IMPERILED WORLD
Warming of the global threat of authoritarianism, Richard Kagan asks, "What makes us so confident that democracy is guaranteed in the West?"

COLD WAR 2.0
A new arms race between the US and Russia is an era of cyber-enhanced information warfare and advanced capabilities is undermining strategic stability, argues Richard Haass and Jon Wolfsthal.

THE RUSSIANS FILE
Eric Schmitt describes the negotiations between the US and Russia. Alexey Gromov makes the case for new multilateral formats, Dmitriy Yemtsov Moscow should retreat carefully, and Beil Ilene and Adam Post support lifting sanctions.

MIDDLE EAST PRIMER
Michael Lavi reviews the Kurds along the In the Near East, the future of the Kardo along the Baghdad border.

AFRICAN MOVEMENT
The continent is emerging from a sea of poverty and now has a real middle class – it could actually lead to even more south-north migration. Stephen Smith explains.

LIKE IT OR NOT
Social media manipulation has become a real security threat. NAO and civil society allies must come together to counteract the power of disinformation to divide, writes Vening Fung, Sri Lanka.

THE US president's impulses are forcing the world's hands

We must re-address arms control

The EU-US relationship is in crisis

With friends like these...
The year 2019 was sealed by a climate of gloom and doom. The current global order is facing a crisis of legitimacy. No one is sure if it will be replaced by a new order, or if this crisis will eventually lead to something that resembles the old order even more closely. The rise of new powers abroad is challenging the established order, and the spread of authoritarianism is a serious threat to liberal democracy.

The challenge is not just economic. The rise of China and the spread of authoritarianism are exacerbating the development problems of the world's most populous countries. The increasing influence of China is also changing the geopolitical landscape of the world. China is no longer a distant power; it is now a partner and a potential competitor.

In this context, it is high time for the European Union to become a truly capable actor on the international scene. The EU must be able to take on the role of a mediator and to promote dialogue and cooperation between different countries and regions.

However, the EU is not the only actor on the international scene. The United States, Russia, and China are also playing a significant role in shaping the world order. The EU must be able to work together with these countries to promote a just and stable international order.

The EU must also be able to respond to the challenges posed by new technologies, such as artificial intelligence and data protection. These challenges require a collaborative approach, and the EU must be able to work with other countries and international organizations to find solutions.

Finally, the EU must be able to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape. The rise of new powers abroad is changing the balance of power in the world, and the EU must be able to respond to these changes in a timely and effective manner.

In conclusion, the EU must be able to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape and to respond to the challenges posed by new technologies. The EU must also be able to work together with other countries and international organizations to promote a just and stable international order.

Who will run the world? A new world order is on the horizon.
Authoritarian advantage

The struggle for a liberal world order is occurring not just outside the West but also within it.

BY ROBERT KAGAN

February 2019

The Security Times – Strategy

A

character in the Hegelian drama always asks, "What is the end of it all?" In 1989, many people asked, "What is the end of the Cold War?" In February 2019, many people are asking, "What is the end of the West?"

The world order that was forged after the end of World War II was a system of liberal democracy, based on the idea that the interests of the many are superior to the interests of the few. This system was built on the principles of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and it was supposed to be a model for the rest of the world.

But the system is under threat, as authoritarian regimes around the world are challenging its fundamental principles. The struggle for a liberal world order is occurring not just outside the West but also within it.

We see this in Russia, where President Vladimir Putin has positioned himself as the voice of "conservatives, traditionalists and nationalists" against "international liberal democracy." In his 2016 State of the Nation address, Putin said: "We are living in a world where the consolidation of [...]"

The struggle is not just occurring in Russia, but also in other parts of the world. In Europe, the ascension of the far-right has been a cause for concern, as these parties have been able to capitalize on the feelings of anger and resentment among people who feel left behind.

The struggle is also occurring in the United States, where the rise of Donald Trump has been seen as a threat to the liberal world order. Trump's rhetoric, which often promotes nationalism and protectionism, is seen as a threat to the principles of free trade and open societies.

The struggle is not just occurring in politics, but also in culture. The rise of populist movements, which often promote a "return to tradition" or "nationalism," is seen as a threat to the principles of diversity and tolerance.

The struggle is also occurring in economics. The rise of neo-liberalism, which emphasizes free markets and limited government, is seen as a threat to the principles of social welfare and equality.

The struggle is occurring in all areas of life, and it is a struggle that is not just occurring outside the West, but also within it. The struggle for a liberal world order is occurring not just outside the West but also within it.

Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. A co-founder of the Project for the New American Century, he is also a contributing columnist for the New Republic.

The New Republic
Arms control – here we go again

The world’s security risks have become more severe. But what are today’s great powers willing – and able – to do to counter them?

BY DAN SMITH

The contemporary security agenda is marked by a worrying number of negative developments. Glorious progress appears to have been quashed, with minor exceptions, the world is once more at war in many parts. This is not the direction our current political and military leaders want to head in. Nor does anyone else.

The US president has talked about nuclear weapons. The world’s security risks have become more severe. But what are today’s great powers willing – and able – to do to counter them?

With the 2010 Presidential Nuclear Threats Assessment, the US undertook to reduce its nuclear stockpile by 30 percent by 2020. The US and Russia are the only states that have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is designed to ban nuclear testing. But the treaty is not yet in force.

The US president has talked about nuclear weapons. The world’s security risks have become more severe. But what are today’s great powers willing – and able – to do to counter them?

The 1968 Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty was a major step in the reduction and limitation of nuclear forces. It was signed by the US and the Soviet Union, and it marked the end of the Cold War.

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As we move into 2019, a new round of US-Russian nuclear competition is gathering momentum. The risk of nuclear conflict through deliberate action is small. But new threats of nuclear escalation and coercion are growing. While negotiations on INF are proceeding, and deploying and deploying new offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, the two governments are taking actions that could lower the likelihood of nuclear interchanges.

Amid all of this political engagement, strategic dialogue and trust have evaporated from the complex and increasingly adversarial relationship. This dynamic not only threatens to undo 50 years of efforts to avoid the possibility of a US-Russia nuclear exchange; it is also fuelling the development of additional arms – or built on the spread of nuclear weapons.

Despite the crises and close calls over the South China War, the growth of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the threat of nuclear competition or, instead, of a Nuclear Accident of cooperation – a danger that has the potential to affect us all – must be taken more seriously.

Two special new problems are the extent to which Washington and Moscow have interconnected their own nuclear arsenals and their various systems. This mixing of capabilities in Europe and elsewhere.

We will need to be more than lucky, however, for any meaningful or verifiable reduction of the nuclear competition. US and Russian leaders will need to show that they understand the necessity and the precedent that their predecessors set, that 50 years of unbroken progress is not an accident but a strategic shift to a world where nuclear weapons are no longer a part of the equation.

Unilaterally, the United States and Russia are the main architects of this architecture of strategic arms. The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, for example, this complex, the 2010 New START Treaty, limits both Moscow and Washington to no more than 1,550 warheads on 800 missiles and bombers and expires in February 2022. The accord built on its predecessors, including the original 1991 GATT Treaty that established a new relationship between the two countries and created a system of transparency and predictability in strategic nuclear deployments that lasted for nearly three decades. For the Trump administration, steeped as it is in the arms race dynamics of the Cold War era, the nuclear competition is a mirror image of the Cold War and has the potential to affect us all.

For Moscow, the picture is more complex, and the INF Treaty, START II and NPT are seen as legacies of an era that is gone. The Trump administration sees the INF Treaty as a threat to US security, and US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has called for a new nuclear test ban treaty.

Washington and Moscow have interconnected their own nuclear arsenals and their various systems. This mixing of capabilities in Europe and elsewhere.

Both the United States and Russia will need to prepare to get serious, and the agreements negotiated over the last 20 years can build back to the existential fear generated in the Cold War. Let’s hope that Arms Race 1.0 will not repeat nuclear near misses to get both sides to the negotiating table.

RICHARD BURT
Chairman of the Nuclear Crisis Group and former US Ambassador to Russia

February 2019

The Security Times – Strategy

SALT I: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Signed on July 1, 1968, by the UK, US and the Soviet Union, the treaty prohibit the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It was later expanded to cover underground testing (SALT III).

SALT II

SALT II: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

Signed on June 18, 1979, by Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter within the context of a broader strategic dialogue, SALT II was the last arms control agreement reached by the two superpowers. Under the new treaty, the number of strategic nuclear warheads was reduced to just 2,000 in each country. The treaty was never approved by Congress.

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Adistant dream

Even if prudent, there will be no European army anytime soon

BY CLAUS NAUMANN

C oncerns are growing in many European countries regarding the future of the EU. This depends on the United States and the security guarantees concretized in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The President’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria is an affront to the key principle that the UN defines as the international order. It is a necessary condition for the UN to fulfill its role of peacekeeper, as was the case in the Balkans and Kosovo.

In the wake of the decision, the US administration is pressuring the EU to take more responsibility for European defense. The US President has called for the EU to increase its defense spending and take an active role in European and global security. The US believes that the EU should act in a more proactive manner and take on more responsibility for its own defense. It is clear that the US has a strategy to use the EU as a tool to support its own objectives.

Therefore, Europe must develop its own defense strategy and strengthen its defense capabilities to ensure its own security and sovereignty. The EU must take the lead in this process, with the support of the US and other NATO member countries.

But, if our problems could be solved by a single decision, our troubles would be quite simple. Our main problem is that we cannot make a single decision, and the terms of Europe’s burden-sharing will not be assessed by a single decision. Again, this is not prin- cipal, but rather it is a matter of money, but rather risk-sharing. A system in which the French or the British does not have the right to say no, but everyone else is doing so, will be a new, and I would say, considerably more valuable market, where the EU can set the rules for security.

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FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

NATO is not dead. European defense budgets have been on the rise since 2015. US forces are still in Europe, and Donald Trump will eventually leave. But the White House can no longer assume the permanent protection of the US from all threats. Europe must take over the strategic responsibilities of the US, and work together to ensure its own security.

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NATO - unfazed by morning tweets

Recalibrating its geostrategic compass is a must if the Alliance is to remain relevant

BY KARL-HEINZ KAMP

On its 70th anniversary, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is doing fairly well as the most successful security alliance in modern history. Through constant evolution and adaptation, NATO has managed to preserve its relevance for both sides of the Atlantic, each by fundamentally unique security environments. On the long term, however, NATO faces an almost existential problem, as it will be difficult to maintain its significance for the United States as the dominant power within the Alliance. This will have to do with the erratic policy of its current president, Donald Trump, and more to do with America’s geostrategic recategorization away from Russia and towards China. Recalibrating its geostrategic compass is a must if the Alliance is to remain relevant.

Washington is afflicted with a president that openly defies NATO and shows no occasion to express his disrespect for alliances and allies. On closer look, however, Trump’s morning tweets against America’s international commitments speak more to the president’s ignorance in international politics than to his country’s flagging engagement within NATO. Indeed, since Donald Trump assumed office, US NATO commitments in Eastern Europe have actually increased.

Since 2014, the US has increased its emergency response support for Eastern Europe - the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) - from $10 billion to $6.5 billion in 2019. Furthermore, the US has strengthened the “Eastern front” through rotational deployments of combat brigades, the pre-deployment of weapons and ammunition, the modernization of airfields and the enhancement of naval capabilities in the north, particularly to adverses the anti-submarine warfare. The recent resignation of Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis as the guardian of America’s trans-Atlantic focus stirred fears that US support for NATO could diminish. Yet, these concerns underestimate the troubled, imperious congressional support for NATO in Washington. Rosenstein’s recent stay of execution from realizing his isolationist impulses, at least with respect to the Alliance.

On the financial side, Congress voted those who cite the fact that America’s role in NATO may sur-

rise to the US. In five or ten years, Washington could come to the

time. While the US does not have the resources to mount a frontal

great-power ambitions. Lacking the ironclad, bipartisan congression-

stronger than in the past five years ago. Still, NATO and the American engage-

ment in Europe faces one major
taking economic development, and which increasingly correlates to mil-

itary capabilities. Hence, China is on its way to becoming the true peer of Washington, challenging the US role not only in the Pacific but also in the international order of things. If Russia is no longer perceived as a global strategic threat, but as a regional problem that can be

dashed with limited means, Europe

will then gradually lose its rele-

ance to the US. In the few years to come, Washington could come to the

conclusion that a number of well-equipped US combat brigades sta-

tioned on a bilateral basis in Eastern Europe, plus some maritime capa-

bilities in the High North, should suffice to blunt potential Russian aggression against its neighbors. The US would no longer see NATO as critical to its interests, with the possible exception of those Euros-

pean allies it deems relevant without having to struggle with the consensus-driven institution comprising 29 member states. It might also be tempting for the US to redirect its resources previously used in Europe to the Asia-Pacific region in order to cope with the rise of China as its true challenger in global dominance.

In the event of a burgeoning Sino-

American bilateralism, NATO could preserve its relevance for the US only if it can contribute to hedging China’s global ambitions and keeping Bei-

jing with its weight in international politics on a grand scale. China, in contrast, is perceived as a rising power underlying breath-

ing the current order through its

one concept of international rela-

tions. A NATO able to contribute to deterring China would not only be beneficial to the US but also to its European allies. One means to realizing this would involve a greater European readiness for mili-

tary burdens-sharing with respect to Asia. If the US remains the only NATO member with significant power projection capabilities in Asia, the Europeans will have to show more military willingness in their neighborhood in order to free up US military capabilities in areas beyond the reach of most NATO allies.

Many Alliance members may contemplate that NATO would ever expand its portfolio as far as Asia-Pacific. However, fundamental political changes require fundamentally new approaches to Europe’s proximity to Russia and another adaptation of the Alliance to a new and changing environment may become inevitable.

KARL-HEINZ KAMP

is president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin. This article reflects the author’s personal opinion.

February 2019

The Security Times – Strategy

BY KARL-HEINZ KAMP

on its 70th anniversary, NATO found itself back in “Article 5 world” – a security environment where Alliance commitments must be bol-

stered by credible deterrence and defense posture. NATO adapted swiftly to the new requirements; indeed, more quickly than Vladi-

mir Putin had expected when he launched his war against Ukraine. Since 2014, NATO has profoundly modernized its defense on many fronts. The NATO Response Force (NRF), created in 2010, has been tripled to comprise a joint force of 40,000 troops. Its readiness has been improved through the 5,000

multinational troops constituting the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). Under its abridge-

ment called Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), four combat-ready battle groups have been operational since 2017 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Moreover, NATO has vastly intensified its training and the size of its multinational exer-

ises while developing new defense

pans. Even nuclear deterrence, a posture still contested by citizen
dissenters, which keeps the president from realizing the current order through its

one concept of international rela-

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is president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin. This article reflects the author’s personal opinion.
A look at Western Europe’s postwar history helps illuminate what is at stake in the foreign policy’s point of departure in the past, and the foundation that underpins its current policy making forward. We can see the outcome of World War II as a global overview of Europe. In a matter of a few years, European imperialism and colonial masters found that their role on the global stage had changed completely. The power of the United States and the Soviet Union grew to such an extent that no European could hope to be more than a commentator or ally of one side or the other.

In the niche of world politics, which became the stamping ground for European foreign policy for decades, Western Europeans could experiment at least with new ideas, if not power. And this they did. Peaceful European unification was the result. In the case of West Germany, such experiments included Konrad Adenauer’s European integration and reconciliation policy in the 1950s and Willy Brandt’s détente and Ostpolitik in the 1970s. Europe’s approaches eventually brought the whole continent back to the center of world politics as the fulcrum of the Iron Curtain and, shortly thereafter, of the Soviet bloc transformed the world stage and, in turn, the EU. EU enlargement and integration moving ahead, made a success of its role on the world stage as the industrialized world, find
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February 2019

SHOWING OUR TRUE COLORS

“Why’s wrong with America First?” – and other foreign policy questions Democratic presidential candidates will have to answer

BY ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER

What’s wrong with America First? – and other foreign policy questions Democratic presidential candidates will have to answer

Here is my version of the most important test question that will determine the future of America’s global leadership role. It is simple: “What should the United States do in the world?”, and profound: “What should our country stand for in a world that is more complicated than it used to be?”

I have perforce left out a number of important foreign policy issues, such as immigration (which I am choosing to treat as a domestic issue), refugees, technology transfers and, indeed, most areas of the world. But to force five questions I would add a sixth bonus question, one that is currently taking shape despite how critically it will determine future US foreign policy.

To paraphrase the musical Hamilton, which will actually be in the room where it happens? Which candidate will recognize that a wake-up call is coming in all the areas of the world which the American people, reflect and connect to the entire world? The foreign policy establishment currently reflects and connects to the entire world. The foreign policy candidates and their teams are serious about the challenges they face, and their teams are committed to addressing them. But the American people, and the American public, are not.

Two long years of speeches and debates, advertisements, prima- naries and conventions lie before us on the Domestic side and possibly the Republican side as well. Foreign policy issues rarely make the front pages. Even when they do, they will likely be on those three broad and related questions that will determine how the world sees America and America’s place in the world.

What happens if we suffer a terrorist attack, perhaps even on US soil, and the US is unable to provide a firm response to this threat? Is the US going to simply fail abroad or is the US going to stand and invest in the social, political and economic foundations on which democracies rest? Is the US going to engage in preventive diplomacy, but also to take necessary military action?

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Why modern wars never end

Violence has morphed from a political instrument into an economic resource, but this is only one of five reasons for today's never-ending conflicts.

BY HERFRIED MÜNKLER

February 2019

Image: A peace treaty in the United States that was signed in 1919.

BY HERFRIED MÜNKLER

In the grand scheme of European history, the 19th and 20th centuries are an era of peace. However, this characterization of the epoch was often defined by historians as spanning the Conference of Vienna and the end of World War I—only partly true. A whole series of wars took the lives of Europe’s people during the time, like the Crimean War and the Balkan and German wars of unification, just to name a few of the more ignominious conflicts. But these were limited in both time and space, and usually when there was a decisive battle after which peace was signed. The situation was different, however, in the 20th century. Each new war started almost as soon as the previous one had ended. The Second World War was no exception, which may come as a surprise to many people today, when the US is the main actor in the global arena and Russia and China know full well that they alone can compete with the West.

Europeans were obviously upset over Trump’s decision to abandon the deal. But they were also furious with the way in which the US had been acting towards the deal. The US had been quite clear about its intention to走了 away from the deal, even though they had promised in person and online, Pompeo included the European Union in that list. Keeping with the title of his talk, he then urged Euro- peans to “reassert their sovereign- 2019. Painting by William Dyce.
BY ERIC BONSE

When Federica Mogherini was named the European Union’s new foreign policy chief, one particular photo made the rounds in Brussels. It shows the Italian politician at the Kremlin, shaking the hand of Vladimir Putin. That grasp is firm, their eyes locked. The photo was taken during her first trip to Moscow, in July 2014, when Mogherini was still foreign minister of Italy.

Whoever greets Putin so affably cannot possibly speak for all 28 countries of the EU, and her critics in Brussels. The Eastern Europeans in particular accused Mogherini of being too close to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Italian social democrat got the job. But the photo with Putin has haunted her to this day. It has become a symbol of the dramatic transformation in EU-Russian relations.

It would be understandable today that Mogherini would strike a friendly pose for a photo with Putin. Today, she must never let down her guard. Every statement on Russia by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – Mogherini’s official title – is a diplomatic balancing act. The “strategic partner” of four years ago has become an adversary, for many, even an enemy.

The annunciation of Crimea, the most dramatic consequence of the former Russian agent Sergei Skripal and the nerve attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s defense union – PESCO, containing Russia. And this drama is unfolding all over the European Union. Russia is seen as capable of almost anything.

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The EU will gladly accept the supposition that he has no problem with a “natural partner and strategic player,” in terms of the European defense union, she is pushing for an expansion of tank routes within the EU to enable more rapid military mobilization in the east.

According to Brussels, the plans do not exclusively target Russia. The campaign against disinformation is said to focus on more than just Moscow. However, who else they are referring to remains an open question. It is hard to identify a strategy there, but at best it amounts to strategic ambivalence. The EU is keeping all of its options on the table. As the most powerful player, it is formidable.

Strategic ambivalence

The EU needs a firm grasp on its neighbor to the east

While Germany may be in a position to be the decisive factor, its stance has become precarious, even awkward. On the one hand, the German government is committed to its close cooperation with France, even terms of Europe’s relations with Russia. On the other hand, Berlin is under massive pressure from Washington to engage more strongly militarily and to position itself more squarely against Russia. And this drama is unfolding, in Germany assumes NATO’s military command, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF): at the beginning of June, Germany takes over a leadership role in the Alliance.

All the while, the EU is increasingly shifting its policies in opposition to Moscow. Although Mogherini may still see Russia as a “natural partner and strategic player,” in terms of the European defense union, she is pushing for an expansion of tank routes within the EU to enable more rapid military mobilization in the east.

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The cancellation of the INF Treaty by the United States presents huge problems for the EU. While most EU countries share the conclusion that Russia is harming the nuclear disarmament treaty, they fear unilateral action by the US that could have profound disadvantages for Europe. According to the INF, “The INF contributed to the end of the Cold War – and no one in Europe wants to go back to those dark days.”

But so far it does not look as if the EU is in a position to prevent a return to times that the contract had long believed had overcome. The INF was no weapon. It was a symbol. It was a symbol for a return to times that the INF had long believed had overcome.

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Helsinki 2.0 – illusion or imperative?

We need new multilateral formats, including a new permanent conference on European security with Russian participation

BY ALEXEI GROMYKO

February 2019

State of play: Russia and the fraying West

Despite their troubles, Europe and the US are not withdrawing. It would behoove Moscow to avoid escalation

BY DMITRI TRENIN

February 2019

The Security Times – Strategy

The architects of Helsinki 1.0 in July 1975: Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford for the US...

BY ALEXEI GROMYKO

Director of the Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences [IRAS]
Despite everything: Get Russia involved

Cold hard fact: Peace is only possible with Moscow on board

BY ROLF MÜTZENICH AND ACHIM POST

When Social Democrats make the case for new initiatives in Ger- many’s official Russia policy, they are usually dismissed for being “naïve Russophiles.” So let’s get the fol- lowing out of the way before we go any further. Yes, the Russian state has broken international law and continues to undertake obvi- ous violations of it. Yes, it’s highly likely that Russia has broken international law following out of the way before we

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As we meet in Munich this year, the prediction made in last year’s edition of this paper with regard to the growing importance of great power rivalries still rings in our ears. Geopolitics is back and likely to stay. What is more, our strategic environment is growing ever more unpredictable. Today, major powers openly challenge the rules-based international order and seek to promote alternative visions of a world divided into spheres of influence. Geopolitical rivalries strike tensions and raise the alarm bell of a new “proliferation age” that risks escalating into inad- vertent military confrontation. Climate change is becoming an existential threat while cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns are the new weapons of the 21st century.

For the European Union, the answer is clear: these challenges can be tackled only through a multilateral approach. If we stay united, we will have the tools and the political weight to shape the future global order. This is why instead of retreating from inter- national cooperation and global partnerships, the EU is stepping up its commitment to address global challenges together with its partners. This is true for the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iranian non- proliferation, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the EU’s strategy for connectivity between Asia and Europe and the reform of the WTO.

While these agreements are, in essence, hard to reach, we can contractualize them by ensuring a more peaceful, prosper- ous and secure global environ- ment – even more so when it is clear that no single country can address these challenges alone. I am convinced this approach is the right one. The fact that demands for European action from our partners have never been so high speaks for itself.

The starting point cannot be to dismantle the current architecture and start from scratch. When pursuing legitimate business interests as the EU’s collective defense.

To harness these opportunities, we need to be extra vigilant to prevent new proliferation, such as the NPT treaty or the nuclear deal with Iran, as the stakes for our own security are simply too high. The starting point cannot be to di- minish the current architecture and start from scratch. The European Union is working at all levels to promote the universalization and implementation of existing agree- ments, such as the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifera- tion. We are also pushing for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force, which could play an important role as we work towards a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.

Taking greater responsibility does not stop at defense issues. Security today is also about eco- nomic security. This notion includes the strategic importance of the euro and the need to ensure that the single currency can play its full role on the international scene. Promoting the euro’s inter- national role is part of Europe’s commitment to an open, multilat- eral and rules-based global econ- omy. The extra-territorial effects of sanctions also challenge the EU’s capacity to follow through on our own political commitments. In this context, we are developing new policies that will assist, pro- tect and reassure economic actors when pursuing legitimate business abroad.

As Europeans, we cannot afford to waste time or be less innovative than others. We need to modern- ize our approaches and engage more actively with new actors at the intersection of technology and foreign and security policy. This is why the high representative launched the Global Tech Panel – including the CEOs of major tech companies – to help ensure that international ethics and rules can keep pace with human ingenuity. To harness those opportunities, we must also take the security implications seriously, hence the recent European Commission Communication on Artificial Intelligence.

All in all, supporting a rules- based multilateralism and greater European strategic autonomy are not contradictory objectives. When we strengthen our resilience in the face of new cyberattacks, the European Union will play its part in rein- vestigating the multilateral order and become a force to be reckoned with as an assertive actor in a vola- tile world.

HELGA MARIA SCHMID
secretary general of the EU’s European External Action Service.

From Brussels with love

To a more assertive EU in a volatile world
The Munich Security Conference has grown accustomed in recent years to the West’s fretful alliances and its preoccupation with the threat of Russian interference. The conference has become a regular rendezvous for the heads of state and government of the Western alliance, as well as for representatives from other countries. The conference is a global forum to discuss the challenges facing the world and to explore possible solutions.

The Munich Security Conference is an important platform for discussing the future of the global order and the challenges facing the Western alliance. The conference is a regular event and attracts a large number of participants from around the world. It is a forum for discussing the challenges facing the world and the need for cooperation to address these challenges.
When it comes to defence, the sky’s no longer the limit.

Airbus is the world’s leading independent supplier of cutting edge defence and space technologies. We deliver strategic advantages in a rapidly changing environment – thanks to a network of connected smart assets. From military aircraft, satellites and unmanned systems to services such as cybersecurity, geointelligence and secure communications we’ve been serving governments across the globe for over fifty years.

Security. We make it fly.
Looking for alternatives in all the wrong places

MICHAEL LÜDERS

As the US Navy Times reported in November 2018, the United States and Saudi Arabia have apparently reached a framework agreement for the sale of nuclear power stations to the Kingdom. The deal “is one of the most significant agreements of its kind in history,” a US official said. The possible sale of a nuclear reactor to Saudi Arabia, which has been a long-standing goal of the US government, is expected to be a significant milestone in the US-Saudi relationship.

The agreement comes as the US and Saudi Arabia continue to engage in efforts to strengthen their strategic partnership. The two countries have a long history of cooperation, particularly in the areas of security and defense. The US has been a key ally of Saudi Arabia in its efforts to counter the threat posed by Iran, while Saudi Arabia has been a major investor in US military and defense industries.

The potential sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia has sparked controversy and opposition from some quarters, however. Critics argue that such technology could be used for military purposes, particularly in the context of the ongoing conflict in Yemen.

The agreement has also drawn attention to the broader challenges facing the Middle East, including the deepening power vacuum in the region and the rise of extremist groups such as ISIS. As the US and Saudi Arabia seek to strengthen their relationship, it will be important to ensure that such cooperation does not come at the expense of stability and security in the region.
Beyond all recognition

The EU and its members will have to come up with their own policy for the new reality in Syria.

The future of Syria will no longer be decided on the battlefield or in UN-led political negotiations. The new US Special Envoy for Syria might be able to set up a constitutional committee with credible representatives from different sides to shape the outcome. It is very unlikely, however, that Assad’s government would allow the adoption of any constitutional text that could seriously limit its power or that of the security apparatus. However, Syria still nonetheless only partly resembles Syria before the war. Assad will be in power and, secondly, sedimentary. As long as the political system is not overthrown, these two factors will be key drivers for the new reality in Syria. Even before the US decision to leave, it was right for Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the presidents of Russia and Turkey in order to avoid further international polarization over Syria, at the very least. In view of developments, it is clear whether such a format can ever achieve a significant degree of international coordination, it is certainly useful to say ‘no’ at all, much of Russia tries to achieve in Syria today, i.e., after its own and Israel’s victory, as compatible with European interests – and certainly when compared with the human agenda. The latter – trying to secure some form of human hegemony in Syria nor in further sedimentary. As long as the political system is not overthrown, these two factors will be key drivers for the new reality in Syria. Even before the US decision to leave, it was right for Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the presidents of Russia and Turkey in order to avoid further international polarization over Syria, at the very least. In view of developments, it is clear whether such a format can ever achieve a significant degree of international coordination, it is certainly useful to say ‘no’ at all, much of Russia tries to achieve in Syria today, i.e., after its own and Israel’s victory, as compatible with European interests – and certainly when compared with the human agenda. The latter – trying to secure some form of human hegemony in Syria nor in further sedimentary. As long as the political system is not overthrown, these two factors will be key drivers for the new reality in Syria. Even before the US decision to leave, it was right for Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the presidents of Russia and Turkey in order to avoid further international polarization over Syria, at the very least. In view of developments, it is clear whether such a format can ever achieve a significant degree of international coordination, it is certainly useful to say ‘no’ at all, much of Russia tries to achieve in Syria today, i.e., after its own and Israel’s victory, as compatible with European interests – and certainly when compared with the human agenda. The latter – trying to secure some form of human hegemony in Syria nor in further sedimentary. As long as the political system is not overthrown, these two factors will be key drivers for the new reality in Syria. Even before the US decision to leave, it was right for Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the presidents of Russia and Turkey in order to avoid further international polarization over Syria, at the very least. In view of developments, it is clear whether such a format can ever achieve a significant degree of international coordination, it is certainly useful to say ‘no’ at all, much of Russia tries to achieve in Syria today, i.e., after its own and Israel’s victory, as compatible with European interests – and certainly when compared with the human agenda. The latter – trying to secure some form of human hegemony in Syria nor in further sedimentary. As long as the political system is not overthrown, these two factors will be key drivers for the new reality in Syria. Even before the US decision to leave, it was right for Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron to meet and discuss Syria with the presidents of Russia and Turkey in order to avoid further international polarization over Syria, at the very least. In view of developments, it is clear whether such a format can ever achieve a significant degree of international coordination, it is certainly useful to say ‘no’ at all, much of Russia tries to achieve in Syria today, i.e., after its own and Israel’s victory, as compatible with European interests – and certainly when compared with the human agenda. The latter – trying to secure some form of human hegemony in Syria nor in further
As long as civil war in Syria continues, neither Israel nor Iran can have interest in escalating the conflict between their two countries. Yet, the conflict has already taken on a sinister tone.

The Israeli defense

Military success in the age of terrorist armies hinges on public education, too

BY RAFAEL L. BARDAJÍ

Our High Level Military Group of senior retired military personnel from ten democratic nations, including the former German, Italian and Canadian chiefs of the defense staff, has examined this challenging new reality through the lens of their own operational experience. We studied Israel’s military operations in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, as well as campaigns in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Advocates in these conflicts all share an approach to warfare that turns a complex set of basic premises. The deliberate failures to distinguish between combatants and civilians, placing them at the center of military operations and thus exploiting the protections Western militaries will adhere to in a studied tactic. They use human shields, protected locations such as hospitals as well as civilian housing as bases, weapon stores and command and control centers. Advances in communications technology have also had a major impact on the light against irregular and terrorist adversaries, who often display a highly developed ability to exploit social and traditional media in order to influence the battle over political narratives with real strategic effect. As such all informal political and social networks, particularly where enemy messengers must reach potential recipients of the message, are serious harm on the army’s effectiveness.

International institutions and human rights organizations also often too engaged in misleading or Politicized narratives around core concepts of warfare and international law, while governments (who often are complicit with the networks that such warfare entails. The unwarranted legal pursuit of troops post-conflict in some countries has compounded their uncertainty over whether our nations will continue to stand behind them as they seek to defend us. Yet the militaries of all the democracies we examined in detail go to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties by using strict rules of engagement and establishing command and control in the face of terror armies. In many cases, the measures employed to protect civilians constitute a gravitational disadvantage against the battlefield advantage. It is therefore important to challenge any brutality against the requirements of the law of armed conflict.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of Israel, a nation famed for its heavy-handedness in war. It has long been the case that the Israeli army has been target of war as a warning designed to be interpreted as a warning designed to be

In keeping with a tacit US-Russian agreement, it is up to Iran to make sure that the Iranian and Russian networks to that conflict has an interpretative significance to the military operation. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The case is not in all controversial as the assessment is that Tehran’s access to an Iranian corridor of influence can attack its “Zionist archenemies” and “aiding” in the future.

Still, Tehran makes no secret about its efforts to supply its belligerents in the case of focus on the new weapons factories to be thought of. Three dies later, when diplomats want to inspect those sites, they find nothing there - nothing left. If that were the case, Israel would not have deployed an additional northern border only with Syria. Instead, it would have deployed Israeli forces in the new Hezbollah, a militia heavily armed by Tehran. On its northern border in Gaza, it would have to continue to deal with, the Israeli move would support against Iran’s. In other words, with Tehran closer than ever before, Jerusalem is attempting to financially regularly and hardly attacking Hamas forces. Until now, all of this happened without Israel ever having to admit to its military strikes. In the beginning of this hour, however, the outgoing Chief of General Staff Gadi Eisenkot officially admitted to having carried out thousands of air strikes on Syrian territory over the last four years. Tunisian open-source can be interpreted primarily as a warning designed to be ignored by the restaurant between its threat to the north with a role. The message that Tehran’s presence on the border has brought to the most significant on the war effort available. As Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani recently noted, Iran’s continuing toprecision pesticides to weapons of mass destruction in Lebanon and Gaza so that it can unleash as “a weapon on a vast scale for any foolish Israeli behavior.” This new Israeli transparency is no doubt designed to act as a threat of war and to prevent war. The Israeli Air Force’s freedom to attack is based on the argument that at least as long as the civil war in Syria is not officially over - none of the parties to that conflict has an interpretative significance. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. The new strategy of openness is quite controversial in Israel. 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The Security Times – Challenges
February 2019

BY ANDREA BOHM

Until a recent interview, a few months ago, the former foreign minister of Iraq, Hoshiyar Zebari, has been rather difficult to pin down for a meeting, even in basra, the city where he has been living for the past few years. The official explanation is that he is too busy with his political campaigning. But Zebari is also a man of his word, and he always keeps his promises. And he has been working hard to get the al-Sadr government back on track, which means making compromises with the country’s political parties. Zebari is one of the most influential figures in Iraq, and he has been working hard to bring the country together again. But he knows that this will be a long and difficult process.

BY WOLFRAM LACHER

For the past four years, US efforts to contain Iran’s ambition to use its vast resources have been in vain. It has managed to throw up handfuls of states at its mercy, but its policy in the region has not been effective since 2014. And now, the US is getting tired of fighting a losing battle with the region’s most powerful and violent states. The US is no longer interested in containing Iran’s influence, and it is now looking for ways to do so.

The Security Times – Challenges
February 2019

BY ANDREA BOHM

The political scene in Iraq is full of controversies and disagreements. The country is divided into three main regions: the Sunni-majority region of the north, the Shia-majority region of the south, and the mixed-population region of the west. The government is fragile, and it is struggling to govern the country effectively. The situation in Iraq is complex, and it is difficult to make any predictions about the future of the country.

BY WOLFRAM LACHER

Indifference to chaos

What kind of a neighborhood does Iraq tell us about its unstable neighborhood?

The Security Times – Challenges
February 2019

BY WOLFRAM LACHER

The Middle East is a region of great strategic importance. It is home to some of the world’s most powerful countries, and it is also a region of great religious and cultural diversity. It is a region that is constantly changing, and it is one that is full of opportunities for those who are willing to take advantage of them. It is a region that is full of challenges, and it is one that requires a lot of attention from the outside world.

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I t is not often that some-
voting Israeli Prime Min-
ister Benjamin Netanyahu
speedwhistles. Yet following his
visit to Moscow in late January, Erdoğ-
united the Kurds between a rock and hard place

February 2019

The clear winners in Syria are Assad, Iran and Russia –
and defeat

region would be set up “soon.”

Turkish border in Syria’s Kurdish
announcing an “attack within the

November, Erdoğan had been

windy admission of defeat. Since

emerge in the next few months,”

titial threat.

Kurds suddenly face an existen-
tional threat.

After returning from Russia, Erdoğ-

Erdoğan wanted to continue the

Syrian Kurds currently

control about a third of Syria.
in Ankara’s pledges to the Russians.

With Russian and Iranian help, he fears

tory demand that he once again cooperate

with Assad officially – something

Erdoğan’s triumph has turned

into defeat. The clear winners of the

US pullout from Syria, mean-
whiled an Assad, Iran and Russia,
which continues to inch closer to
its goal of a Shi’ite land bridge
to the Mediterranean. The ques-
tion now is whether Russia has

taken on a bigger load than it can

in bavaria

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Bavaria THE European bastion for IT security.

 Strait of Hormoz

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IRAQ

TURKEY

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The Security Times – Challenges
February 2019

Reclassified

Afghanistan is again the world’s deadliest conflict

BY THOMAS RUTTIG

Reports of a “breakthrough” in US-Taliban talks has returned Afghanistan to the international limelight. Although both sides have reached consensus about a “framework” to deal with the key issues – a US troop withdrawal and Taliban guarantees about preventing a return of Al Qaeda-type terrorist groups to the country – the situation has not in fact improved. While making progress, Zalmay Khalilzad, Washington’s new Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, must make sure that solid political, human, women’s and minority rights promises by the current constitution are transferred to the new political system. A peace deal that has no buy-in for the majority of Afghans would be worthless. The Security Times – Challenges was alarm still ringing across Afghanistan. Only a few days after the announcement – which has been somewhat talked back – that the US would extract all its aid, could lead to its break-down. This cannot be desirable for any country in the world. Moreover, US Special Forces and air support sometimes make all the difference when the Taliban attacks Afghan cities. A substantial US withdrawal, if lacking in the sort of aid and advice the Taliban needs to coexist, could lead to its break-down. This cannot be desirable for help. US military experts say that Afghan troops need “at least another 50,000” of international aid and advice. For some years, Afghanistan has been seeing the erosion of what official German analyses, echoing international and US Council on Foreign Relations now again classify Afghanistan as the deadliest conflict in the world. The Taliban control no provincia-l capital and only a few of the almost 400 district centers. But according to a survey by the BII, they carry out a significant amount of activity in roughly 70 percent of the country and control much of rural Afghanistan, encircling many cities and towns. In many cases, however, local populations work towards making sure that they do not occupy such centers, as they hope to avoid counterattacks from the air and the destruction they would cause. When the Taliban lost the large city of Ghazni after a five-day occupation, it was unclear whether it was the result of pressure from the allies or their own forces. The local offices of the Islamic State holds almost no territory, yet possesses under-ground urban structures with the potential to carry out brutal terror attacks, above all against Shi’ites. For Northern Afghanistan – where the Bandeirada leads the Train Advise Assist Command – part of Operation Freedom Support head-quartered in Mazar-e-Sharif – the social anthropologist Konstanz Gey is co-director of the Afghanistan foreign policy now again classify Afghanistan as the deadliest conflict in the world. The Taliban control no provincia-l capital and only a few of the almost 400 district centers. But according to a survey by the BII, they carry out a significant amount of activity in roughly 70 percent of the country and control much of rural Afghanistan, encircling many cities and towns. In many cases, however, local populations work towards making sure that they do not occupy such centers, as they hope to avoid counterattacks from the air and the destruction they would cause. When the Taliban lost the large city of Ghazni after a five-day occupation, it was unclear whether it was the result of pressure from the allies or their own forces. The local offices of the Islamic State holds almost no territory, yet possesses under-ground urban structures with the potential to carry out brutal terror attacks, above all against Shi’ites. For Northern Afghanistan – where the Bandeirada leads the Train Advise Assist Command – part of Operation Freedom Support head-quartered in Mazar-e-Sharif – the social anthropologist Konstanz Gey-st淡定 the increasing number of security incidents while the Taliban still increase control, mean- ing their military campaign has become more focused. In Northern Afghanistan, the Taliban are focused at the outskirts of its capital of Mazar-e-Sharif. In October, a group of election volunteers who mistakenly ventured out of Mazar’s city limits ran into Taliban forces. Fearing an attack, the group turned back. The Taliban’s expanded bases in Samangan Province are no longer within city limits ran into Taliban forces. Fearing an attack, the group turned back. The Taliban’s expanded bases in Samangan Province are now protected by former US National Security Advisor Richard Haas, so are many of the development-related achievements of the last 17 years. According to data from the World Bank and the UN, 44.0 percent of Afghanistan now live below the pov- erty line – just as in 2013, shortly after the fall of the Taliban. Moreov- er, economic growth once again trails population growth. Under these conditions, the Afghan government, when pres- sed with foreign aid, can barely hold its ground against the Talli- ban. If no progress is made, elec- tions riddled with fraud will fur- ther erode the already severely compromised trust of the popu- lace. The upcoming presidential election, now delayed until July 2019, could become mired in organizational chaos, as was the case with the 2018 parliamentary elections and most other previous ones. The Taliban can simply wait and see if the Kabul government proceeds to crumble. The government’s only trump card is the fact that very few US officials expect the Taliban to talk. If the government does not make its voice heard, many will have no choice other than to submit to Taliban rule – just like their fellow Afghans in the regions already controlled by rebel forces, where they have had to come to terms with this reality.

THOMAS RUTTIG

The Security Times – Challenges
The war IS not over

February 2019

The Security Times – Challenges

Pulling out would lead to more conflict on the ground and more instability overall

BY BEHNAM SAID

Shortly before the holidays, on Dec. 19, 2018, US President Donald Trump planned surprise visits over the Islamic State (IS) and ordered the withdrawal of 2,000 American troops from the northeast of Syria. Experts and observers mostly agreed that the true beneficiaries of this decision were Turkey on the one side and the current Syrian government and its allies Russia and Iran on the other. Additional winners include jihadist militias such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Hamas and Isis, which is far from being defeated everywhere.

To assess the impact of the withdrawal on the capabilities of IS, it is important to keep in mind that the organization has deep regional roots and long-standing experience in the field. Its history did not begin with territorial control, which was a later outcome of its successful strategy. It was founded in October 2014 as the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda and in its first years grew in terms of numbers and activities. Within a short period of time, Al Qaeda in Iraq became one of the most feared and powerful militias in postwar Iraq. In January 2006, it declared the “Islamic State of Iraq,” an alliance of jihadist insurgent groups under its leadership. Over the next few years, the tide began to turn as it patiently worked towards a comeback. The militants have gone underground and returned to their insurgent roots. For the moment, they are back in the hit-and-run business while attempting to rebuild their networks. To make matters worse, just a day after announcing his decision on Syria, President Trump also ordered the withdrawal of half of the 14,000 US troops stationed in Afghanistan. Last year, Afghanistan witnessed a massive military campaign by the strengthened Taliban militia in various parts of the country. Although the Afghan government officially announced that IS would be able to maintain security without US support, every observer of the developments knows that even now – with US boots on the ground – Afghanistan is far from being a peaceful and stable country. For the Taliban, the announcement is seen as the fulfillment of their long declared prophecy of a US defeat in Afghanistan, especially as it comes before a deal with the US, with Turkey on the one side and the current Syrian government and its allies Russia and Iran on the other.

The war IS not over

BY BEHNAM SAID

Although the Afghan government announced that IS would be able to maintain security without US support, every observer of the developments knows that even now – with US boots on the ground – Afghanistan is far from being a peaceful and stable country. For the Taliban, the announcement is seen as the fulfillment of their long declared prophecy of a US defeat in Afghanistan, especially as it comes before a deal with the US. IS and the Taliban began as insurgent groups, not as regular armies. They have ample demonstrated their resilience when facing enormous military pressure. If the pressure lets up, it will be only a matter of time before we see them rise again.

February 2019

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Denuclearization doubts

US-North Korean talks continue, but can Kim Jong-un’s pledge to give up his nuclear program be taken at face value?

BY HANNS G. HILPERT

The White House has announced that US President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un will hold their second summit meeting at the end of February. Optimists expect that Kim Jong-un will follow through with his stated willingness to denuclearize and commit to a verifiable, irreversible dismantling. Pessimists are afraid that we will see just another summit full of rhetoric and void of substance. As of today, we do not know what the summit meeting might hold, but we should be clear about where we stand.

Let us remember Summit I, when the two leaders convened in Singapore on June 6, 2018, for their first and unprecedented meeting. On his way home, President Trump spoke of a breakthrough and tweeted that “North Korea no longer presented a nuclear threat.” Noted experts and observers disagreed. They deplored the summit’s sparse final declaration, which lacked substance and perspective. They missed meaningful concessions in the return for the tremendous political validation North Korea had received from meeting the president of the United States. Indeed, no decisive steps on nuclear disarmament were announced.

These legitimate objections notwithstanding, the Singapore summit was significant and productive. Last year’s summit tackled the root cause of the diplomatic failures of the past - the mutual distrust between the US and North Korea - instead of narrowly focusing on diplomatic and military issues and techniques. Once the leaders have agreed on a common objective, it was said, negotiations will proceed in good spirit and tensions can be reduced. Regrettably, this political approach has worked only to some extent. To begin with, the most pressing outcome so far is that the imminent risk of war has been reduced and diplomacy reigns again.

When in November 2018, some US military experts put the risk of war as high as 60 percent, in 2019, North Korea halted all missile and nuclear tests, thereby de-escalating military tensions.

The UN Security Council’s sanctions regime against North Korea remains intact, notwithstanding the various sanctions violations, loopholes and the so-called ‘gap’ for ‘adjustment’ in China and Russia. Thus, the international community has sustained the pressure on North Korea to give up nuclear armament unilaterally and completely.

There is no doubt that the country has undertaken some initial steps towards denuclearization, for example the high-visibility dismantling of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. However, these actions are far from sufficient to achieve the required irreversible abolition of nuclear and missile weapons. What is more, North Korea has refused to provide an inventory of its warheads and production facilities and remains adamantly against allowing international verification. Still worse, rather than phasing out its nuclear armaments, Pyongyang appears to be continuing to invest in upgrading its ballistic missile bases and nuclear production facilities, as has been disclosed by intelligence research institutions.

Given the unresolved controversial issue, it should come as no surprise that bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea have stalled for some time. In addition to the absence of clear North Korean obligations, matters are further complicated by the lack of clarity surrounding the term ‘completely denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.’ It may imply the North Korean demand that US troops leave South Korea and that nuclear-armed American bombers and submarines withdraw from the region.

Despite these various problems, the negotiations have not failed. Indeed, there is talk among the ranks that in the run-up to the summit, the climate of the talks has become very good. Preparations are taking place at different working levels and through different channels. Both South Korea and China are participating in the negotiations in an indirect way.

South Korea experienced a remarkable rapprochement with North Korea in 2018. Over the year, the top leaders of the two Korean states met three times, concluding wide-reaching agreements on common political objectives, on security issues and on bilateral cooperation. Most notably, both sides agreed on practical steps to reduce border tensions, such as removing guard posts, carrying out demining operations and establishing no-fly zones.

These new arrangements do not amount to a “false non-aggression agreement.” As South Korean Blue House official has claimed, but they represent meaningful confidence building measures and have effectively ratcheted down tensions in the 1950s. Record the inter-Korean rapprochement, South Korea has assumed the very delicate role of facilitation and mediation between North Korea, its former war enemy, and the US, its alliance partner.

China-North Korea relations have improved significantly and President Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un will agree on a grand bargain that would end the complex and multi-faceted conflict over North Korea’s nuclear program. Aside from the impossibility of dealing with these many interwoven problems all at once, there remains significant doubt surrounding the sincerity of the US’ assertion to give up completely on the country’s nuclear program, into which North Korea has invested so much for decades that it has become a significant part of its national identity.

Against this backdrop, the upcoming summit can ideally represent the first steps of a nuclear carve-out process. Such process can only be envisaged as a gradual, long-term procedure involving several administrations. In order even to initiate such a positive development, the forthcoming summit must finally lead to a concrete commitment to nuclear disarmament.

HANNS G. HILPERT

Director of the East Asia Research Unit at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

The Security Times – Challenges

February 2019
The Security Times – Challenges

Russia's aggression in the Black Sea shows how little it worries about a strong response from the West

The Kerch Bridge is located between the Russian mainland to the east and Crimea to the west. Russia and Ukraine share this territory, which has been under a de facto occupation since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The bridge was built as a symbol of Russian power and has raised tensions with Ukraine to a new high. Russian coast guard forces have opened fire on three Ukrainian naval vessels, two of which were damaged and abandoned. This act of aggression is the first of its kind in the Sea of Azov, which has been a flashpoint for conflicts between Russia and Ukraine since the onset of the crisis in 2014.

The Kerch Bridge was opened in 2018 after the Russian annexation of Crimea, allowing vessels to transit the Kerch Strait. It was the first direct link between Russia and Ukraine, which the Ukrainian government responded by announcing its intent to set up a new naval base in Berdyansk. Russia has responded by sending its coast guard forces to the Kerch Bridge, which is now under Russian control.

The timing of the clash – four months before the presidential elections in Ukraine – suggests that the Russian leadership is looking for an opportunity to interfere in Ukraine's political process. President Putin has previously accused the Ukrainian military of provoking the incident in the Sea of Azov to boost his popularity, claiming the "war in Ukraine is not going to end - as long as the government in Kiev is in power."

The fact remains, however, that the Ukrainian president cannot settle this conflict unless Russia agrees to the terms of the conflict is not. Russia's aggression in the Black Sea shows how little Putin worries about a strong response from the West. While this particular scenario still appears unlikely, a further escalation of the conflict is possible. Russia has tested the waters once more with the Kerch Bridge attack, and it is unclear whether or not it will follow through with future provocations.

The Kerch Bridge is not just a symbol of Russian power, but also a gateway to Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia. The bridge is located in international waters of the Sea of Azov, which have been substantially weakened by the loss of a larger part of its fleet. The Ukrainian navy has been in custody since January 2019, and it is unclear whether or not Ukraine will make any concessions.
February 2019

The Security Times – Challenges

For a future without the continent's division

BY DOMINIC JOHNSON

Africa is the cradle of humanity and simultaneously the least developed continent. It is home to more than 1.2 billion people, including 200 million refugees and displaced persons. Over the past century, it has been a political battleground for the struggle against colonialism and the quest for independence. The continent is yet to develop fully, with economic growth not keeping up with population growth. While some countries have made significant progress, others remain mired in poverty and conflict.

The Security Times – Challenges

African authoritarianism and Western intrusion are blocking the continent’s development

BY MARC-ANTOINE PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS

Europe’s future is marked by terrorism, which remains a threat that cannot be ignored. In recent years, Europe has faced a wave of attacks carried out by extremist groups, including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. These groups have been able to exploit weak governance structures and radicalized youth to carry out violent acts.

The Security Times – Challenges

All terror policies are local

Jihadi groups in Southern Africa are more of a global threat than a local one

Known by various names, the Islamic State (IS) has long been in full swing. More than 25,000 people have died in its attacks, and the group has been responsible for thousands of atrocities, including beheadings, bombings, and executions. The group has also been responsible for the recruitment and training of thousands of fighters from around the world, who have carried out attacks in other countries.

The Security Times – Challenges

In this sense, the centrifugal forces of the African continent have proved to differ widely from those of the Middle East. This is partly because the African continent is more diverse in terms of geography, culture, and religion.

The Security Times – Challenges

In the future, the African continent will have to adapt to a rapidly changing world and meet the challenges of terrorism, climate change, and economic development.
On 10 February 2018, the Al-Shabaab position was announced as had previously been the case under the Islamic State. The announcement was in line with AQ’s tactical advice on how to get the most out of their resources, and it was not a spontaneous decision. Al-Shabaab’s leadership had carefully considered the impact of this move on their objectives. The move was intended to strengthen their ideological and political goals, as well as to attract potential recruits from the region.

In its early days, Al-Shabaab was a small and localized group, mainly active in the southern regions of Somalia. However, as it gained more resources and support, its operations expanded to other parts of the Horn of Africa, including Kenya and Yemen.

The move to affiliate with AQ came after Al-Shabaab had already gained some notoriety for its brutal tactics and relentless attacks on government forces and civilians. The group’s leadership believed that this affiliation would help them gain more legitimacy and support from the international community.

Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with AQ also served as a way to distance itself from the mainstream Islamic State movement in Iraq and Syria. The group’s leadership was concerned about the potential for the IS movement to overshadow its own goals and objectives. By affiliating with AQ, Al-Shabaab hoped to maintain its own identity and ensure that its views and goals were not lost.

The move also served as a way to strengthen ties with other like-minded groups in the region, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These groups shared similar goals and strategies, and the affiliation with AQ was seen as a way to solidify these connections.

Despite the initial gains, the move to affiliate with AQ did not make Al-Shabaab any stronger. The group continued to face significant challenges, including a lack of resources, internal discord, and international isolation. The affiliation with AQ did not bring the hoped-for gains, and the group continued to struggle against its enemies.

In conclusion, Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with AQ was a strategic move that had both positive and negative consequences. While it helped the group gain more legitimacy and support, it also brought additional challenges and dangers. The group continued to operate in the region, and its activities continued to be a source of concern for both the Somali government and international stakeholders.
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The Scramble for Europe

The number of Africans migrating overseas is bound to rise significantly, and most will head for Europe.

Will Africa become Europe’s Mexico?

The continent is a vast ocean where more than 1.2 billion people live, and its population is growing rapidly. In sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic waves, which emanated mostly from the developed regions of the world, to which it is also more and more in step with the rest of the world, to which it has been dealt with, haphazardly, as a disposable daily income equal to the median age in Europe will double. The current demographic projections as well as the magnitude, duration and destinations of future migratory patterns can vary significantly. Comparisons with Mexico are also less apt because Africa is not a single country neighboring the Old Continent’s faltering low-skilled labor force and, then, the Afro-optimistic leitmotiv of their continent. Back then, the choices ordinary Africans had been forcibly opened to free movement, the balance of this assessment might cause them to make ends meet. At the other extreme, which often constituted a community of 37 million inhabitants, while today it is also smaller but also a smaller proportion of the total US population.

Africa’s spectacular population growth.

By 2050, seven out of ten Africans will be under the age of 25, while the median age in Europe will approach 40. Additionally, in a little more than 10 years, for every 100 European men (in this case, all including their children born in the US-Mexican-Americans now constitute a community of 37 million people, about 15 percent of the total US population. If Africans followed that example, the Afro-optimistic fetishes of “Africa Rising” would become a reality. At the end of a sustained African migration wave, Europe’s population would include some 50 to 100 million Africans, European politicians and immigrants, all combined, with just nine million today. History is never written ahead of time—past events can be grandiose, misleading, or misinterpreted. For reasons that have been largely ignored, the current demographic projections as well as the magnitude, duration and destinations of future migratory patterns can vary significantly. Comparisons with Mexico are also less apt because Africa is not a single country neighboring the Old Continent, the Mediterranean is a decidedly more realistic body of water than the Big Blue. On the other hand, in 1975, the population of America was 215 million times that of Mexico’s then-60 million inhabitants, while today it is still 4.5 times larger, although the proportion of population as a percentage of the total US population. The current demographic patterns in sub-Saharan Africa, between $2 and $4 a day. To one. And the continent will be more moody in terms of age structure, if the shape of the age pyramids. Today, four out of ten Africans are under the age of 15, twice as many as in the EU, where the median age is 45. As the population of Europe continues to age, sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic will continue to trend in the opposite directions. By 2050, seven out of ten Africans will be under the age of 25 while the median age in Europe will approach 40. Additionally, in a little more than 10 years, for every 100 European men (in this case, all including their children born in the US-Mexican-Americans now constitute a community of 37 million people, about 15 percent of the total US population. If Africans followed that example, the Afro-optimistic fetishes of “Africa Rising” would become a reality. At the end of a sustained African migration wave, Europe’s population would include some 50 to 100 million Africans, European politicians and immigrants, all combined, with just nine million today.
Global arms sales have grown for the third year in a row with Russia crowding out the US for second place.

Boeing-McDonnell-Douglas

In direct dialogue with the European Union institutions

Ever since the Austrian accession to the European Union, our law firm's founders have gradually expanded our EU expertise. Today, LGP covers a wide range of key topics important for the future of the EU: energy, environment, infrastructure, competition, data protection, digitalization, human rights and migration. Through our LGP Senior Expert Council, we involve former politicians and experts on major issues and are in direct dialogue with the EU institutions.

Our clients rely on our know-how when it comes to international politics, European integration, strategic planning, market entry, decision-making in the EU law, international trade, Eastern Europe or financing topics. Through our offices in Vienna (Austria), Bratislava (Slovakia), Astana (Kazakhstan), Skopje (North Macedonia), and Tirana (Albania) as well as by collaborating with Anderson Global, we are present throughout Europe and worldwide. LGP – legal advice at the interface between law, politics and business.

Who’s buying, who’s selling?

The ten largest producers of arms and military services, excluding China, 2016–2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>2017 Sales</th>
<th>2016 Sales</th>
<th>% Share of Top Exporter's Sales</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lockheed Martin</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>$44.9</td>
<td>$41.5</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>$51.0</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>$26.9</td>
<td>$21.0</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>$29.4</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Raytheon</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>$23.9</td>
<td>$23.4</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$25.3</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Airbus Group</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>$22.9</td>
<td>$21.2</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>$23.5</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>General Dynamics</td>
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<td>$22.3</td>
<td>$18.6</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$30.8</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Northrop Grumman</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>$22.3</td>
<td>$21.9</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$25.1</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>$19.5</td>
<td>$19.6</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>$35.0</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>$9.0</td>
<td>$8.4</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>$13.2</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Leopolda</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>$6.6</td>
<td>$7.1</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>$13.4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIPRI

BY MARKUS BICKEL

The difference is swelling in Asia.

Whereas $8.9 billion was spent on the 16 peacekeeping operations organized by the United Nations, global arms sales reached $146.7 billion. For the third year in a row, the US, China and Russia are at the top, along with Russia, China, Germany and the UK. Global arms sales reached a new high. Germany earned almost fifteen times more in arms revenue than they spent on peacekeeping missions – clear evidence that arms spending can be used to boost the global business of arms.

This said fact is confirmed by the numbers presented last December by the renowned Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which showed that in 2017 arms sales amounted to $146.7 billion, of which $35.7 billion were originated in the US, $29.2 billion in China and $23.8 billion in Russia. These three countries together account for 78.8 percent of global arms sales. Europe, which for years held the top spot, is now ranked third with arms sales of $18.3 billion.

A new high in Asia

Asia had a turnover of $21 billion, which is 48 percent more than in 2016. Japan, India, South Korea, China and Saudi Arabia are among the top ten arms importers worldwide. In 2017 Saudi Arabia alone invested $66.3 billion in arms – an increase of 110 percent over the previous year. The increase in Asia’s arms imports is even more pronounced. After years of stagnation, the share of arms imports by Arab countries increased by 35 percent over 2008. On the other hand, Pakistan, with its membership in the military coalition against the terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIS), achieved a 44 percent growth in arms sales. The respective increase in arms imports in the case of Pakistan equates to 21 percent. These investments considerably contributed to the country’s seven percent increase in the defence budget, with 13 percent spending totaling $1.74 trillion annually, still spends 2.7 percent of its GDP on arms. India also account for a 1 percent increase in arms imports.

Asia is now ranked as the second largest arms importer worldwide, just behind the US. In 2017, the US as the largest arms importer of $398.2 billion, an increase of 10 percent over 2016. The lion’s share of this amount comes from the US and 21 percent from China. For example, the export ban worth the paper they’re printed on. For example, the export ban that ran from 2013 to 2015, roughly 37 percent of all Egyptian weapons imports came from France, with 26 percent from the US and 21 percent from Russia.

Largest arms exporters

The lion’s share of the $398.2 billion in global revenue generated by the 100 largest companies continues to come from the US and European arms manufacturing giants.

BY MARKUS BICKEL

German-language portal

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T +43 1 533 33 30
F +43 1 533 33 30 FAX

AMCS sales 2017

AMCS sales 2016

% Change 2016 to 2017

Total sales 2017

% Share of Top Exporter's Sales 2017

6 6 Global Dynamics USA $19.5 $19.6 -0.9% $35.0 63%

7 7 Airbus Group Europe $22.3 $21.9 2% $25.1 88%

8 8 China $9.0 $8.4 7% $13.2 58%

9 9 Leopolda Russia $6.6 $7.1 -6% $13.4 50%

10 10 Indonesia $2.8 $1.8 60% $19.3 57%
A considerable number of states remain reluctant to fully submit information on their military spending within a joint comparative framework to an international body. Even if established, however, such a database would only diminish, not eliminate, the ambiguities that mark the comparison of military expenditures. Because measuring military spending requires a precise technical issue, ambiguities will persist. Such measurement is inherently political and, as a result, is regularly subject to partisan disputes. During the Cold War, measuring Soviet military spending was a prominent point of contention in Western security debates. NATO’s current percent deflection formula involves debates over the definition of military expenditure. For example, does development and capability spending count as “preventive” military spending? The WMEAT database quoted above shows how simply switching from one currency conversion mechanism to another allows for quite different interpretations of the current state of great power competition between the US, China, and Russia. Calculated one way, China and Russia combined spent $567 billion compared to the US, which spent $641 billion. Calculated the other way, China, and Russia combined can account for a military expenditure of $761 billion. For those who advocate increased US military spending, the second interpretation is far more appealing, while official Chinese statements prefer different relative measures and stress that China’s military spending is lower than that of other major countries, both as a percentage of GDP and in terms of per capita military expenditures. It is in light of this ever-present possibility of politicization that the seemingly unsatisfactory situation of a lacking global standard with a variety of data providers and datasets on military expenditures, also has its merits. Although it allows proponents of different political agendas to more easily cherry pick the figures that best fit their arguments, the existence of independent data providers such as the ISS and SIPRI acts as a critical check on the political uses and abuses of data on military expenditure. The independent data providers produce alternative reference points that allow critical scrutiny of arguments about military spending and capabilities advanced in national and international political debates on security policy. That said, attempts to promote official global standards and databases for the comparison of military expenditures and capabilities via international bodies should not be dismissed as futile exercises. These negotiations help states better understand the comparative measures through which other states assess regional and global military developments. The likelihood of establishing unambiguously measurable international bodies can thus be increased. Moreover, globally accepted standards and data would facilitate future arms control negotiations by demonstrating that, and how, problems of comparability can be overcome. Past arms control negotiations provide ample evidence that problems of comparability are often exploited as a convenient excuse for states that lack the political will to actually realize arms control and arms reduction proposals.

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Death by remote

The high number of civilian drone victims begs the question: Do drones actually serve the war on terror?

BY EMRAN FEROZ

Second weeks ago, Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund, a powerful Taliban commander from the southern Afghan province of Helmand, was struck down by an American drone strike and his death celebrated. Many observers, including journalists and politicians from Afghanistan and elsewhere, flooded networks like Twitter with exclamations of joy over the attack.

The death of Mullah Manan, as the Taliban leader was called, was important news. But it was also a headline that served the narrative that the war on terror is sensible and success-oriented endeavor.

But this is not the case. On the day Mullah Manan was killed, at least one other attack was carried out in Afghanistan that deserved attention. In the east Afghan province of Paktia, at least eight civilians became the target of air onslaughts, usually in the form of raids, drone strikes or other military operations, are carried out on a regular basis. The victims are frequently civilians. “My brothers and my father were Taliban fighters,” I was told by the normal Pasta Khan, from the province of Khoot. “But no one’s interested in that.” In June 2019, drones killed his brothers, his father and other members of his tribe. The nomads were forced to mourn a total of 14 victims.

Pasta Khan now suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and paranoia. He lives in constant fear that American drones are watching him and could obliterate him at any time. The children in the village of Rari Tana, not far from the Pakistan border, have similar fears—they’re too afraid to go outside and play.

Similar scenarios are playing out in other Afghan provinces that I visited. In Wardak Province, near Kabul, miners, grocers and taxi drivers are hunted and killed by US drones. The drone operators, who work in shifts from their little cubbies, are interested in valuable minerals and quick profits, but while Manan’s death attracted considerable attention, we heard little about the nameless, faceless Afghans who perished in silence; he eventually succumbed to illness and old age. Nevertheless, on multiple occasions over the past 17 years, Haqqani was declared dead after drone strikes leveled on Kabul and its target – the Taliban founder and leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar – survived. Years later, Omar would die a natural death. However, the US drones that stalked him over the years continued to claim the lives of other civilians.

In the past year, it became known that Mullah Haqqani, a well-known Taliban leader and head of the so-called Haqqani network, had been dead for some time. He did not perish by way of Hellfire missiles, he eventually succumbed to illness and old age. Nevertheless, on multiple occasions over the past 17 years, Haqqani was declared dead after drone strikes leveled on Kabul and its allies.

Such has been the case with other renowned militants as well, including none other than the leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. He, too, has been reportedly killed on several occasions, yet he lives on. The British human rights organization Reprieve called attention to this problem in 2014, highlighting the fact that between 2001 and 2014, the killing of 42 targeted individuals in Yemen and Pakistan resulted in the killing of at least 247 others who were not targeted.

The critical yet unspoken question remains: Who were all these people?

The Munich Security Report aims to serve as a companion and impulse for the discussions at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and as background for participants.

Our annual digest, for which we work together with some of the world’s premier research institutions, assembles particularly insightful and important data on key issues for the hundreds of senior leaders coming to Munich in February. At the same time, it is also made available to security professionals and the interested public.

Last year’s report was downloaded tens of thousands of times and widely referenced in both German and international media.
Despite all we know of the realities in those affected regions, this question is almost never posed. It is also objectionable that journalists, analysts and policymakers disproportionately view the death of men like Mullah Mansur while ignoring the numerous civilian victims of the global drone war. Such behavior merely contributes to the perpetuation of the fraudulent narrative of the “precise” drone that exclusively kills “terrorists.”

Recent figures indicate that from January to September 2018, the US military dropped more than 5,000 bombs from manned and unmanned aircraft over Afghanistan — marking a 17-year high. Moreover, such statistics issued by the military have proved to be erroneous in the past. In 2011, it was found that numerous sets of data from Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan were faulty. The Militär-Times, which brought the scandal to light, reported “potentially thousands of lethal airstrikes” of which the public was never informed. Even less data exists on the 2,000 victims of drone strikes, Obama officials maintained that each and every one of them was a “terrorist.” For that point in time, even consecutive estimates of civilian drone victims exceeded by far those provided by the White House.

Through my own research alone, I have been able to reconstruct dozens of cases where civilians exclusively were killed. But none of this much matters when the White House classifies more or less all males in range of a drone strike as “militants” or “enemy combatants.”

The following question is thus all the more relevant: If I were killed by a drone in Afghanistan, would I be considered a terrorist or as long as the opposite is not proved? And this begs my final question: Who makes the effort to prove otherwise, when an Afghan nomad, greengrocer or farmer is obliterated via remote control from Nevada? Far too few of us — that’s the grim truth.

EMRAN PEROZ is a Freelance Journalist who published a book titled “Death at the Push of a Button; Westend Verlag). (Death at the Push Knopfdruck) published a book titled “Populäre Untertage; Westend Verlag).

Reporting on the bright colors of the trans-Atlantic relationship and the ties that bind the US and Germany
The real cyber threat is your friends
It was the largest data breach in German history. But what made it remarkable is that our democratic processes are being undermined by the very technologies that are supposed to facilitate free, fair and open. The actions of Russian operators affected thousands of German citizens, accessing and cryptography, to yield more money, man- and money, and more. The long-term effects of these actions will likely be felt for years to come. The German government has taken several steps to address this issue, including strengthening its cybersecurity laws and increasing funding for research. However, more needs to be done to ensure that our democratic processes remain secure and resilient against future attacks.

B Y P W. S ING E R

February 2019
Behavioral norms in cyberspace

BY MYRIAM DUNN CAVELTY AND JACQUELINE EGGENSCHWILER

The unprecedented scale of digital aggregation and connectivity means that cyberspace now involves a high level of connectivity to the world around as drastically increases the scope for cyberattacks. The unbearable result of this fact is that cyber events of any kind and magnitude have also put on the table the important topics that need to be addressed without delay. Most of the normative efforts conducted by states are geared toward the high-end of cyber-aggressions and tasks the failed cyber-attack, which could be devastating but has proven to have very low probability of occurrence. Instead, more common are devastating cyber attacks below the threshold of war. The biggest actual cyber actors in cyberspace: cyber exploitation or cyber espionage, with the goal of gathering information and exploiting vulnerabilities in an adversary’s security posture in a strategic way. This is a world of intelligent agencies whose actions are regulated by domestic laws in their home states but remain more or less unconstrained internationally.

The private-sector initiatives aim to tackle the distorting actions of digital industries. Bad actors who plant and exploit vulnerabilities in current operating systems and hardware are making cyberspace more insecure; their aim is to have more access to data while preparing for future conflict. Cyber attacks are developed to integrate security systems and services that are not even aware of and are enormously trusting of new technologies. There is an increasing awareness of the risks involved in those new emerging technologies, the actual use of the technologies themselves is never a matter of debate. This points to the fact that we urgently need a paradigm shift in security policy. Security is not just about preventing incidents but also about preventing the consequences of attacks.

The challenges of a globally connected cyber-risk resilience is becoming an issue of national and regional importance. With the rise of 5G networks, artificial intelligence and billions of devices in the Internet of Things, we can see that the exposure to attack will only grow.

Behavioral norms in cyberspace

BY TOM KOEHLER AND OLIVER ROLLOPS

Who would have believed, just a decade ago, that the internet would enable cybercrime to infiltrate almost $600 billion worth of damage around the world in 2017? Or that cyber-risk on the rise of critical infrastructures as well as our private lives would cause disaster for insurance companies to optimize their demand for cover? Or that hospitals might access data from connected lifesaving systems and this is exactly where technology strategy risks emerge, many of them unimagined today? And who can imagine today that a cyber attack on a city traffic flow mean that the risks will continue to increase the scope for cyberattacks. States, international organizations, the actual use of the technologies themselves is never a matter of debate. This points to the fact that we urgently need a paradigm shift in security policy. Security is not just about preventing incidents but also about preventing the consequences of attacks.

The challenges of a globally connected cyber-risk resilience is becoming an issue of national and regional importance. With the rise of 5G networks, artificial intelligence and billions of devices in the Internet of Things, we can see that the exposure to attack will only grow.

Fail-safe cyber resilience

We need early warning and quick response systems that work

BY MYRIAM DUNN CAVELTY

Surely one of the first things that we can learn is that we must learn to manage these threats and develop functioning fail-safe systems and cyber-risk resilient capabilities in case of large-scale cyber-attacks. We need to build a resilient cyber-increase in the scope for cyberattacks. The unbearable result of this fact is that cyber events of any kind and magnitude have also put on the table the important topics that need to be addressed without delay. Most of the normative efforts conducted by states are geared toward the high-end of cyber-aggressions and tasks the failed cyber-attack, which could be devastating but has proven to have very low probability of occurrence. Instead, more common are devastating cyber attacks below the threshold of war. The biggest actual cyber actors in cyberspace: cyber exploitation or cyber espionage, with the goal of gathering information and exploiting vulnerabilities in an adversary’s security posture in a strategic way. This is a world of intelligent agencies whose actions are regulated by domestic laws in their home states but remain more or less unconstrained internationally.

Information and communication technology is being shaped by both natural and social processes. The process of digitization is actually work in practice! Generally speaking, the digitalization of a city takes numerous présents systems and integrates them together. Homes and buildings can suddenly communicate with utility services. Traffic lights are digitally controlled and public transport travel. Hospitals might access data from primary care providers and health insurances to optimize their demand planning. It is precisely this process of connecting up different systems that can create the greatest security risks, because the high dynamic systems of systems are subject to failure that is more likely in a city in the digital age. In fact, it is precisely what we assume that is the most secure is the least secure, because the risk of cyber exploitation is higher.

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