The hour of populism

Since the euro crisis, the continent has been quarreling over the distribution of refugees - and the demagogues have a field day | By Peter H. Koepf and Lutz Lichtenberger

The Munich Security Conference revealed the wide chasm between the Western states and the Russian- and the European-Atlantic organizations and the role of the EU. Realpolitik prevails. But steps can be taken:

Respect! 22

Young people who feel disengaged and estranged by society are more likely to join terrorist groups, concludes biographer Andreas Rummenigge.

The bleakest possible picture

The Munich Security Conference revealed the wide chasm between the Western states and the Russian- and the European-Atlantic organizations and the role of the EU. Realpolitik prevails. But steps can be taken:

Respect! 22

Young people who feel disengaged and estranged by society are more likely to join terrorist groups, concludes biographer Andreas Rummenigge.
The VIEW FROM RUSSIA: NATO exploited and the rule of law, while the US was running screw-prison and torturing prisoners. The US-led neutrality of the Bucharest decision. Writing in 2008, former President of NATO’s Council. 1990, “the very fact that we are ready to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the US reason for question.” But they did do defense work all over the end of the Cold War – to build NATO’s goal for the West’s words, but also respect for the West’s competence.

An OSCE report explains why the Russia and the West do not see eye to eye
The Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, but it had never been a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.

The West had provided in the coalescence of ideas and states, but it did not try to exploit Russian weakness, instead it made efforts to support cooperation beyond the bipolar confrontation. In this context, the EU’s decision on enlargement; the East was not a victory for the West but rather the outcome of a 40-year-long conflict, and was maximalized as much in the Middle East as in Eastern Europe. In the Soviet Union and other states from the Eastern Atlantic space came to an end as “neue Europa.” The Fall of the Berlin Wall led to the collapse of ideological and system blocks and states, and the completion of the process of reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. The Cold War opened a new path to creative state-making and national self-determination.
Two years ago at the Munich Security Conference, we discussed how shouldering international responsibility starts at home. This insight has become a reality to an extent I would not have imagined then. In 2015, Germany received over one million refugees fleeing war and violence in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflicts. We know first-hand our responsibility, offering protection to hundreds of thousands of people who must leave their homes – mostly without knocking first. Illustrated that the world has become smaller, and more than that: terminating the principle of European solidarity is now a shared challenge.

In a divided Europe, right-wing populism is on the rise again. Freedom of movement within the Schengen area – a major achievement of our integration process – is in danger. We cannot allow ourselves to stand on the sidelines of this crisis.

We have built this continent for over half a century; we have put enormous efforts, power and strength into achieving a truly united Europe. Together we have managed to overcome huge challenges in the past and present. And yet again, we are facing truly historic tasks to shape the future, to make Europe great again for our children, and also to reduce and control the steady influx of migrants to Europe. However difficult this might seem, we also hold a great chance for success. We have already taken steps towards a European solution, the European Commission has already put forward the outline of a broader mandate for Frontex, and we are working hard to implement the far-reaching agreement with Turkey in order to reduce and manage the flow of refugees. Clearly, we will not achieve a solution overnight, but we are already in the process of implementing a bundle of measures that will help us to tackle the crisis.

I admit: this is not going to be an easy road, but it is the only one which will not lead into a dead end. Ultimately, however, we will not be able to bring the influx of refugees back down to manageable levels unless we address the root-causes – most importantly by defusing the violent conflicts and crises that have destabilized Europe’s eastern and southern neighborhood.

These are trying times for the European Union. Striking a balance between the common European interest in maximizing an effective and humane refugee policy on the one hand and the need to build and maintain political majorities in member states will remain a key challenge.

On the international stage, Germany has stepped up its efforts to contribute to political and diplomatic solutions. This is more often than not a painstaking process, requiring patience and persistence, but we have recently made important progress. The nuclear accord with Iran shows that it was possible to negotiate a solution for a proliferation crisis that had been an immediate potential to become a hot war. And it may yet turn out to be a crucial milestone on a road map for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

At the same time we need to complement reassurance with a reinvigoration of our dialogue with Russia. I am speaking of a dialogue that should identify areas of common interest but also clearly spell out where we have sharp differences. The core principles of European security, as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, are not to be negotiated away. Without any doubt, there is still a lot of work ahead of us: frequent violations of the ceasefire must stop. Every shot that is fired is still one too many. At the same time, a constitutional reform for decriminalization in Ukraine and the elaboration of a special status law for certain areas in eastern Ukraine remains decisive for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in Ukraine have stirred many concerns and fears, especially among our Eastern European NATO allies. That is why Germany has politically supported and militarily contributed to the Alliance’s reassurance and adaptation measures.

At the same time we need to complement reassurance with a reinvigoration of our dialogue with Russia. I am speaking of a dialogue that should identify areas of common interest but also clearly spell out where we have sharp differences. The core principles of European security, as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, are not to be negotiated away. Without any doubt, there is still a lot of work ahead of us: frequent violations of the ceasefire must stop. Every shot that is fired is still one too many. At the same time, a constitutional reform for decriminalization in Ukraine and the elaboration of a special status law for certain areas in eastern Ukraine remains decisive for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Renew dialogue, rebuild trust and restore security

Germany’s goals for its OSCE chairmanship

By Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier

With 57 participating States in North America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the world’s largest regional security organization.

The OSCE works for stability, peace and democracy for more than a billion people, through political dialogue about shared values and practical work that makes a lasting difference.

osce.org
towards longer-term peace that are essential to pave the way for reconciliation and reconstruction, efforts that are essential to pave the way towards longer-term peace in conflict areas. A case in point is Iraq, where we are helping to quickly rebuild public services and critical infrastructure in areas liberated from ISIS. We are committed to these measures in order to strengthen the confidence of the Iraqi people in their public institutions. In Tikrit, this stabilization operation has allowed more than 130,000 internally displaced persons to return to their homes, and we are preparing to deliver the same support in Hayan, Ramadi and elsewhere.

Relaying on diplomacy, crisis prevention and stabilization does not rule out military engagement if and where it is a necessary component of a peace effort. We all know that a group like ISIS, which is not interested in negotiated solutions or peace accords, will not be defeated without military means. Germany has decided to contribute reconnaissance assets, logistical support and protection to the fight against ISIS, as well as providing training and equipment to the Kurdish Peshmerga, who are fighting ISIS on the ground. Germany is also contributing, alongside its NATO allies and other partners, to international missions in Afghanistan, Sudan and Mali.

In sum, Germany’s international responsibility has many facets – domestically, on the European level and with regard to global peace efforts. We must use the full spectrum of our foreign policy and security tools in an effective and coherent way, from counter-terrorism to post-conflict stabilization. The political processes to solve conflicts and crises will always be at the center stage, involving persistent efforts and patience. The conclusion of the nuclear agreement with Iran and the beginning of its implementation is a heartening example that such efforts can indeed be successful.

The bleakest possible picture

on whom she can still rely is shrinking fast. The talk of a new wave of European states in Vienna’s Hofburg Palace in January.

US Secretary of State John Kerry listed off all the crises, but then offered: “There absolutely no doubt whatsoever we’re going to get the right, we’re going to get the right moment, and we’re going to get the right strategy and the security and the stability that every country needs. We are going to do just fine.”

Marrin Schale, President of the European Parliament, said: “Desolidarization is the big crisis in the EU. We are stripping out our common agreements.” Chief of the German Chancellor’s Peter Altmeier exclaimed: “Locking doors is not the solution,” and later, “we will not accept national solutions.” Wolfgang Ischinger admonished: “Desolidarization will make things worse, not better. We need more EU, full stop.” Fear has never been a good adviser, he added.

The solid reasoning of the German delegation fell on deaf ears. Defense Minister von der Leyen cannot understand why 1.5 to 2 million refugees should pose a threat to an EU comprising 100 million people. This crisis is “reversal dynamic, the solidarity among EU member states is threat- ening to erode. The future Europe promised over the past 70 years, as the model for freedom and common values, threatens to be consumed by xenophobia and national- ism.” If the Europeans find no solutions, “we are shifting the dilemma to countries with external borders: security or human rights.” That is a new breed of European rulers.

Security guarantees of the United States remain indispensable. It is in this context that Germany actively contributes to conflict resolution, be it in the context of the EU+3 or the Vienna talks on Syria.

Germany wants to be a facilita- tor, enabling dialogue and sup- porting negotiation processes. We have stepped up our commit- ment of both diplomatic energy and resources to crisis stabiliza- tion and reconstruction, efforts that are essential to pave the way towards longer-term peace in conflict areas. A case in point is Iraq, where we are helping to quickly rebuild public ser- vices and critical infrastructure in areas liberated from ISIS. We are committed to these mea- sures in order to strengthen the confidence of the Iraqi people in their public institu- tions. In Tikrit, this stabilization operation has allowed more than 130,000 internally displaced persons to return to their homes, and we are preparing to deliver the same support in Hayan, Ramadi and elsewhere.

Relaying on diplomacy, crisis prevention and stabilization does not rule out military engagement if and where it is a necessary component of a peace effort. We all know that a group like ISIS, which is not interested in negotiated solutions or peace accords, will not be defeated without military means. Germany has decided to con- tribute reconnaissance assets, logistical support and promo- tion to the fight against ISIS, as well as providing training and equipment to the Kurdish Pesh- marga, who are fighting ISIS on the ground. Germany is also con- tributing, alongside its NATO allies and other partners, to intern- ational missions in Afghanistan, Sudan and Mali.

In sum, Germany’s interna- tional responsibility has many facets – domestically, on the European level and with regard to global peace efforts. We must use the full spectrum of our for- eign policy and security tools in an effective and coherent way, from counter-terrorism to post-conflict stabilization. The political processes to solve con- flicts and crises will always be at the center stage, involving persistent efforts and patience. The conclu- sion of the nuclear agreement with Iran and the beginning of its implementation is a hearten- ing example that such efforts can indeed be successful.
MSC Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger: “Renationalization will make things worse, not better. We need more EU, full stop.”

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls: “We have entered a new era, characterized by a durable presence of hyperterrorism.”

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini: “Peace is not the absence of conflict. Conflict is part of life. Peace is the capability to manage conflicts in a peaceful way.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: “NATO does not seek confrontation. We do not want a new Cold War. At the same time our response has to be firm.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi: “We intend to make this year the final year of Daesh’s existence in Iraq.”

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen: “The future Europe promised over the past 70 years, as the model for freedom and common values, threatens to be consumed by xenophobia and nationalism.”

King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein of Jordan: “We, as Arabs and Muslims, have a responsibility and duty to be in the lead in the fight against the Khawarej, or outlaws of Islam. This is a war to protect our religion, our values and the future of our people.”

President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz: “Revitalization is the biggest crisis in the EU. We areqing out our common agreements.”

US Secretary of State John Kerry: “This moment is not as overwhelming as people think it is. We know what needs to be done and, most importantly, we have the power to do it.”

Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite: “We are going to aggression. We are allowing Russia to behave that way in Ukraine, in Syria.”

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir: “ISIS is as much Muslim as the KKK is Christian.”

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko: “Mr. Putin, this is not a civil war in Ukraine, this is your aggression.”

President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz: “Desolidarization is the biggest crisis in the EU. We are wiping out our common agreements.”

Polish President Andrzej Duda: “My dream is to have a good relationship with all neighbours.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: “We should not demonize Assad. We should not demonize anyone in Syria except the terrorists.”

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier: “We have to reassert the true strength of states by their ability and willingness to take on responsibility not only for their own security.”

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev: “Renationalism is a challenging issue. It’s difficult to say how long it would take.”

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen: “The future Europe promised over the past 70 years, as the model for freedom and common values, threatens to be consumed by xenophobia and nationalism.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: “NATO does not seek confrontation. We do not want a new Cold War. At the same time our response has to be firm.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi: “We intend to make this year the final year of Daesh’s existence in Iraq.”

German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen: “The future Europe promised over the past 70 years, as the model for freedom and common values, threatens to be consumed by xenophobia and nationalism.”

Polish President Andrzej Duda: “My dream is to have a good relationship with all neighbours.”

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: “We should not demonize Assad. We should not demonize anyone in Syria except the terrorists.”

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier: “We have to reassert the true strength of states by their ability and willingness to take on responsibility not only for their own security.”

President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz: “Revitalization is the biggest crisis in the EU. We areqing out our common agreements.”

Former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan: “You cannot have peace without security, and you cannot have security without inclusive development.”
The refugee distribution crisis also raised tempers at the Security Times International Press Lounge on the eve of the Munich Security Conference. Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn reacted against plans to heavily arm the EU’s external borders. Because Frontex has failed, she maintains, Europe should now turn to NATO for help. Her concerns are that “if refugees from Aleppo – who have just saved their own lives – look down the rifles lining the border to the EU, then Europe is finished.”

For Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić, the crisis has but one cause: “lack of political will.” To the question posed by Security Times Executive Editor Theo Sommer as to whether there is danger of war in the Balkans, Dačić responded: “We always hear this expectation. But in the last ten years no crisis has commenced in the Balkans.” Neither the euro crisis nor the financial crisis nor the refugee crisis. “You’re ingest again in Serbia,” he said. “How long will we be the victims of your incapacity?”

Why so direct, Mr. Minister? Serbia is due for elections in April.

MSC/MARC MUELLER

www.cybersecurity-madeingermany.com

Big decisions need strong security.

Wherever important decisions are made, data safety becomes just as important. Giesecke & Devrient and secunet is your team for this task. Together, we ensure governments can safely exchange critical data. And secrets stay secrets.

Big decisions need strong security.

Wherever important decisions are made, data safety becomes just as important. Giesecke & Devrient and secunet is your team for this task. Together, we ensure governments can safely exchange critical data. And secrets stay secrets.
The best defense against extremism is unity.

The science and security board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has returned its annual "Doomsday Clock" to midnight, symbolizing a threat to the world "so threatening that the minute hand of the Doomsday Clock must remain at these minutes to midnight, the closer it has been to catastrophe since the early days of above-ground hydrogen bomb testing."

This was one of two 2016 developments that moved the clock, the other being the US presidential election. The Science and Security Board says the country is "on the brink of nuclear war, weighing anew on the minds of global leaders."

In his last State of the Union address, US President Barack Obama said that "in this world that in many ways is falling apart, we fight terrorism, and stood for Turkey, and NATO will continue to support them, even as they continue to suffer. The United States, he said, was "playing a key role in trying to resolve them."

The ceremony of innocence is struck at the heart of the European Union. There are once more contested by the members of the union. The Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has returned its annual "Doomsday Clock" to midnight, symbolizing a threat to the world "so threatening that the minute hand of the Doomsday Clock must remain at these minutes to midnight, the closer it has been to catastrophe since the early days of above-ground hydrogen bomb testing."

Two facts compounded the problem: 1) The US is polarized and paralyzed, making it less likely that it will be able to act decisively; 2) Putin is more amenable to a deal with the US, which could lead to a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons. William Perry reasons that the US should be at the forefront of efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and that this is in the best interests of the United States and the world. He calls for a "denuclearization" of the Middle East, which he believes is in the US's best interests. The former US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, has made a plea for the US to lead the way in reducing the number of nuclear weapons, arguing that this is in the best interests of the world and the US. He has been a strong advocate for reducing the number of nuclear weapons and has called for a "denuclearization" of the Middle East.
International politics has become a “G-zero world” with no shared values, standards or priorities (Ian Bremmer). Global hegemony is no longer possible. While Washington will remain preeminent for decades, it will no longer predominate. Nor can any other nation don the cap of world policeman.

The Middle East is experiencing an extraordinary level of violent turmoil. The state system is fraying in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya. Except in Tunisia, the Arab Spring has ended in dictatorial winter. The self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is imposing its writ on Mesopotamia. Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in intense proxy warfare. The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, although no longer central to the region, continues to fester; another intifada seems more likely than any diplomatic settlement, two-state or otherwise. Afghanistan’s future after ISAF is perilous at best. The Levant stands before a long phase of turbulence. It will take decades for the Middle East to find its future shape, viable national borders and an enlightened attitude to religious diversity. The explosive mix of elite failure, terrorism and mass migration defines military solutions.

The same goes for many regional flashpoints in Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, the smoldering conflict between India and Pakistan, the Chinese-Chinese tug-of-war over Taiwan, the dangerous Korean tinderbox and steadily increasing tensions between China and the US are causes for global concern. Looking at the world as it is, not as we wish it were, one cannot help but feel that our leaders should welcome another revenant: realpolitik. In other words, secure your defenses but do not eschew dialogue; contain where necessary and cooperate where possible; bear in mind humanitarian principles, but not as the sole benchmark for securing your interests; avoid bluster and blame; tolerate differences among nations while simultaneously building on common interests.

Our diplomats are beginning to use a new term for this: “compartmentalized cooperation.” It is a method for dealing with friends as well as rivals and adversaries: disagree where your interests diverge, but join hands wherever they coincide, turn red-hot conflicts into frozen ones rather than bull-headedly pursuing maximum objectives. Strategic patience is a virtue, not a vice.

Avoiding disasters must be accorded absolute priority. De-escalatory diplomacy is the order of the day.

Theo Sommer is the executive editor of The German Times and former editor of the German weekly Die Zeit.
Letting go

Even if full implementation of Minsk II seems unlikely, the EU and US should continue pressing all parties to meet its provisions |
By Steven Pifer

Russia is not yet prepared to reach a settlement of the crisis in eastern Ukraine, at least not on terms that would be considered reasonable for Kiev.

The key to the conflict lies in the West's continued reluctance to recognize the separatists as the true representatives of the people of Donbas, and in Moscow's failure to accept its responsibility for Donbass, which may consider a frozen state acceptable for the near to medium term. Kiev is in a position to assume economic responsibility for Donbass, which would require significant humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to repair the heavy damage caused by nearly two years of fighting. Some promises regarding economic and anti-corruption reforms – additional financial assistance, with the costs of any renewed offensive.

The two sides have yet to agree on terms for a ceasefire in the eastern Ukraine, at least not on terms that would be considered reasonable for Kiev.

Kiev and separatist leaders have been preparing for several months for a political settlement in eastern Ukraine, at least not on terms that would be considered reasonable for Kiev.

The West should make clear to the separatists that they need to say sorry to Ukraine, and to Moscow, for their actions.

The West should also consider more serious economic sanctions against Russia, such as those targeting the Russian economy, if Moscow does not make any significant concessions.

The West should also consider more serious economic sanctions against Russia, such as those targeting the Russian economy, if Moscow does not make any significant concessions.

The West should also consider more serious economic sanctions against Russia, such as those targeting the Russian economy, if Moscow does not make any significant concessions.
Russia’s Syria gambit

Putin’s overriding goal in the Levant is not defeating terrorism, but elevating Russia’s place in the world order by Dmitri Treinin

February 2016

BERLIN RESIDENCE AT ITS BEST

For more information about an incomparable residence on Schinkelplatz, please contact us.

+49 (0) 30 364 102 118 | www.berlin-schinkelplatz.de
The use of military force to redraw national boundaries on Europe’s borders was a stark reminder to NATO that relations with Russia could deteriorate as well as develop. The alliance began to craft a response to Moscow’s aggression at its 2014 Summit, and the credibility of this response will be measured at NATO’s Warsaw Summit this July.

It was no surprise that Russia’s actions in 2014 – annexing Crimea and supporting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine – caused considerable concern in NATO capitals, particularly in its eastern member states. As leaders agreed in the Wales Declaration at the end of the 2014 Summit, “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”

The capabilities Russia has recently employed highlight that despite budgetary concerns, Russia’s armed forces have benefited from significant technical and financial investment. And these capabilities are being used. In Syria Russia has recently demonstrated its advanced guided weapons, launched from both air and sea, and continues to mount large-scale military exercises with tens of thousands of troops. An assertive Moscow, however, is not the only challenge confronting NATO. The actions of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) along with the continuing fragility and failure of states on Europe’s southern and southeastern periphery have had growing impact at home – notably as a cause of the 2015 refugee crisis – and have reminded Europe’s defense planners of the complex security challenges they face.

With vulnerabilities on its southern and its eastern flank clearly on display, NATO is trying to improve its military readiness, reinforce its collective defense posture and accelerate decision-making. The Wales Summit ushered in another phase of strategic adaptation for NATO. It saw member states agree on a new Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to sustain NATO’s eastern members regarding solidarity and the collective defense commitment, and adapt NATO’s forces to better respond not just to the continued challenge from Moscow, but also to instability in Europe’s south and southeast. There was an accompanying ambition, for those then spending under 2 percent of GDP on defense, to “move towards the 2 percent guideline within a decade,” i.e. by 2024. Since 2014 NATO’s exercise activity has developed both in frequency and scope, in line with the “assurance” side of the RAP.

“The wall box – designed for the mobility of the future.”

Challenging NATO: Russian forces prepare a Tupolev Tu-22M3 for combat over Syria.
acknowledged that “our current permanent force structure” is unlikely to change. As such, the US is relying on pre-positioning equipment: a heavy brigade set of military equipment (the European Army Set) has been distributed to maintenance bases in Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria—all due to be operational in 2016—and is ready to be driven out by US forces rotating through those countries on exercise. Separately, the US has been working to establish two Aegis Ashore bases in Poland and Romania as part of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense. In the three Baltic States, Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015. All are procuring artillery, armored vehicles as well as anti-air and air defense systems. Poland is also boosting its budget and there are plans to acquire Patriot defense systems, ACM-135 air-launched cruise missiles and a range of medium-range systems that include new surveillance, possibly with the capability of carrying cruise missiles as well. Though the change in government law in the year has raised questions concerning the details of some of these plans, the overall trajectory is clear: in Norway—already one of the few states to have increased spending since 2008—the government has proposed a 7.9 percent real term defense budget increase for 2016. Questions have been raised over Ireland and Sweden’s reluctance with NATO. Increased cooperation in the Arctic region, but both are examining their capabilities and plan to bolster bilateral cooperation. However, maintaining the current position shown by NATO since 2014 and resourcing future defense plans may be challenging. If NATO in 2016 is 1.1 percent. Figures released by the ISS Military Balance in 2013 indicate that all of NATO’s states have adopted a threshold of 2 percent. This has led to major terrorist threats and as a result significantly boosted defense outlays. While it has taken an active role in NATO’s assurance missions, France’s principal military focus is now on security, surveillance and tackling, as is its existing commitments in Africa. These examples indicate the remaining importance of developing a cohesive perception of European security concerns in order to develop and maintain a system of unified responses. The military assurance and adaptation measures agreed in NATO are important capabilities, but more remains to be done. As an example, some observers may consider recently established forces and facilities, such as NATO Force Integration Units (FIUs), to be a response for triggering NATO’s involvement in the event of an attack, while some allies as the East are calling for a more permanent NATO presence in their territories. Furthermore, although the RAP and NATO countries may face “nuclear,” “hybrid” or “cyber” threats as well as military challenges, and these concerns remain.
Russia's annexation of Crimea and its ongoing undeclared war with Ukraine have created a radically new situation for NATO. Two major preoccupations upon which the alliance's post-Cold War reform was based – that Russia's evolution would remain benign and the enlargement of Western institutions could be recast without raising the risk of military confrontations – no longer apply.

Russia's intervention does not necessarily mean it will be a direct threat to NATO. However, if Ukraine were to conclude an association agreement with the European Union in the near future, it would affect the security of Europe's post-Cold War order, which includes the right of countries to freely choose their alliances, experienced a major setback.

The West, notably the United States, has been faced with a reality that any vacillations it attempts to deal with in the Middle East will be followed by other actions. These developments have sparked NATO's largest political and military intervention since the end of the Cold War. For the Allies to consider the policy they want to pursue towards Russia, the Alliance must be an important factor in shaping political and military developments in both the eastern and southern reaches of NATO's member states. If Russia were to cause more than simply a problem for the future of certain NATO bastions, it would be needed to consider that the future of Russia bastions that are capable of creating a new security order.

The West must also consider that they are the only opportunity to cope with the political security threat to NATO. They can be seen in several ways as a major shift from the Cold War era. NATO's largest political and military intervention since the end of the Cold War was designed to overturn the crisis in the Middle East.

The debate in Europe over the future role in European security is a geopolitical challenge that calls for at least some sort of strategic alliance and unofficial treaties. Most observers agree that Putin's 2012 return to the office of president has shifted the focus to maintaining power in the Near East, Russia's nuclear saber-rattling has raised concerns, the United States has called for a shift from “realpolitik” to “liberalism”.

A similar logic pertains to the future of the Middle East. Whether it's propping up Syria, its last ally in the Middle East. Whether it's propping up Syria, its last ally in the Middle East, or it's propping up Russia, its last ally in the Middle East, the Middle East is now a place of constant geopolitical shifts.

The West's main strategy of allying with Russia in the Middle East has changed. The United States is now focused on Syria, its last ally in the Middle East. Whether it's propping up Syria, its last ally in the Middle East, or it's propping up Russia, its last ally in the Middle East, the Middle East is now a place of constant geopolitical shifts.

The West's main strategy of allying with Russia in the Middle East has changed. The United States is now focused on Syria, its last ally in the Middle East. Whether it's propping up Syria, its last ally in the Middle East, or it's propping up Russia, its last ally in the Middle East, the Middle East is now a place of constant geopolitical shifts.

The West's main strategy of allying with Russia in the Middle East has changed. The United States is now focused on Syria, its last ally in the Middle East. Whether it's propping up Syria, its last ally in the Middle East, or it's propping up Russia, its last ally in the Middle East, the Middle East is now a place of constant geopolitical shifts.
S
since the Russian annexation of Crimea, and given instability in Western
nudities, pictures of mili-
tactics have been appearing
in Central Europe have begun
to make regular appearances in
the evening news. On their own
TV screens, Russian citizens have
seen an introduction of how
to, and NATO propaganda has
even more images of mass drills
and parades of modern Russian
weaponry. And the escalation
of voices has found physical
expression as well, there has
been a notable increase in dangerous
counters between the Russian
military and those of NATO
members. In November 2015,
the Turkish Air Force shot down
a Russian SU-24 bomber, killing
one of its own crew.

In the coming months an even
dangerous threat may emerge on
both sides of the NATO-Russian
border. From the High North to the
Black Sea, it could include the deployment
of additional military forces and
new categories of weapons into
the area – along with nuclear
warheads – and even more fre-
quently exercises. Another inci-
dent would increase chances of
a Russian Su-24 bomber, killing
the Turkish Air Force shot down
in November 2015,

In response, NATO
must maintain its thinking
of an adversary that is becoming
more dangerous, to include the
“red lines” against Moscow’s
assertive behavior elsewhere,
its military posture is adequately
escalatory, but is satisfied that
the relationship will continue
to be adversarial and a return to
business as usual is impossible.

We need more warning
to call on NATO to show
a confidence-building measure,
NATO-protected territory. As

Our efforts should focus on
establishing a new set of rules
for managing the NATO-Russian
confrontation at lower political
and financial costs, and with a
reduced chance of a military crisis
or escalation. The aim should be
to establish a new military
equilibrium, which is understood
as a situation where each side
resists introducing military mea-
sures that can be interpreted by
the other side as provocative or
escalatory, but is satisfied that
new military postures are adap-
tively robust to deter an armed
attack on the other line.

Initial plans should involve
both Russia and NATO in the
training of an exercise schedule,
a plan of major Russian
exercises planned for 2016

could be made available by the
Russian Ministry of Defense. One particular source of NATO anxiety are Russian
“snap exercises,” which often involve the sudden mobilization
of substantial military forces
and their deployment close to NATO-protected territory. As a confidence-building measure,
Moscow could voluntarily decide
to reduce the frequency and size
of such exercises.

Third, NATO and Russia should suspend sabre-rat-
ing on their military doctrines
and postures. Russia has concerns
about the “aggressive” scenarios
of NATO exercises in Central
and Eastern Europe and the pur-
pose of developing a territorial
military defense in Romania and
Poland. In NATO, many experts
worry about the threat of hybrid
warfare against the Baltic States
and about Moscow’s apparent
readiness to use its nuclear
weapon at an early phase of a

Millions of farmers across the world rely on the soil for their livelihoods.
And we’re helping to keep it fertile for future generations. CLAAS is one of the world’s leading
guardians of farming technology. Our ultra-reliable machines are designed to meet the needs of farmers
across the planet.

The future of sustainable harvesting.
Two years into Germany’s “new” foreign policy
By Volker Perthes

Refugees, Syria, Russia, terrorism and EU problem-solving capacity have merged into one singular crisis landscape.

Germany’s “new” foreign policy

Premier Angela Merkel is leading a more proactive foreign policy on the world stage.

The freedom of the seas in general and in particular the specific problem of military conflict in the South China Sea constitutes one of the few points on which Germany and Europe see as vital contributions to international crisis management.

On the sidelines no more

Germany’s new level of international co-leadership, which emerged after the joint crisis management of the refugee crisis and the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine.

Volker Perthes is director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.

Germany’s new level of international co-leadership – emerging after the joint crisis management of the refugee crisis and the crises in Afghanistan and Ukraine – was an important factor in the recent German election campaign. The Greens’ Greens (Die Grünen) party, under the leadership of Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck, made it a key issue. The Greens campaigned on the need for the Federal Republic of Germany to play a more active role in international cooperation and crisis management. They argued that the Greens needed to strengthen Germany’s international role in order to protect the rights and interests of the people, to preserve peace and order, to ensure prosperity, and to combat climate change. The Greens also argued that Germany should lead the way in creating a more inclusive, democratic, and sustainable international economy. The Greens also emphasized the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations and other international organizations in promoting peace and stability.

The Greens’ Greens (Die Grünen) campaign was a success. The Greens gained 15.8% of the vote, which was the highest percentage ever for a Green party in a federal election. The Greens also gained 79 seats in the Bundestag, which was an increase of 23 seats from the previous election. The Greens’ Greens (Die Grünen) were able to form a government coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The Greens’ Greens (Die Grünen) government aims to strengthen Germany’s role in international cooperation and crisis management, to reduce emissions, and to promote the rights and interests of the people, to promote peace and stability, and to combat climate change. The Greens’ Greens (Die Grünen) government also aims to strengthen the role of the United Nations and other international organizations in promoting peace and stability.
February 2016 Section

Security Challenges

The new Syria peace process is in peril before it has even begun

By Andrea Böhm

The new Syrian war is likely to persist for a long time to come, as the participants are not willing to compromise on anything. In the past, the terms of the Geneva peace talks have been characterized by a spirit of optimism. But now, this optimism appears to have evaporated. In particular, the participants are no longer willing to accept any compromises, even if they mean significant concessions, in order to achieve a political solution to the conflict.

At their meeting in Vienna on Oct. 30, the participants agreed on the following political principles that will be part of the political process. These principles have been carefully crafted to ensure that no one side can get everything they want, while also making it clear that some compromises will have to be made in order to achieve progress.

1. A political transition in Syria will be achieved through a constitutional process, with the participation of all major groups, including the opposition.
2. The Syrian regime will be dissolved, and a new government will be formed, with the participation of opposition representatives.
3. A new constitution will be drawn up, with the participation of all major groups, including the opposition.
4. Free and fair elections will be held in Syria, with the participation of all major groups.
5. A new President will be elected, with the participation of all major groups.
6. The Syrian regime will be dissolved, and a new government will be formed, with the participation of opposition representatives.
7. A new constitution will be drawn up, with the participation of all major groups, including the opposition.
8. Free and fair elections will be held in Syria, with the participation of all major groups.
9. A new President will be elected, with the participation of all major groups.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

However, there are also a number of challenges that will need to be addressed in order to achieve a political transition in Syria. These challenges include:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

Despite these challenges, the participants are determined to achieve a political transition in Syria, and they have agreed to work together to overcome these challenges. The participants are also committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and they are willing to make the necessary sacrifices to achieve this goal.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.

The participants have also agreed to a number of practical steps, including:

1. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
2. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
3. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
4. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
5. The participation of all Syrian groups, including the opposition, in the political process.
Saudia Arabia.

one can afford the luxury of alienating itself, we keep hearing a well-worn bit of pricing war on the global oil market.

They each have a barely concealed hand interests collide and clash mercilessly for months, has by now taken on the quarter of the world’s traded oil passes makes relations with these states at the Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran, have that the two predominant Gulf powers, inclining Western politicians is the fact countries are extremely problematic and patronage of Syrian rebels and parts of war or the fighting in Iraq, or the Saudi as extended policy arms. Whether it’s active parliament – there’s no voting at with its highly restricted yet thoroughly with its population of almost 80 million, has neither a constitution nor a legal codex that monarch’s capacity to reform. The problem with this bilateral con- ditions on the Persian Gulf is not only that, even for the most hard-boiled policy makers, both states set unprec- cedentedly clear驭 with respect to their treat- ment of civil and human rights, demo- cracy and rule of law. The two regimes are beholden neither to the death penalty, both in part employ Shia law; both are authoritarian in their regimes. In Saudi Arabia, except for one experi- ence in the 1990s, the government has with its highly restricted yet thoroughly terroristic action package. None of which, all women’s rights are a grime matter under the law, with women not permitted to respect the laws as well.

For its part, Tehran is concerned about or rid itself of terrorist groups, militias, or resistance movements as extended policy arms. Whether it’s Tehran’s backing of Hezbollah in Lida- no, other Shia militias in Syria’s civil war or the fighting in Iraq, or the Saudi patronage of Yemen’s rebels and parts of the anti-government forces in Iraq, both countries are extremely problematic, and often dubious allies—the US, besides, do not even consider al-Qaeda in their fight against terrorism. Each other just feel how much the Americans have has been, and are to return to the settlement of disputes, and that the role of Iran is to continue to play a role in the Gulf, and that a country that regards and legitimizes itself as the custodians of all of Islam’s holy sites of Masjids and Madinah, has been an area par- ticipating in the Saudi Arabian and Wahhabi Muslim scholars. From the beginning, this alliance has been repeatedly restricted the Sunni-ruled Arab world.

In the Saudis’ view, ever since the Iran nuclear deal was finalized, it is the US, as we know, did not do. Instead, President Barack Obama pushed forward with the nuclear deal with Iran, which was concluded in July 2015. It showed the Saudis’ anxiety to return to the global market and to the international stage. No longer it is a partisan state and part of the alleged “axis of evil.” The Saudis felt betrayed by the Americans, who had once been their closest ally.

The monarchy of Saudi Arabia, with a population of 30 million, has neither a constitution nor a legal code that encompasses all areas of law. The Saudis, that the war opened up pretty much for the US, as we know, did not do. Instead, President Barack Obama pushed forward with the nuclear deal with Iran, which was concluded in July 2015. It showed the Saudis’ anxiety to return to the global market and to the international stage. No longer it is a partisan state and part of the alleged “axis of evil.” The Saudis felt betrayed by the Americans, who had once been their closest ally.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its population of 30 million, has neither a constitution nor a legal code that encompasses all areas of law. The Saudis, that the war opened up pretty much for the US, as we know, did not do. Instead, President Barack Obama pushed forward with the nuclear deal with Iran, which was concluded in July 2015. It showed the Saudis’ anxiety to return to the global market and to the international stage. No longer it is a partisan state and part of the alleged “axis of evil.” The Saudis felt betrayed by the Americans, who had once been their closest ally.

For its part, the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a population of almost 80 million, was created in a revolution against the secular monarch. The fall of the Shah led to the proclamation of a firmly Shia state that has a president and a parliament. Strategic policy and the facts, however, lie in the hands of a “grandiatary” represented by a council of experts, mainly clerics. The Velayat Faqih derived from Ayatollah Khomeini meant “rule by the supreme religious scholar.” In its early days the Islamic Republic also imposed a doctrine of “sweeping evolutions,” spreading among the Gulf monarchies and prompting them to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council as a defensive alliance against their neighbor.

Even if Tehran has stepped opaquely projecting the extent of evolutions, the conflict focuses more on the role of Shiites in the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia’s war on Iran, with a comparatively large Shiite minority con- stituting 20% of the population, shows that for decades it has lost mutual- ally driven conflicts, and that in Western Sunni and Shia states, the new generation of hardliners have been making steady gains.

The red carpet laid for Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on his European tour demonstrated a desire to show that Riyadh just how much the Iranians have been, and are to return to the settlement of disputes, and that the role of Iran is to continue to play a role in the Gulf, and that a country that regards and legitimizes itself as the custodians of all of Islam’s holy sites of Masjids and Madinah, has been an area par- ticipating in the Saudi Arabian and Wahhabi Islamic states.

For its part, the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a population of almost 80 million, was created in a revolution against the secular monarch. The fall of the Shah led to the proclamation of a firmly Shia state that has a president and a parliament. Strategic policy and the facts, however, lie in the hands of a “grandiatary” represented by a council of experts, mainly clerics. The Velayat Faqih derived from Ayatollah Khomeini meant “rule by the supreme religious scholar.” In its early days the Islamic Republic also imposed a doctrine of “sweeping evolutions,” spreading among the Gulf monarchies and prompting them to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council as a defensive alliance against their neighbor.
Turkey stumbles

Erdogan’s recklessness has jeopardized his country's future. By Michael Thumann

Turkey’s solutions within the region have often been a story of double standards and non-commitment. Today, Turkey sides from terrorist attacks by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) and from an internal war against Kurdish separatists in the southeast. The country has also struggled with the toxic sectarian Sunni-Shia divide.

In 2013 early Turkey was a widely respected country comfortably seated between the EU, oil-rich Russia and a relatively peaceful Middle East. The Turkish economic powerhouses grew from free trade to bring prosperity to visitors while amassing great relations with many of its neighbors. These factors contributed to Erdogan’s rising image, making him a beacon of hope for many in the region.

Turkey’s fall from some divine nationalism by Prime Minister Erdogan since as far as the country’s changing environment. Erdogan’s quest for absolute power has divided Turkey’s traditionally multi-cultural society and greatly destabilized regions just next to its borders. Erdogan has become a civil war of instability and non-cooperation across the region.

The EU’s leverage has proven far from easy to contain. Turkey’s border with Syria causes all sorts of refugees cross into Turkey on a daily basis. As the country’s Turkish government has returned the movement of Syrian refugees from Syria in the past, this country is still home to its citizens, particularly in areas close to the border. It will take years of massive work by police and service agencies to reintegrate those who are operating on Turkish soil.

What has landed in this precarious situation and which conclusions has the Turkish government drawn from it?

The current situation cannot be understood without first considering Erdogan’s mistakes over the past few years. When Egyptian president Mubarak was in January 2013, Erdogan, then prime minister, was caught by surprise. Two months earlier he had authored the Human Rights Act by Libya’s new regime. Erdogan’s change in his policy towards Syria was a balanced foreign policy, with an emphasis on social-economic relations, while avoiding to take sides in the struggle between Syria, King Abdullah II of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This posture of non-alignment was one reason for Turkey’s economic success.

The other things began to change in March 2011. Erdogan’s government grew its popularity with the help of the Kula Islamic Party (IP), as it won a majority in the June 2015 elections, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which seems to fight each other as often as they engage. Erdogan’s chair in the Middle East is muddled by its pro-ISIS stance and its failure to promote its role as a leader against the Middle East. Erdogan’s focus had been on the most important strategic partner in his fight against ISIS, which is the United States.

In its struggle for regional supremacy with Saudi Arabia, Erdogan has openly sided with Saudi Arabia in Syria against Bashar al-Assad, yet Erdogan’s missteps over the last five years have contributed to a new dynamic. Erdogan has recentally changed his policy towards Saudi Arabia since it returned to the global stage. Erdogan’s recent stance against ISIS is one of the most significant moves that have taken place in the region. Erdogan’s team has recently taken a more hard-line stance against ISIS. Erdogan has threatened to use force against ISIS, and Erdogan’s team has expressed its intention to use force against ISIS in the region.

The United States has already announced its intention to send troops to the region to fight against ISIS. Erdogan’s team has expressed its intention to use force against ISIS, and Erdogan’s team has expressed its intention to use force against ISIS in the region.

Attacks on computers and networks are on the rise. Cyber crime and data theft have dramatic consequences ranging from enormous economic damage to loss of image and customers. Years of work can be destroyed in minutes.

Rohde & Schwarz supports government, society and business with IT solutions and encryption technology made in Germany. Ensure your security at www.rohde-schwarz.com

R&S®STLine ETH Encryptor

R&S®SITGate U50 Next Generation Firewall

February 2016

Innovative solutions for the highest IT security requirements.
Mountains west of Mosul. Queried what was until recently a army, have advanced this far since rifles provided by the German of Nineveh Province. Peshmerga, this strategy appears to be run by President Masoud Bar - the autonomous Kurdish region Bakr al-Bagdadi’s caliphate and between the Iraqi part of Abu as on the hard-fought border that they can be enablers for the America’s local allies: “That – rather, it was to strengthen was not to form new divisions Carter pointed out that the aim drive IS out of its proto-capitals. Peshmerga, it will not be possible to help from the Iraqi-Kurdish Pesh- border of Turkey – as well as from theYPG, which are holed up in the Qandil Moun- Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – will not be able to hold out there, even if they are supported by Russian sheet over the strategic importance of the Syrian -Iraq border region as a that Iraq’s second biggest city would now be liberated. But officials of the Iraqi-Kurds, said that the border is a key to military success in that the self-pro- Albayrak was drawn up one hundred years taking of the strategically impor- beat the regime of Bashar Assad. Erdogan is bitterly opposed to. That also explains Erdogan’s light for the military strikes, a move very much against Wash- the PKK are worse now than they have been for years. When they claimed Islamic State’s hold on the Kurdish region. They have been focusing on the removal of another barrier, the brief historic alliance among Kurds in thinly covered history. Rela- tions between Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (PKK) and the PKK are even more tense now than they have been for years. When they fiercely opposed the PKK, they have been fighting the PKK for the anti-IS alliance, as the PKK are now regarded by Ankara as part of the Islamist militants. The YPG is one of the groups that Erdogan is bitterly opposed to. That also explains Erdogan’s light for the military strikes, a move very much against Wash-ington’s will, as President Barack 20 February 2016

Kurds vs. Kurds
Rivalry between the Syrian arm of the PKK and the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil is undermining the fight against IS | By Markus Bickel

Erdogan is bitterly opposed to. That also explains Erdogan’s light for the military strikes, a move very much against Wash-ington’s will, as President Barack

BORDER SURVEILLANCE, EARLY WARNING AND CRISIS PREVENTION
Get the full situational awareness picture

▪ Stationary and mobile solutions
▪ Automatic wideband interception, localisation, evaluation and database storage of radio signals
▪ Data fusion from different sensor systems
▪ Task based 24/7 operation
▪ Made in Germany
www.plath.de • www.plathgroup.com

Markus Bickel is the Corrеспonding author of the article and the author of “The Forgotten Conflict in the Middle East, 2011).”
The Balkans have been making headlines again since last year’s exodus of the refugee crisis. Chancellor Angela Merkel, speaking recently to her follow-up parties, warned that a closing of borders in Europe, especially between Germany and Austria, could lead to conflict and war in the Balkans. This statement had multiple subtexts: the German public as well as coalition partners, who were being warned what a collapse of the Schengen open-border regime could bring about internally as well as in the immediate European neighborhood. Her speech was also a warning to the leaders and states in the Balkans to cooperate rather than fall prey to mutual recriminations.

In concert with the EU, Germany is muddling through this crisis. For the moment there is a worthwhile lack of a much-needed, methodic approach to everything from asylum policies and relocation schemes to enhanced external return policies. The Balkan states are not the only ones to bear their burden, many in the Western Balkans are, in fact, heavily overburdened. This is unfathomable, if the EU is not today fulfilling its duties to the refugees, it is not fulfilling its duties to its own citizens. If the waiting conditions in the Western Balkans are bad, its conditions in the EU and NATO are not much better. This is a puzzle. The Balkans are not the periphery, as is sometimes said, they are the inner core of the European Union, surrounded by EU and NATO member states. This Southeastern European peninsula – the Western Balkans – remains the last non-integrated part of Europe. This is unfathomable; it is not good for the EU and it is not good for its credibility. If the EU is unable to help spur the enlargement process to the Western Balkans, it is hard to grasp how capable it is in dealing with other challenges.

The European Union’s enlargement is crucial for its credibility. If the EU is unable to help spur the enlargement process to the Western Balkans, it is hard to grasp how capable it is in dealing with other challenges.

The European Union’s enlargement is crucial for its credibility. If the EU is unable to help spur the enlargement process to the Western Balkans, it is hard to grasp how capable it is in dealing with other challenges.

The Balkan countries constitute only one piece of the complex puzzle. The sheer and immediate goal is to stem the flow of refugees and migrants and keep them in the countries from which they have fled, be they in the Middle East or Africa. The enlargement of the core states in the Middle East is badly needed but nowhere in sight. Geographically and geopolitically, the Balkans are not the periphery, as is sometimes said; they are the inner core of the European Union, surrounded by EU and NATO member states. This Southeastern European peninsula – the Western Balkans – remains the last non-integrated part of Europe. This is unfathomable; it is not good for the EU and it is not good for its credibility. If the EU is unable to help spur the enlargement process to the Western Balkans, it is hard to grasp how capable it is in dealing with other challenges.

The EU Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2013 opened the pathway to full membership for the Balkan countries. All have committed to both EU and NATO integration (except, of course, the moment, Serbia when it comes to NATO). Only Croatia has made it into both NATO and the EU; the others are moving toward the goal, some clearly with great difficulty – in particular Macedonia (largely due to its dispute with Greece over its name) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro, Serbia and Albania have adhered candidate status and the third two are already negotiating their entry. The challenges in the region are undoubtedly grave; very low economic growth, high unemployment rates and the stagnation or decline of living standards coupled with a continuing brain drain and widespread irregular migration. However, we will not return to the Western Balkans. The conflict in the 1990s, which caused 70,000 deaths, 500,000,000 people to leave their homes and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is much too present in the minds of the political leaders and the electorate that suffered and paid such a huge price. No one wants to revisit such times, no matter how domestic, political rhetoric may sound. From the migrant crisis will not lead to war, though it can cause considerable tension and create further obstacles to the integration process. In fact, compared to other parts of the world, the Balkans can be seen as a case of peace. And there is a reason for this: the essence of the European Union and its enlargement policies. This leads to a second observation. From understanding the current crisis, the soft power of the EU is alive and well in the Western Balkans. The Belgrade-Pristina agreement signed by the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo under the aegis of the EU High Representative of the Union, Catherine Ashton in 2013, and now carried forward by her successor, Federica Mogherini, testifies to the beneficial and soothing effects of the EU’s soft power in the region. Germany’s initiative in the Mediterranean and its further obstacles to the integration process. In fact, compared to other parts of the world, the Balkans can be seen as a case of peace. And there is a reason for this: the essence of the European Union and its enlargement policies. This leads to a second observation. From understanding the current crisis, the soft power of the EU is alive and well in the Western Balkans. The Belgrade-Pristina agreement signed by the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo under the aegis of the EU High Representative of the Union, Catherine Ashton in 2013, and now carried forward by her successor, Federica Mogherini, testifies to the beneficial and soothing effects of the EU’s soft power in the region. Germany’s initiative in the Mediterranean and its enlargement policies have been trying to drive a wedge in the region. The two-day visit to Serbia last November by the NATO secretary general was a notable event. Moscow’s new assertiveness was demonstrated by its actions in Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty have been a serious cause of concern. Moscow has been trying to drive a wedge in the region between those who are opposed to an EU and NATO enlargement and those who see their future as lying firmly with the EU and NATO. Russia’s key relationship with the region is based on its energy and gas exports. The migration crisis has shown that, for all intents and purposes, the Western Balkans are a de facto member of the EU and more broadly of the Euro-Atlantic arena. The migrants enter the EU through Serbia, Kosovo, then pass through Montenegro to Albania and into another EU member state, Croatia. No concrete solution is possible without the full involvement of these countries.

War should never have occurred in Europe at the end of the 20th century. It did – and Yugoslavia disappeared in a self-inflicted, violent conflict that would ultimately result in its division into seven countries. The region of the Western Balkans and its citizens must find a de facto member of the EU and NATO. That is much too present in the minds of the political leaders and the electorate that suffered and paid such a huge price. No one wants to revisit such times, no matter how domestic, political rhetoric may sound. From the migrant crisis will not lead to war, though it can cause considerable tension and create further obstacles to the integration process. In fact, compared to other parts of the world, the Balkans can be seen as a case of peace. And there is a reason for this: the essence of the European Union and its enlargement policies. This leads to a second observation. From understanding the current crisis, the soft power of the EU is alive and well in the Western Balkans. The Belgrade-Pristina agreement signed by the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo under the aegis of the EU High Representative of the Union, Catherine Ashton in 2013, and now carried forward by her successor, Federica Mogherini, testifies to the beneficial and soothing effects of the EU’s soft power in the region. Germany’s initiative in the Mediterranean and its enlargement policies have been trying to drive a wedge in the region. The two-day visit to Serbia last November by the NATO secretary general was a notable event. Moscow’s new assertiveness was demonstrated by its actions in Ukraine. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its violations of Ukraine’s sovereignty have been a serious cause of concern. Moscow has been trying to drive a wedge in the region between those who are opposed to an EU and NATO enlargement and those who see their future as lying firmly with the EU and NATO. Russia’s key relationship with the region is based on its energy and gas exports. The migration crisis has shown that, for all intents and purposes, the Western Balkans are a de facto member of the EU and more broadly of the Euro-Atlantic arena. The migrants enter the EU through Serbia, Kosovo, then pass through Montenegro to Albania and into another EU member state, Croatia. No concrete solution is possible without the full involvement of these countries. The region of the Western Balkans and its citizens must find an accelerated path into the EU while respecting all its rigorous criteria for membership.

Ivan Vejvoda is senior vice president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Terrorists of our own creation

Why we need a new strategy to destroy IS | By Elmar Thevesen

How we know a dose of new realism in our responses to terrorism? Until we acknowledge our own complicity in nurturing the very reality that terrorist organizations exploit and continue to thrive, we will failing to successfully contain and defeat the Islamic movement, which attracts thousands of young people from across Europe and has repeatedly struck fear into the hearts of societies across our continent. Nonetheless, we are still struggling to realize the right measures to stop it.

We must admit that our approach since the devastation of Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington has failed. Largely due to our failure to understand the ideology and principles that fuel or openly promote propaganda disseminated by terrorist leaders. Among many examples is an audio message by Osama bin Laden urging young Muslims in the West to become “tigers of the fight” and “heroes of the blood” to ignite the fires of global terrorism could have been extinguished.

It should come as no surprise that young adolescents are the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) leaders to the underprivileged in our societies, coming from criminal backgrounds, dysfunctional families and socially deprived neighborhoods, mostly in big cities. This is not to say that Muslim students, intellectuals, doctors and lawyers who have joined the jihad are being swayed by Syria and Iraq.

But they, too, are starting to become vanguards of a perceived justice. They are drawn by the endless stream of videos showing some atrocities that instil a feeling of powerlessness in both the intellectuals and the underprivileged, for whom IS provides a sense of power, belonging and self-worth that are unable to experience in Western societies.

This must be addressed – urgently. IS is not only using socio-economic appeals to draw fighters into the war in Syria and Iraq, but also to pass new forms in different parts of the world, especially Europe. The continuous flow of lone-wolf-type and single-cell attacks over the past two years is an indication of what to expect next. A magazine for substitute action has been widely published on the Internet and, according to German investigators, enthusiastically read and disseminated by young Muslims in European countries.

“Muslim Gangs. The Future of Muslims in the West” – the first ebook in the Black Flag series – calls for the creation of on-the-ground groups to promote jihad and establish no-go zones in bigger cities. According to the authors, the increasing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims will fuel the first-stage movement: “The non-Nins are already trying to win over politicians, and influence people in society to their anti-Islamic cause. This division will become more clear in the coming years when more and more far-right political groupings (with Neo-Nazi thugs as their subordinates) will emerge and become more active in Europe.

This strategy is still far from over; it has been known for some time. The prestigious IS propaganda machine has its divisions and their enemies lends their lives to win over politicians, and influence people in society to their anti-Islamic cause. This division will become more clear in the coming years when more and more far-right political groupings (with Neo-Nazi thugs as their subordinates) will emerge and become more active in Europe. This weak argument that IS is bolstered by our failure to recognize the injustices of our world. This weak argument is bolstered by our failure to recognize the injustices of our world. This weak argument is bolstered by our failure to recognize the injustices of our world. This weak argument is bolstered by our failure to recognize the injustices of our world. This weak argument is bolstered by our failure to recognize the injustices of our world.

As a result of disrespect for the rule of law. The fact of hundreds of thousands of refugees arriving in Europe, the far-right political groupings (with Neo-Nazi thugs as their subordinates) will emerge and become more active in Europe.

The IS propaganda machine has its divisions and their enemies lends their lives to win over politicians, and influence people in society to their anti-Islamic cause. This division will become more clear in the coming years when more and more far-right political groupings (with Neo-Nazi thugs as their subordinates) will emerge and become more active in Europe.

And ‘you will attack Rome, and South with its missiles and ships. The self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is pursuing the same goals as Osama bin Laden. And ‘you will attack Rome, and South with its missiles and ships. The self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is pursuing the same goals as Osama bin Laden.

So, how do we counter all that? Let’s put up a real fight, hedieh. Let’s do our best and follow through the strategy IS is pursuing with this warmanship: to win   

We must set up guideposts, giving hope. This sounds idealistic? But they, too, are striving to become vanguards of a perceived justice. They are drawn by the endless stream of videos showing some atrocities that instil a feeling of powerlessness in both the intellectuals and the underprivileged, for whom IS provides a sense of power, belonging and self-worth that are unable to experience in Western societies.

This must be addressed – urgently. IS is not only using socio-economic appeals to draw fighters into the war in Syria and Iraq, but also to pass new forms in different parts of the world, especially Europe. The continuous flow of lone-wolf-type and single-cell attacks over the past two years is an indication of what to expect next. A magazine for substitute action has been widely published on the Internet and, according to German investigators, enthusiastically read and disseminated by young Muslims in European countries.

“Muslim Gangs. The Future of Muslims in the West” – the first ebook in the Black Flag series – calls for the creation of on-the-ground groups to promote jihad and establish no-go zones in bigger cities. According to the authors, the increasing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims will fuel the first-stage movement: “The non-Nins are already trying to win over politicians, and influence people in society to their anti-Islamic cause. This division will become more clear in the coming years when more and more far-right political groupings (with Neo-Nazi thugs as their subordinates) will emerge and become more active in Europe.

This strategy is still far from over; it has been known for some time. The prestigious IS propaganda machine has its divisions and their enemies lends their lives to win over politicians, and influence people in society to their anti-Islamic cause. This division will become more clear in the coming years when more and more far-right political groupings (with Neo-Nazi thugs as their subordinates) will emerge and become more active in Europe.

And ‘you will attack Rome, and South with its missiles and ships. The self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is pursuing the same goals as Osama bin Laden.
The Internet is many things, but fundamentally it is a different kind of medium. It is the connection between us, but it is also the means to new technology and new applications. If the existing protocols are insufficient, developers are free to create new ones. For example, the World Wide Web and its technical protocols arrived 20 years after the Internet's initial design and ten years after the Internet was commercialized. Over the course of 33 years, operators of the Internet, governments, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and mass media have built a billion-dollar ecosystem of devices and people around the world. The Internet ecosystem grew even stronger this year, with more than 3 billion people using it.
INVENTOR OF CRUISES SINCE 1891

When HAPAG director Albert Ballin put to sea in 1891 with the Augusta Victoria, he invented a completely new form of travel: the cruise. This pioneering spirit characterises us to this day. It’s how we were able to reinvent the cruise in 2013 – with the MS EUROPA 2 recognised as the best ship in its class. 125 years of cruises – become a part of the history: www.since-1891.com/times