambition. I worked hard, loved my job (still do) and sacrificed many things to get to the point where we are now. Cybersecurity was a niche field with just a few thousand of enthusiasts back then (and we all really enjoyed ourselves). No borders, no nationalities, no politics at all – just like scientists from over the world working together to fight, say, cancer or HIV. What I've never wanted to get involved in was politics – and have never needed to actually, despite all the rumors and hearsay. Our one top priority has always been straightforward: to make a technically superior product. And that's exactly what we've been busy with all these years. Our small, low-key cybersecurity world has never been in geopolitical crossfire like now. But the worrying emerging trends in the global cybersecurity industry are ever more ironic in this context. These trends have unquestionably affected our company over the last year – but you can never really be sure for whom the bell tolls next.

1 State control and international regulation of cybersecurity are tools that should be used to fight cybercrime, but instead of development of stronger protection of our vulnerable infrastructure we see a trend of balkanization and cyberspace fragmentation: a very last-century trend for an industry that's dealing with cutting-edge technologies. Last year's cyberattacks show that the services that are the backbone of our national economies, security and health are very fragile. And criminals show no mercy for societies' vital institutions.

2 There's a broad consensus among international economists that protectionism has a negative effect on overall worldwide economic growth and welfare. Nevertheless, protectionism is being actively used in the world's IT industry today: exclusion of foreign companies from regional markets through government regulations is just one example of this. To me, the situation looks like a serious imbalance between government regulation and free market principles. Competition is always good – it allows consumers to choose and enjoy the best products and technologies. When you artificially limit competition there's a deferred negative effect for all – consumers, developers and vendors.

3 But what causes me the most frustration is the decline in crucial international cooperation that took so long to build up. International cybersecurity legislation remains rudimentary, plus there's a global deficit of experienced cybersecurity specialists. Those are just two reasons to continue international cooperation to fight cybercrime. Temporarily freezing cybersecurity cooperation is like throwing a boomerang and stealing time from yourself. Cybercrime has no physical boundaries, so building them between international law enforcement agencies and cybersecurity companies is highly inefficient at best, dangerous at worst.

4 Alas, the world's increasing fondness of the boomerang doesn't stop there. For we also have increased militarization of cyberspace to deal with these days. Though they don't publicize it, more than 30 countries around the world have already created their own cyber-militaries and are treating cyberspace as a strategic domain. I sincerely hope that a containment policy similar to the one that has helped us avoid nuclear war will act as a restraining force against serious state-sponsored cyberattacks. The effects and consequences of cyberwar, in my opinion, should never be underestimated or romanticized.

I've already expressed my concerns about geopolitics having a negative impact on global cybersecurity, but I'll do so again. Cyberthreats have become a global problem that has spread far beyond any geographical borders. We are determined to detect and neutralize any and all forms of malicious programs – regardless of their origin or purpose. But to fight the bad guys targeting our economies, our businesses, our savings, our privacy, our personal information – and above all our safety – we have to be united.

Proven.
Transparent.
Independent.

KASPERSKY

www.kaspersky.com/transparency

When we're talking about worldwide cybersecurity, we need to keep one thing at the forefront of our minds: the only ones to benefit from global fragmentation and balkanization are criminals. Let's not make their lives easier by going backward instead of forward.



Eugene Kaspersky is a world-renowned cybersecurity expert and successful entrepreneur. He is Chief Executive Officer of Kaspersky Lab, the world's largest privately-held vendor of endpoint protection and cybersecurity solutions. Eugene began his career in cybersecurity accidentally when his computer became infected with the "Cascade" virus in 1989. Eugene's specialized education in cryptography helped him analyze the encrypted virus, understand its behavior, and then develop a removal tool for it. After successfully removing the virus, Eugene's curiosity and passion for computer technology drove him to start analyzing more malicious programs and developing disinfection modules for them. This exotic collection of antivirus modules would eventually become the foundation for Kaspersky Lab's antivirus database. Today the database is one of the most comprehensive and complete collections in cybersecurity, used in detecting and preventing systems from being infected by more than 500 million malicious programs.

Further pursuing his passion for defensive technologies, in 1990 Eugene started gathering a team of like-minded enthusiast researchers to create the AVP Toolkit Pro antivirus program, which four years later was recognized by the University of Hamburg as the most effective antivirus software in the world.

Wishing to combine their successful track record of antivirus programming with their entrepreneurial vision, Eugene and his colleagues decided to establish their own independent company. In 1997 Kaspersky Lab was founded, with Eugene heading the company's antivirus research. In 2007 he was named Kaspersky Lab's CEO.

Today Kaspersky Lab is one of the fastest growing IT security vendors worldwide, operating in almost 200 countries and territories worldwide. The company employs more than 3,800 professionals and IT security specialists in 35 dedicated regional offices across 31 countries, and its cybersecurity technologies protect over 400 million users worldwide.

Kaspersky Lab's globally renowned team of experts has investigated some of the most complex and sophisticated cyberattacks ever known, including Stuxnet, Flame, and Red October. The company also cooperates extensively with INTERPOL, Europol, and national police bodies to actively assist them in their fight against cybercrime.

Eugene has an Honorary Doctorate of Science from the UK's Plymouth University. He regularly gives both lectures on cybersecurity at universities around the globe, and keynotes at leading conferences and industry events.

Security Briefs



Mourning the victims of the Paris attacks in Nov. 2015. The perpetrators were IS returnees from Syria.

BY PETER R. NEUMANN

The threat IS not over yet

The Islamic State's nature and dynamics are certain to change

Over three years after the launch of the military campaign against the Islamic State, the US-led global coalition, together with Iraqi and Kurdish forces, have accomplished their mission. Ninety-eight percent of the territory IS once held in Syria and Iraq has been recaptured. The caliphate's most important cities, Raqqa and Mosul, are no longer controlled by jihadists. And of the 40,000 men who once fought for IS, only 3,000 are thought to remain, hiding in the desert and hoping to survive.

Needless to say, the situation is not quite as rosy as the statistics suggest. While much of the territory has been recaptured, IS as an organization continues to exist, and none of the political conflicts that fuelled its rise – most importantly, the Syrian civil war – have been resolved. Moreover, IS has never just been a territorial project, but also a utopia and a transnational terrorist network that has attracted and inspired tens of thousands of followers from all over the world.

What does its military defeat in Syria and Iraq mean for the group's ability to carry out terrorist attacks? Will its terrorist campaign in Europe, which has targeted Paris, London, Brussels, Berlin, Stockholm and other major European cities, continue? No one can predict with confidence where or what the IS will be in five years' time. Although the group may wish to intensify

its terrorist campaign, it is far from certain whether its supporters will respond with the same enthusiasm they showed in 2014 when the caliphate seemed unstoppable. And while returning foreign fighters will become more significant in terrorist plots, this will not automatically result in a higher number of attacks, but more likely an increase in their complexity.

In short, the IS terrorist campaign will not simply stop, as too many people have been drawn into the jihadist orbit over the past five years. But its physical decline raises serious doubts about the long-term trajectory and viability of the Islamic State as a project and organization.

There can be no doubt that the demise of the physical caliphate has had an impact on the group's strategy. Long gone are the days when the self-declared caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was calling on Muslims across the world to abandon their "decadent homelands" and migrate to the IS. For more than a year now, the group has been telling its followers to stay where they are and fight the infidels "where it hurts them most." Rather than being one of several options, terrorism is now presented as a duty.

This is reflected in the group's

propaganda output, which is focusing less on promoting the utopia that IS had supposedly created, but increasingly comprises crude and, arguably, desperate exhortations to attack Western targets. During the last week of 2017 alone, the group published four high-quality videos seeking to inspire attacks on New Year's Eve.

However, this tells us little about the extent to which the group's message continues to resonate. In fact, there is no evidence that the physical caliphate has morphed into a "virtual" one, as is often alleged. On the contrary, the group's propaganda output has severely declined since its peak in 2015. According to my colleague Charlie Winter, more than three-quarters of IS media offices, which produced the daily deluge of propaganda videos and online magazines, have closed down. "It is almost as if someone has pressed the mute button," he wrote in a recent article.

Instead of populating mainstream social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, IS supporters have been pushed into the darker corners of the internet, especially the private messaging app Telegram, where reaching out to new supporters is more difficult.

What's more, some of the internal debates have become critical of the organization. Even its most passionate supporters can now be observed questioning whether IS, which had proclaimed a thousand-year Reich and whose motto is "remaining and expanding," can survive its physical destruction. The excitement and enthusiasm that permeated these forums in 2014 and 2015 is gone.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to declare the terrorist threat to be over. The Syrian civil war and the rise of IS have rejuvenated the global jihadist movement. More than 5,000 Western Europeans have traveled to Syria, with thousands more who have cheered the group's victories from home. Since the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, jihadists have been responsible for plotting more than a hundred attacks in Europe. In 41 instances they were successful.

While the chances are slim that this campaign will suddenly come to an end, its nature and dynamics are certain to change. So far, less than one-fifth of the jihadist plots in Europe involved attackers who had been fighters in Syria. Nearly two-thirds consisted of

lone attackers planning to use unsophisticated weapons such as knives, machetes, hammers or vehicles. Although many of them had previously been on security agencies' "radar," few had terrorist training or were capable of handling explosives.

The steady trickle of returning fighters, who have spent time in terrorist training camps and participated in the Syrian civil war, will change this. Like in previous conflicts, only a minority of the returnees will become involved in terrorism. But their numbers could be sufficient to professionalize Islamic State's campaign in Europe by inserting experienced fighters who have worked in teams, know how to build bombs and have the charisma and credibility that result from being jihad veterans.

It may be no accident that Islamic State's most devastating operation in Europe – the November 2015 attacks in Paris,

which killed 137 people – was planned and executed by a team of returnees. Indeed, as time goes by and the superficial appeal of the IS brand continues to fade, more experienced and ideologically committed members are likely to play a bigger role.

One of the most significant facts about IS recruits in Europe is their close proximity to "ordinary" crime. In most Western European countries, more than half of the group's recruits have criminal pasts, often as members of gangs, drug dealers, thieves or burglars. For many of these young men, joining IS was a way of seeking redemption. In the words of a Danish fighter, "it's not good enough just praying with all the shit I've done."


This currently provides IS with many advantages. Not only do their European followers find it easy to acquire weapons and forged documents, many have been radicalized and recruited in prisons where criminal and jihadist milieus overlap. When released, they have funded their attacks through petty crime – be it by trading in counterfeit goods, dealing drugs or stealing people's wallets.

However, the nexus between crime and terror can go both ways. At the moment it is fueling terrorism and helping to facilitate attacks against innocent civilians. But if Islamic State is no longer seen as credible, successful or sufficiently "cool" to attract attention, some of their recruits may return to their criminal pasts. What started out as a quest for a global caliphate may ultimately end up as a bunch of local gang.

PETER R. NEUMANN is professor of security studies at King's College London and serves as director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR).

DETERRENCE IN THE CYBER AGE

Preventing a cyber-Pearl Harbor is not the only digital challenge nation states face



DIANON IMAGES

BY JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

Cyber security is a relatively new foreign policy problem. A decade ago it received little attention, but in 2013 the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper declared cyber security risks to be the biggest threat facing the nation.

In 1996, only 36 million people or about 1 percent of the world population used the internet. In a mere two decades, that grew to half the world population. Now with big data, artificial intelligence and the “Internet of Things,” the number of internet connections may grow to a trillion by 2030. The attack surface will expand, the number of actors will increase and attribution will be difficult. Can deterrence work in such a world?

Talk of a “cyber-Pearl Harbor” first appeared in the 1990s amid warnings about contaminated water supplies, disrupted financial systems and collapsed power grids. Despite many smaller attacks, such disasters have not yet occurred. Does that suggest that some kinds of deterrence work in the cyber age, or is it just too soon to know?

Deterrence means dissuading someone from doing something by making them believe that the costs to them will exceed their expected benefit. Understanding deterrence in cyberspace is often difficult, because our minds are captive to Cold War images of deterrence as threatening massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because the aim there is total prevention.

In contrast, many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other

behaviors such as crime, which governments strive only imperfectly to deter. Moreover, cyber deterrence need not be limited to cyber responses. The political scientist Robert Jervis identified “three waves of deterrence theory” in the nuclear era. Theorizing about deterrence in the cyber era is emerging from only its first wave.

There are four major mechanisms to reduce and prevent adverse action in cyberspace: threat of punishment, denial by defense, entanglement and normative taboos. None of these four mechanisms is perfect, but together they illustrate the range of means by which it is possible to reduce the likelihood of adverse acts causing harm. They can complement one another by affecting actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits of particular actions. There is also an element of learning involved as states develop a more sophisticated understanding of the costs that are incurred in cyber warfare and as their economic dependence on the internet grows. Policy analysis focusing solely on punishment may miss some of the most important political behavior that indicates deterrence and dissuasion are working in the cyber realm despite the problem of attribution. In fact, while attribution is crucial for punishment, it is not important for deterrence by denial or entanglement.

Because deterrence rests on perceptions, its effectiveness depends on answers not just to the question “how” but also to the questions “who” and “what.” A threat, defense, entanglement or norm that may deter some actors may not deter others. Similarly, it may succeed in regard to some actions but not others. Much depends on how actors perceive the capability

and credibility of the deterrent instrument. As such, cyber deterrence resembles the concept of extended deterrence, in which a state attempts to protect an ally.

THE ANSWER TO WHETHER A POLICY OF DETERRENCE CAN WORK IN CYBERSPACE DEPENDS ON HOW, WHO AND WHAT

In the cyber realm, the effectiveness of deterrence depends on whom (state or non-state) one is trying to deter from which of their behaviors. Ironically, deterring major states from acts of force may be easier than deterring non-state actors from actions that do not rise to the level of force. The threat of a “bolt from the blue” by a major state has probably been exaggerated. Major state actors are more likely to be entangled in interdependent relationships than are many non-state actors. American declaratory policy has made clear that deterrence is not limited to cyber-against-cyber, although that is possible; deterrence can also be cross-domain or cross-sector with any weapons of its choice, including naming and shaming, economic sanctions and nuclear weapons.

The United States and other countries have asserted that the laws of armed conflict apply in cyberspace. For a cyber operation to be treated as an armed attack depends on its consequences rather

than the instruments used. It is more difficult to deter attacks that do not reach the equivalence of an armed attack. Hybrid warfare, as in Ukraine, and information war-

fare exploit such gray zones. The 2016 Russian disruption of the US presidential campaign fell into such a gray area, and the Obama administration has been criticized for its inadequate response. For tactical reasons, the administration held back until too late, and the Trump administration failed to follow up. The result was inadequate deterrence and grave concerns for the future.

Yet even in gray zones, some progress has been made on deterrence. For years, the United States complained that China’s cyber espionage for commercial advantage subverted fair trade and had enormous costs for the US economy. China, and other governments, lumped commercial espionage with general spying and rejected the development of a norm that would limit their exploitation of stolen intellectual property. The US indictment of five Chinese military officers for cyber theft plus the threat of further sanctions seems to have changed Chinese declaratory

policy, and perhaps its behavior as well. On Sept. 25, 2015, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping agreed that neither government would “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property” for economic advantage.

The answer to whether a policy of deterrence can work in cyberspace depends on how, who and what. Ambiguities of attribution and the diversity of adversaries do not make deterrence and dissuasion impossible, but punishment occupies a smaller part of the policy space than in the case of nuclear weapons. Punishment is possible against both states and criminals, but attribution problems often slow and blunt its deterrent effects. Denial—through computer hygiene, defense and resilience—plays a larger role in dealing with non-state actors than with major states whose intelligence services can formulate an advanced persistent threat. With time and effort, a major military or intelligence agency is likely to penetrate most defenses, but the combination of threat of punishment plus effective defense can influence their calculations of costs and benefits, and thus far most attacks have involved gray zones rather than Pearl Harbors.

They should also pay attention to the mechanisms of entanglement and norms. Entanglement can alter the cost-benefit calculation of a major state such as China, but it probably has little effect on a state such as North Korea, which is weakly linked to the international economic system. It affects non-state actors in different ways; some cyber criminals are like parasites that know they will suffer if they kill their host, but some dark-web criminals and terrorists may be indifferent to the damage they do.

Stability in cyberspace is difficult to predict, because the speed of technological innovation in the cyber realm is greater than in the nuclear realm. Over time, better attribution forensics may enhance the role of punishment; and better defenses through encryption or machine learning may increase the role of denial. The currently supposed advantage of offense over defense may change over time. Cyber learning is also important. As states and organizations come to better understand the limitations and uncertainties of cyber attacks and the growing importance of the internet to their economic wellbeing, cost-benefit calculations regarding the utility of cyber warfare may change just as nuclear learning altered analysts’ understanding of the costs of nuclear warfare. Not all cyber attacks are of equal importance; not all can be deterred; and not all rise to the level of significant national security threats. The lesson for policymakers is to focus on the most important attacks as well as to understand the full range of mechanisms at their disposal and the contexts in which attacks can be prevented. One size does not fit all, and that is the key to understanding deterrence in the cyber age.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. is a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and author of the essay “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace” in *International Security*.

BY DAN SMITH

The arms control horizon is both grim and complex, bogged down by a triple tangle of geopolitical, strategic and technological factors while reflecting the depth and difficulty of today’s security dilemmas. The continued inability to move forward risks deepening them, yet even small advances could signal and encourage an easing of global tensions.

In the 1970s, Cold War arms control negotiations were a key element of US-Soviet détente. When relations deteriorated, arms control stalled and became an irritant. But as change in the Soviet Union unfolded and the Cold War came to a close, arms control and arms reductions were suddenly never more popular or attainable among the international powers with most at stake.

On the nuclear front, two US-Soviet treaties set the pace. The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty removed all ground-launched nuclear and conventional missiles (and their launchers) of any range from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed in July 1991, reduced each side to 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads on a maximum of 1,600 delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles). As the Soviet Union broke up, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons ambitions (as did post-apartheid South Africa in the course of its own transformation). Although the negotiation of a follow-on treaty took almost two decades, in 2010 Russia and the US signed New START, limiting each side to 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 700 strategic delivery systems. Overall, the number of nuclear weapons worldwide fell from some 65,000–70,000 at peak to 14,945 at the end of 2016 (as per latest reliable data point).

Conventional arms control was equally dramatic. The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe capped at equal levels the numbers of heavy weapons deployed between the Atlantic and the Urals by the states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, binding the latter states even after the Pact itself fell apart. This was not all. Other arms control milestones of the period include the Chemical Weapons Convention signed in 1993, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013.

Today’s scene is rather different. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has not come into force because a number of key states have not ratified it, including the US, China, Pakistan, India and North Korea. The US and Russia accuse one another of violating the 1987 INF Treaty. Though New START is being implemented, its agreed expiration date is 2021, and there are no current

talks on its replacement nor any in sight. That means that there are currently no meaningful nuclear arms reduction talks involving the leading nuclear powers.

The idea of Russia and the US opting for an unrestrained nuclear arms race seems improbable due to its expense and peril. But that view rests on the belief or hope that they will prefer moderation; it does not rest on evidence of a practical commitment to further arms control.

As for conventional weapons, Russia pulled out of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in an extended process that concluded in 2015. The core Russian argument was that NATO’s enlargement meant that the equity of the original caps on equipment numbers had been lost. And furthermore, despite repeated efforts by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), there is no progress and scant active discussion of confidence and security building measures.

What some may regard as the biggest failure of arms control lies outside of the normal negotiating arenas of such agreements. North Korea’s successful programs of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development, despite nine UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions, have frustrated a major international non-proliferation effort. North Korea probably has a current arsenal of some 20 to 30 deployable nuclear warheads. It has the irrefutable capacity to hit regional powers with ballistic missile strikes and probably the ability to strike certain American targets. It is more than likely that it will be able to deploy nuclear missiles capable of reaching targets in the continental United States within an uncomfortably short period of time.

On the other hand, impatience at the retention of nuclear weapons by a handful of states has been steadily growing among many non-nuclear weapon states. The central bargain of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was that the nuclear have-nots would remain have-nots while the nuclear have-tos would divest themselves of their nuclear weapons. The US and Russia have dramatically reduced their arsenals but have shown no signs of readiness for complete elimination, except in occasional rhetoric such as President Barack Obama’s Prague speech in 2009. More tersely, Trump has reiterated the dream of a nuclear-free world but, in the meantime, like his predecessor in the White House, has opted to remain energetically engaged in the nuclear weapons business. For most of the non-nuclear weapon states, this is simply not good enough, which is why 122 of them voted for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—usually known as the “nuclear ban”—and 50 signed up on the first day it was open for signature.

The combination of a sense that arms control does not work, does not go far enough and has weak prospects weakens the will and willingness to support the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is jeopardized even more when the US president persistently casts to push the reset button in US-Russia relations, which had crashed after the war in Georgia in August 2008. But even before Georgia, arms control had been limping as Russia sought a return to a position of global strength and saw many of the arms control agreements to which it was then bound as products of earlier Russian weakness.

A good part of the explanation of why arms control has reached this point of stasis lies in Russia’s relationship with the US and its allies. Many of arms control’s most significant difficulties have been symptoms of a larger ail-

ment in the global body politic. The infection is long-lasting and has taken hold slowly. Long before Crimea and Ukraine, the Obama administration wanted to push the reset button in US-Russia relations, which had crashed after the war in Georgia in August 2008. But even before Georgia, arms control had been limping as Russia sought a return to a position of global strength and saw many of the arms control agreements to which it was then bound as products of earlier Russian weakness.

Even in this atmosphere, however, it was still possible to agree to New START in 2010, which may in part be due to Russia’s view that equality was much more

firmly inscribed in this treaty than in the CFE, for example.

This hint that the prospects of arms control are not governed purely by a priori politics— that strategic considerations also play a part—is reflected in the case of the INF Treaty, about which Russia has been increasingly uncomfortable since 2007. That was the year when discussion surfaced within NATO about placing ballistic missile defenses in Eastern Europe. This move was seen as a potential threat to Russia’s ability to sustain its nuclear deterrence; thus, in 2008 it began testing ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) capable of a range banned by the INF Treaty. It is not possible to aver with certainty that, absent missile defense, Russia would not have developed and tested GLCMs; history is full of ex post rationalizations and is far from devoid of weapons technologies looking for a role and rationale. But it is at least a possibility worth acknowledging that, as so often is the case in the arms race, one side’s defensive measures look offensive to the other.

In short, with positive or negative effect, choices of military strategy can have a political impact—and arms control considerations can either be a part of the choice or fall victim to the impact.

The challenges for arms control that are set by the politics of US-Russian relations and the impact of strategic choices are exacerbated by current developments in arms-related technologies. A key example is the increasing feasibility of autonomy in weapon systems. It is now well within the bounds of technological possibility that weapon systems with autonomy in both acquiring and striking targets will be deployed. It is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that such weapons systems could be deployed in an offensive as well as defensive mode and consequently used in fast-paced contexts of combat. As extraordinary as such scenarios may sound, weapons systems capable of autonomous decision-making vis-à-vis targeting are no more unthinkable than self-driving cars.

This prospect raises discomfiting questions about what used to be called the Laws of War, now known as International Humanitarian Law. Under the Geneva Convention (Article 36 of Additional Protocol 1), parties are bound to review the legality of all new weapons, means or methods of warfare before they are used in armed conflict. How would autonomous weapons respect such laws? Would they—could they—actually be required to? An arms control framework has been found for discussing these weapons, but implementation has been slow. Few governments have defined positions and discussions have thus far been purely informal. It is unclear if or when negotiations will start or what their

objective would be. The question must be whether the pace of arms control will match the pace of arms development.

Uncomfortable questions also emerge over cyber security. While it has become a cliché to say that, in the next war, the first attack will occur in cyberspace, the more uncomfortable thought is that the first attacks have already occurred. This line of thinking suggests that cyber warfare erodes the boundary between war and peace. The cyber vulnerability of critical infrastructure ranging from health systems, finance and public transport to energy generation and communications is recognized as an essential issue for national security. Its potential impact explains some experts’ perspective that cyber warfare will take precedence—or already does take precedence—over kinetic warfare.

And, of course, there are nightmare threats such as cyber attacks taking over the kinetic warfare abilities of a state, including hacking into largely autonomous weapon systems and into the control of nuclear weapon systems.


This eventuality would seem to necessitate international regulations to bring these fields of cyber espionage and cyber terrorism under control. All states have an interest in limiting this sphere of human activity, yet current technology developments make abundantly clear the profundity of the problems we face in terms of arms control, especially when the politics of arms control exhibit so little hope.

There are feasible responses to all the challenges facing arms control. The difficulties with the INF Treaty in an age of missile defense could be brought into the realm of negotiation in lieu of a sterile blame game. New START can be extended beyond 2021 and negotiations on a replacement could begin now. These measures would help quell the impatience of the non-nuclear weapon states, as would other limited steps such as those that address nuclear safety and the availability of fissile materials. These actions could reestablish the unity of purpose needed to prevent further nuclear proliferation. Negotiations on autonomy in weapons systems can be accelerated and the development of the technology slowed. Additional resources can be funneled into cyber security while the capacities of this field are harnessed for improved verification of other arms control measures.

These and many other positive developments can be achieved on the single and simple condition that the two central players—the US and Russia—both decide they want to. And that is the ultimate issue: The future of arms control lies in their hands.

DAN SMITH is director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Estimate of global nuclear weapons in January 2017



BY RONALD ARKIN

Let me unequivocally state: The status quo with respect to innocent civilian casualties is utterly and wholly unacceptable. I am not in favor of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) nor of lethal weapons of any sort. I would hope that LAWS would never need to be used, as I am against killing in all its manifold forms. But if humanity persists in entering into warfare, which is an unfortunate underlying assumption, we must protect the innocent noncombatants in the battlespace far better than we currently do. Technology can and should be used toward that end. Is it not our responsibility as scientists to look for effective ways to reduce man's inhumanity to its fellow man through technology? Research in ethical military robotics can and should be applied toward achieving this goal.

I have studied ethology – animal behavior in their natural environment – as a basis for robotics for my entire career, ranging from frogs, insects, dogs, birds, wolves and human companions. Nowhere has it been more depressing than to study human behavior in the battlefield. The commonplace occurrence of slaughtering civilians in conflict over millennia gives rise to my pessimism in reforming human behavior yet provides optimism for the prospects of robots being able to exceed human moral performance in similar circumstances.

I have the utmost respect for our young men and women in the battlespace, but they are placed into situations where no human has ever been designed to function. This is exacerbated by the tempo at which modern warfare is conducted. Given this pace and resultant stress, expecting widespread compliance with international humanitarian law seems unreasonable and perhaps unattainable by flesh-and-blood warfighters.

I believe judicious design and the use of LAWS can lead to the potential saving of noncombatant lives. If properly developed and deployed, it can and should be used towards achieving that end, and not simply about winning wars. We must position this humanitarian technology at the point where war crimes, carelessness and fatal human error occur and lead to noncombatant deaths. Unmanned systems will never be able to be perfectly ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can ultimately perform more ethically than human soldiers.

I am not averse to a ban should we be unable to reach the goal of reducing noncombatant casualties; but for now we are better served by a moratorium, at least until we can agree upon definitions regarding what we are regulating and it is determined whether we can indeed achieve humanitarian benefits through the use of this technology. A preemptive ban ignores the moral imperative to use technology to reduce the persistent atrocities and mistakes that human warfighters make. At the very least it is premature.

Alternative considerations include the following: Regulate autonomous weapons usage instead of prohibiting them entirely; consider restrictions in well-defined circumstances rather than an outright ban and stigmatization of the weapons systems; do not make decisions based on unfounded fears – remove

RONALD ARKIN is Regents' Professor and director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory at the Georgia Institute of Technology's School of Interactive Computing in Atlanta.

pathos and hype while focusing on the real technical, legal, ethical and moral implications.

Numerous factors point to autonomous robots soon being able to outperform humans on the battlefield from an ethical perspective:

- They are able to act conservatively, as they do not need to protect themselves in cases of low certainty of target identification.

Robot imperative

The moral obligation of using AI to reduce atrocities

- The eventual development and use of a broad range of sensors will render robots better equipped than humans for battlefield observations.

- They can be designed without emotions that would otherwise cloud their judgment or result in anger and frustration with ongoing battlefield events.

- They avoid the human psychological problem of "scenario fulfillment," which contributed to the downing of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes in 1988.

- They can integrate more information from more sources far faster than a human possibly could in real-time before responding with lethal force.

- When working in a team of combined human soldiers and autonomous systems, they have the potential to independently and objectively monitor ethical behavior in the battlefield by all parties and to report any infractions that may be observed.

- LAWS should not be considered an end-all military solution. To the contrary, their use should be limited to specific circumstances. Current thinking recommends:

- Specialized missions where bounded morality applies, e.g. room clearing, counter-sniper operations or perimeter protection in the DMZ.

- High-intensity inter-state warfare, not counter-insurgencies, to minimize likelihood of civilian casualties.

- Deployment in concert with soldiers, not as their replacement. Human presence in the battlefield should be maintained.

Smart autonomous weapons systems may enhance the survival of noncombatants. Human Rights Watch considers the use of precision-guided munitions in urban settings to be a moral imperative. In effect, there may be mobile precision-guided munitions that result in a similar moral imperative for their use. Such weapons have the possibility of deciding when to fire and – more importantly – when not to fire. They should be designed with overrides to ensure meaningful human control. Moreover, they can employ fundamentally different tactics while assuming far more risk than human warfighters in terms of protecting non-combatants and assessing hostility and hostile

intent. In essence, these systems can more effectively operate on a philosophy of "First do no harm" rather than "Shoot first and ask questions later."

Building such systems is not a short-term goal, but rather part of a medium- to long-term agenda addressing many challenging research questions. However, exploiting bounded morality within a narrow mission context helps to achieve better performance with respect to preserving noncombatant life, and thus warrants robust research on humanitarian grounds.

Other researchers have begun related work on at least four continents. Nonetheless, many daunting questions regarding lethality and autonomy remain unresolved. Discussions regarding regulation must be based on reason, not on fear.


Until these questions are resolved, a moratorium is more appropriate than a ban. Only then can a careful, graded introduction of the technology into the battlespace be ensured.

The status quo is unacceptable with respect to noncombatant deaths. It may be possible to save noncombatant lives through the use of this technology, and these efforts should not be prematurely terminated by a preemptive ban. AI can be used to save innocent lives where humans may and do fail. Nowhere is this more evident than on the battlefield.

Smart autonomous weapons systems may enhance the survival of noncombatants. Human Rights Watch considers the use of precision-guided munitions in urban settings to be a moral imperative. In effect, there may be mobile precision-guided munitions that result in a similar moral imperative for their use. Such weapons have the possibility of deciding when to fire and – more importantly – when not to fire. They should be designed with overrides to ensure meaningful human control. Moreover, they can employ fundamentally different tactics while assuming far more risk than human warfighters in terms of protecting non-combatants and assessing hostility and hostile

Smart autonomous weapons systems may enhance the survival of noncombatants. Human Rights Watch considers the use of precision-guided munitions in urban settings to be a moral imperative. In effect, there may be mobile precision-guided munitions that result in a similar moral imperative for their use. Such weapons have the possibility of deciding when to fire and – more importantly – when not to fire. They should be designed with overrides to ensure meaningful human control. Moreover, they can employ fundamentally different tactics while assuming far more risk than human warfighters in terms of protecting non-combatants and assessing hostility and hostile

Smart autonomous weapons systems may enhance the survival of noncombatants. Human Rights Watch considers the use of precision-guided munitions in urban settings to be a moral imperative. In effect, there may be mobile precision-guided munitions that result in a similar moral imperative for their use. Such weapons have the possibility of deciding when to fire and – more importantly – when not to fire. They should be designed with overrides to ensure meaningful human control. Moreover, they can employ fundamentally different tactics while assuming far more risk than human warfighters in terms of protecting non-combatants and assessing hostility and hostile



BY STUART RUSSELL

Beginning in 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) have held meetings at the United Nations in Geneva to discuss possible limitations on the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons systems (AWS). In November 2017, the CCW convened a formal Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), chaired by India's Ambassador to the UN Amandeep Singh Gill, with a mandate to "assess questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems." This article reflects views shared by a great many in the artificial intelligence community. These views were expressed in an open letter on July 28, 2015, signed by over 3,700 AI researchers, and in a letter to the Obama administration written on April 4, 2016, by 41 leading American AI researchers, including almost all of the living presidents of AAAI, the main professional society for artificial intelligence. The British AI community sent a similar letter to then Prime Minister David Cameron.

The UN defines autonomous weapons as having the capacity to "locate, select and eliminate human targets without human intervention." Some have proposed alternative definitions – for example, the UK Ministry of Defence says that autonomous weapons systems must "understand higher-level intent and direction" and "are not yet in existence and are not likely to be for many years, if at all."

Much of the discussion at the UN has been stymied by claims that autonomy is a mysterious, indefinable property. In the view of the AI community, the notion of autonomy is essentially unproblematic in the context of lethal weapons, which is quite distinct from the philosophical context of human autonomy. The autonomy of lethal weapons is no more mysterious than the autonomy of a chess program that decides where to move its pieces and which enemy pieces to eliminate. The key is that the specific targets are not identified and approved – either in advance or at the time of detection – according to human judgment, but are instead selected by an algorithm based on sensory input the algorithm receives after the mission is initiated by a human.

The feasibility of autonomous weapons is also not in question, at least for a broad class of missions that might currently be contemplated.

All of the component technologies – flight control, swarming, navigation, indoor and outdoor exploration and mapping, obstacle avoidance, detecting and tracking humans, tactical planning, coordinated attack – have been demonstrated. Building a lethal autonomous weapon, perhaps in the form of a multi-rotor micro-unmanned aerial vehicle, is easier than building a self-driving car, since the latter is held to a far higher performance standard and must operate without error in a vast range of complex situations. This is not "science fiction." Autonomous weapons do not have to be humanoid, conscious and evil. And the capabilities are not "decades away" as claimed by some countries.

UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other experts have expressed concerns about the ability of autonomous weapons to comply with provisions of international humanitarian law regarding military necessity, proportionality and discrimination between combatants and civilians. Discrimination is probably feasible in most situations, even if not perfectly accurate. However, determining proportionality and necessity is most likely not feasible for current AI systems and would have to be established in advance with reasonable certainty by a human operator for all attacks the weapons may undertake during a mission. This requirement would therefore limit the scope of missions that could legally be initiated.

Another important component of international humanitarian law is the Martens Clause, according to which "the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience." In this regard, Germany has stated that it "will not accept that the decision over life and death is taken solely by an autonomous system" while Japan "has no plan to develop robots with humans out of the loop, which may be capable of committing murder." BAE Systems, the world's second-largest defense contractor, has asserted that it has no intention of developing autonomous weapons, stating that the removal of the human from the loop is "fundamentally wrong."

At present, the broader public has little awareness of the state of technology and the near-term possibilities, but this will presumably change if the killing of humans by autonomous robots becomes commonplace. At that point, the dictates of public conscience will be very clear, but it may be too late to follow them.

The new weapons of mass destruction?

Building a lethal autonomous weapon is easier than building a self-driving car. A new treaty is necessary

Compliance with international humanitarian law, even if achievable, is not sufficient to justify proceeding with an arms race involving lethal autonomous weapons. President Obama:

"I recognize that the potential development of lethal autonomous weapons raises questions that compliance with existing legal norms – if that can be achieved – may not by itself resolve, and that we will need to grapple with more fundamental moral questions about whether and to what extent computer algorithms should be able to take a human life."

One of the "fundamental moral questions" is the effect of autonomous weapons systems on the security of member states and their peoples. On this matter, the message of the AI community, as expressed in the letters mentioned above, has been clear: Because they do not require individual human supervision, autonomous weapons are potentially scalable weapons of mass destruction: an essentially unlimited number of such weapons can be launched by a small number of people. This is an inescapable logical consequence of autonomy. As a result, we expect that autonomous weapons will reduce human security at the individual, local, national and international levels.

It is estimated, for example, that roughly one million lethal weapons can be carried in a single container truck or cargo aircraft, perhaps with only 2 or 3 human operators rather than 20 or 30 million. Such weapons would be able to hunt for and eliminate humans in towns and cities, even inside buildings. They would be cheap,

STUART RUSSELL

is a computer science professor and the Smith-Zadeh Professor in Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley.

effective, unattributable and easily proliferated once the major powers initiate mass production and the weapons become available on the international arms market. For the victor they would have advantages over nuclear weapons or carpet bombing: they leave property intact and can be applied selectively to eliminate only those who might threaten an occupying force. Finally, whereas the use of nuclear weapons represents a cataclysmic threshold we have – often by sheer luck – avoided crossing since 1945, there is no such threshold with scalable autonomous weapons. Attacks could escalate smoothly from 100 casualties to 1,000 to 10,000 to 100,000.



BY KIM MIN-SEOK

Conventional warfare tactics, traditionally maintained through rifles and tanks, artillery, and fighter jets, is now centered on the rapid innovation and advancement of IT, artificial intelligence (AI), avionics and cyber technology in developed countries. The battlefield is expanding to five dimensions – ground, sea, air, space and cyber. However, the South Korean military faces a triple handicap. Thus, without technical innovation, it will be difficult to maintain its combat power.

The first of Korea's handicaps is its surrounding conditions. The Korean Peninsula has achieved stabilization following the Cold War era, but there are indications of another potential clash between land powers such as China and Russia and sea powers like the United States and Japan.

Secondly, the threat posed by North Korea has increased. The North boasts an immense conventional force of 1.2 million soldiers and is becoming an actual nuclear state.

Thirdly, South Korea faces a steep "demographic cliff," and a decrease in its number of troops is inevitable. Thus, the South Korean military is expected to shrink from its current level of 620,000 troops to 500,000 by 2022. While the decrease in manpower has little influence on the navy and air force, the biggest burden will fall upon the 483,000-strong army, which will soon be reduced to 365,000 troops. The South Korean military, especially the Army, will not be able to cope with the changing military structure and potential future threats unless it seeks innovation through drones and automation.

Although the South Korean military has pushed for defense reform since the late 1990s, it has repeatedly failed due to changing administrations, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and instability resulting from North Korea's frequent military provocations. But a current sense of crisis is pushing the South Korean government and the military toward speedy reform. The development of drones and IT technology has caused the South Korean army to establish a drone combat unit. General Kim Yong-woo, the South Korean Army chief of staff who assumed the post last year, intends to change the structure of the Army and shift to new warfare tactics based on technology. The Moon Jae-in government is backing this concept.

The US and Israeli armies were the first to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for military

operations and have experience in developing norms and rules of engagement for their use. The US military has actively used drones in Afghanistan and Iraq in efforts to eradicate terrorist forces including al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Israel was the first country to use a drone militarily and is still plays a leading role in the development of weaponized drones. During a prolonged period of joint military exercises with the US, the South Korean

to replace the Songgolmae. On the division level, an indigenous version of the existing KUS-9 drone must be developed and the RemoEyes replaced. The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) will soon complete development of a MALE (medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles), which is similar to the US MQ-9 Reaper and, aside from basic reconnaissance capabilities, could carry air-to-ground missiles like the AGM-114 Hellfire.

Miniature drones on par with America's WASP UAV are in the works. They will be deployed to the new "decapitation" special forces unit established last year by the South Korean Army. These micro drones provide intelligence on targets

Droning on

The South Korean military is catching up with a new drone army

military has observed the US army's deployment of drones and learned how to use them in combat. It also received technological support from Israel when it first developed its own weaponized drones. Even now, many South Korean companies in the defense industry develop military drones through technical cooperation with Israel.

The South Korean Army currently operates the RQ-101, or Songgolmae (wingspan: 6.4 meters), developed through its homegrown technology in 2000, along with Israeli-made Searcher IIs, while some Army corps have deployed Israel's Heron drones. While the division level commands the KUS-9 drone (2014), the regiment level uses the RemoEye-15 (2004) and the RemoEye-006 UAV (2006) was developed and deployed at the battalion level. Defense reforms emphasizing drone warfare could expand the operational area of corps and divisions by a factor of three to four in the future. This would also enable network-centric warfare based on a drone system.


Furthermore, carrying out the Kill Chain pre-emptive system operations to strike down North Korea's ballistic missiles in near real-time now requires raising the reconnaissance capabilities of forward units in a groundbreaking manner. The Army corps also needs a next-generation drone

the air force and ground troops. Moreover, the Northrop Grumman RQ-4B Global Hawk will be introduced in 2018 to conduct surveillance over the vast territory of North Korea. In addition to the UAVs, the South Korean Army currently plans to make use of a dog-horse robot developed by the defense ministry with some \$43.34 million invested from 2006 to 2012. This robot is capable of autonomous navigation along a set route, short-distance surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as mine detection. The army established a dronebot military research center in January 2018. A pilot-scale drone combat unit will enter service this year. Drones can conduct reconnaissance and execute strikes, while in the long term robots can be tasked with search missions.

The Army also installed a scientific boundary system south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Its high-performance surveillance cameras and optical fiber network automatically alert the situation room when infringed upon, allowing immediate military reaction. Once this new boundary system is fully operational, the number of soldiers stationed in the area can be decreased drastically. Even blind spots along the inter-Korean border will then be effectively monitored. When taking into consideration the demographic cliff, threats from North Korea and China, and the harsh reality of the need for defense reform, the build-up of a drone and robot system in South Korea becomes a realistic prospect. Korea's drone and robot technology is nearing 80 to 85 percent of the level reached by the highly advanced countries like the United States. Setting up a drone army will be facilitated by South Korea's industrial prowess in such fields as materials and battery technology as well as electronics and communications technologies.

KIM MIN-SEOK

was a researcher at the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses from 1982 to 1994 before becoming a journalist. He was spokesman for the South Korean Ministry of National Defense from 2010 to 2016. He is now a military and security expert as well as an opinion columnist for the Korean daily newspaper JoongAng Ilbo.



The construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is highly contentious, and not only internationally. Two German experts present their differing views for *The Security Times*

BY FRIEDBERT PFLÜGER

As polarized as the discussion surrounding Nord Stream 2 may be, each side posits legitimate arguments deserving of careful consideration. It is thus essential to discard doomsday scenarios, return to reason and soberly substantiate the debate. Four main issues are at stake:

Detractors of Nord Stream 2 argue that European energy security is already impaired by an over-dependency on Russian gas. As was the case with previous energy cooperation projects, such as the German-Russian gas-for-pipes deal of the 1970s ("Röhrenembargo"), it is first and foremost Washington that is in opposition, ostensibly in the belief that Russia covers the vast majority of European gas demand. However, this share, often exaggerated in the US, has been fluctuating over the past decade between roughly one-quarter and one-third.

But more importantly, after the Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 and 2009 – which in some Central and Eastern European countries led to serious supply shortages and justified concerns – the EU

took decisive action to drastically diversify supply sources and improve energy security. What emerged is a functional and highly flexible European gas market, lacking confining destination clauses and boasting new interconnectors, storage facilities, reverse flow capabilities and over 30 European LNG import terminals (sufficient to cover more than half of EU demand). While just a decade ago the EU might still have been susceptible to blackmail, we are now witnessing a more-improved energy landscape where gas can scarcely be weaponized.

Prospective European gas demand is a similar point of contention. Will not the triumphant advance of renewables and efficiency measures make additional gas import capacity superfluous? In a recent speech, EU Climate Action and Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete made abundantly clear that this is not the case: "Gas has an important role to play in our decarbonization efforts [and] will shift towards a role where it will complement various renewables and replace more polluting fuels."

In the short and medium term, Europe will continue to require

large volumes of low-carbon fuels for heating, transportation and shipping, as well as for the substitution of coal in electricity generation. Even if consumption levels remain stable, import necessity will expand due to dwindling availability of domestic gas resources; in the Netherlands, for instance, production dropped from 81 bcm in 2013 to 47 bcm in 2016 due to concerns over seismic activity.

Opponents of Nord Stream 2 also challenge the business sense behind the pipeline. But Russia is far from alone in recognizing the opportunities on the European gas market. Other present and prospective contenders include Norway, Qatar, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia and, not least, the United States with its shale gas industry. Most recently, Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Italy signed a memorandum for the construction of the world's longest underwater pipeline to supply Europe

over 2,000 kilometers with up to 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The industry seems far from suffering a lack of demand.

This is good news for Europe. The continent's emerging and diverse portfolio of gas imports contributes to the overall security of supply, to competition and thus to affordable gas prices for households and industry. For better or for worse, the advanced integration of the European gas market and the need for redundant, parallel infrastructure – as the new Nord Stream strands would provide – were demonstrated at the end of last year by an unfortunate explosion at a major gas hub in Baumgarten, Austria, affecting markets all the way from Italy to the UK. The incident promptly triggered an order for a short-term LNG delivery. Incidentally, this order came from Gazprom's Russian competitor, Novatek, which had inaugurated its Yamal liquefaction facility just days earlier.

FRIEDBERT PFLÜGER

German State Secretary of Defense (ret.), is director of the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) at King's College London, senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center and managing director of Pflüger International GmbH.

The issue of subsidies has been raised, including whether they can be justified on the highly developed European gas market. But as long as investors bear the cost and risk of a new infrastructure project themselves – as is the case with Nord Stream 2 – and do not pass it on to governments or taxpayers, consumers should every welcome the prospect of even additional gas molecule reaching our shores, irrespective of its origin.

However, even if Nord Stream 2 possesses a business rationale and poses no threat to European energy security, some argue it may still be objectionable from a geopolitical perspective. Is it not in our best interest to play tough and oppose Nord Stream 2 in order to offer an unambiguous response to Russian transgressions in Ukraine and elsewhere, instead of rewarding Gazprom with additional market access? If so, this should be clearly stated in order to prevent the erosion of European rule of law, not veiled in economic or legal pretext.

Moreover, a crackdown on Nord Stream 2 would not help Ukraine. In a study for the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) at King's College London, Andreas

Goldthau argues that while the country would indeed miss out on transit fees should the majority of gas flows to Western Europe circumvent its network, it also stands to gain from new Western import options boosting its standing in price negotiations with its eastern neighbor and lowering its gas bill. And this would not be a first; the completion of the Lithuania's floating Klaipėda LNG terminal in 2014 brought an immediate 20-percent price reduction for Russian gas imports, even before any significant volumes of liquefied gas had reached the Baltic state.

Political leaders in Europe and the US should think twice before doing precisely what they accuse the Russians of doing: using energy as a political tool. Pipelines such as Nord Stream 2 do not represent subservience to Moscow – they create stabilizing interdependence. This is as true now as it was during even the most precarious periods of the Cold War, when energy remained the only significant area of continued cooperation between East and West. Europe and the US would be well advised to bring calm and composure back into this debate.



BY RALF FÜCKS

If we listen to those groups advocating on behalf of Nord Stream 2 – the second double pipeline designed to move Russian natural gas through the Baltic Sea – we might come to think the new project is a highly energy-efficient and politically quite harmless. According to them, Nord Stream 2 will increase European energy security – after all, the Soviet Union was a reliable provider – and remain a purely commercial project. They argue that the European Commission would do well to stay out of the matter, and should refrain from interfering in Germany's energy sovereignty. Objection, your Honor!

The "European Energy Security Strategy" adopted by the EU Commission in 2014 contains three explicit objectives: an increase in primary energy generation, the diversification of supplier countries and delivery routes, and a joint approach of EU states with regard to third countries. Nord Stream 2 clashes with all three of these objectives. First, the project speculates that natural gas imports to the EU will rise. Second, it increases dependency on Russia, which – already

at liquefied natural gas terminals geared to meet future demand. In other words, there is no shortage in natural gas import capacity today, nor will there be a shortage in the future. For Nord Stream 2 to be used at full capacity, it would require either an enormous increase in EU gas consumption or a squeezing-out of other suppliers and transport routes. Neither of these scenarios would be in the interest of Europe. They would, however, be in the interest of Gazprom & Co.

A sustained increase in the level of natural gas consumption is incompatible with the climate policy goals of the EU. What we need is an extensive decarbonization of the energy sector by mid-century. Instead of creating path dependencies in fossil energy imports over decades, our goal should be to remain flexible in terms of supply sources and transport routes. In the short term, demand for natural gas may pick up as a result of the gradual phasing-out of coal and a further reduction in oil consumption. Over the long term, however, consumption of natural gas will also experience a decline. One key factor in this process is the continuing improvement of energy efficiency in the build-

ing sector and heavy industry. Another factor is the substitution of natural gas by means of synthetic gas (hydrogen and methane) derived from excess renewable electricity. Also, the greater the share of wind and solar energy in Europe's mix of electricity, the more urgent becomes the issue of converting excess amounts of electricity. Any fixation on the import of natural gas would only serve to delay the development of alternative state-of-the-art technologies on an industrial scale.

The new double pipeline also crosses several highly sensitive ecological areas. Indeed, building this pipeline involves massive interventions in the maritime biosphere. Environmental protection organizations criticize both the route and the superficial environmental impact assessment.

The claim that Nord Stream 2 is a purely commercial project is naive. It would be severely negligent to overlook the fact that this pipeline is part of a geopolitical game played by the Kremlin. The goal of this game is to eliminate Ukraine and Poland as transit countries, to cement European dependence on energy imports from Russia and to drive a wedge between EU countries.

While Europe continues to lack a common strategic energy policy, the Russian side continues to expand its energy empire. Part of this game also involves the strategically placed construction of nuclear power plants designed to export electricity to the EU, such as the 2400-megawatt complex on the Belarusian-Lithuanian border and an equally large facility in Kaliningrad.

Gazprom is not your average corporation. Together with the oil giant Rosneft, it forms the economic basis of the authoritarian regime in Moscow. Oil and gas are the most important sources of income for the Russian state and the richest source of systemic corruption. At the same time, Gazprom and Rosneft are at the center of the Kremlin's economic networks in Europe. Indeed, it will be interesting to see how German ex-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder navigates these waters in his role as a leading Gazprom and Rosneft lobbyist.

There is a much less expensive alternative to a second Baltic Sea pipeline: the modernization of the continental transport network. This would comprise a multilateral project that would benefit everyone. If Ukraine and Poland were to be eliminated as interme-

diaries for Russian gas exports to Western Europe, they would lose billions of euros in annual transit fees. In addition, the Kremlin would be able to turn off the gas at any time without jeopardizing its export business. Ukraine would then become even more vulnerable to Russian policies of intimidation. This, too, is part of the political dimension of Nord Stream 2.

If Germany's goal is to achieve a cooperative European energy system, then we should not support the policy pursued by the Kremlin. Our Central and Eastern European neighbors will no doubt express a critical yet understandable sensitivity if their interests and concerns are ignored in another grand bargain between Germany and Russia. Nord Stream 2 is a test of how serious Germany's commitment to "more Europe" truly is.

RALF FÜCKS

was the longtime head of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, an independent political foundation affiliated with Germany's Green Party. He is now the director of the Berlin-based think tank Zentrum Liberale Moderne.

Highspeed

Four powerful Herrenknecht TBMs for the rail link Stuttgart-Ulm. Subsection of a 1,500 km long high speed magistrale across Europe.

Hightech

Multi-mode TBM at Filder Tunnel. Maximum safety in difficult geology requires precise tunnelling technology: The convertible Herrenknecht Multi-mode TBM (ø 10.82 m) bores with screw conveyor or belt conveyor discharge.

Highlights

Gotthard, Crossrail, Doha, S21: Herrenknecht tunnelling technology creates unique rail connections.

Contractors:
 Filder Tunnel ARGE ATCOST 21 / BoStier Tunnel ARGE ATIA
 > Forr Bau GmbH Tunnelbau
 > G. Hinteregger & Söhne Baugesellschaft m.b.H.
 > Östu-Stettin Hoch- und Tiefbau GmbH
 > Swietelsky Baugesellschaft m.b.H.
 Altvorföld Tunnel
 > Implenia Construction GmbH

Pioneering Underground Technologies

> www.herrenknecht.com



invest in bavaria

My home is my castle.
 We know how to secure your data.

IT security influences all areas of application where digital solutions and business models are important. Bavaria supports this future-oriented sector with funding and the establishment of a world-class competence centre for IT security together with the Fraunhofer AISEC. This is good news for players in Bavaria, such as Kaspersky, Symantec, Giesecke & Devrient and many others.

> www.invest-in-bavaria.com

Bavaria.
 The Future.



MS EUROPA | MS EUROPA 2

A CLASS OF THEIR OWN.

"No other ships today can match the high standards set by MS EUROPA and MS EUROPA 2 and their crews."

Douglas Ward, Berlitz Cruise Guide

EUROPA and EUROPA 2, as the world's best cruise ships, were once again awarded the highest distinction: 5-stars-plus*. Experience the elegant luxury and the freedom that takes you places in the highest award category.

*According to Berlitz Cruise Guide 2018

Find out more from your travel agent or at hl-cruises.com



HAPAG ¹⁸/₉₁ LLOYD
CRUISES